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TO BILL FREIVOGEL 
My lazvyer, if I should 
ever need one 
To "capture" a word such as democracy-that 
is, a word which has favorable emotive proper-
ties-is per se to assure oneself of a formidable 
position of strength. And to "surrender" to a 
word with negative associations-to accept for 
instance the term ideology as the proper label 
for all that we say in political matters-is in 
itself to start off with a handicap. 
Giovanni Sartori, 
Democratic Theory 
Natural man, whether simpleton or scientist, 
knows no more of the linguistic forces that bear 
upon him than the savage knows of gravita-
tional forces. 
Benjamin Whorf, 
Language, Thought, and Reality 
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Introduction 
Daniel Schorr 
In the aftermath of President Reagan's landslide 
reelection, I became involved in a spirited exchange of corre-
spondence with a television viewer because I had allowed to go 
unchallenged a reference to the president as a "lame duck" by a 
participant in my program. The writer asked me to apologize for 
this unwarranted slur against a popular president. My explana-
tion that "lame duck" was an unpejorptive description of an 
officeholder who could not be reelected produced another angry 
letter citing a Webster dictionary definition of "lame duck" as an 
official serving out the remainder of a term after having been de-
feated. I was rescued by William Safire's Political Dictionary, a 
manual of "the new language of politics," providing a more cur-
rent definition of "lame duck" as "an office-holder whose power 
is diminished because he is soon to leave office, as a result of de-
feat or statutory limitation" (italics very much mine). 
This was an example of how the usage of words changes and 
how much passion can be generated by how they are used in 
politics. Indeed, words in politics are like emblen1s in wars and 
revolutions-to be flown, shot at, and sometimes captured. 
Word wars are not incidental but are central to political strife-
especially as amplified in this era by the great megaphone of 
television. 
As Democrats have appropriated the word "fair" (as in Fair 
Deal), so Republicans have laid siege to "free" (as in "free en-
terprise"). The word "new" is contested, the Democrats hav-
ing produced the New Deal of FDR days and the Republicans 
counterattacking with New Federalism and, more recently, New 
Opportunity. 
No word has been flown more proudly, disputed more hotly 
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and, finally, battered more decisively than "liberal." Its original 
association with the simple word "free" (Latin liber) became lost 
in antiquity as it became weighted with changing symbolism on 
its voyage through time and across the ocean from Europe. As 
might be expected, "liberal" carried a white-hat connotation 
during the long generations when liberals dominated the politi-
cal scene. When the conservatives finally swept in from the wil-
derness and stormed the bastions of government, they swiftly 
attached black-hat connotations to the word. (My mail indicates 
that to call the news media "liberal" has become an accusation, 
needing no further detailed indictment.) 
It is fascinating to look back on the vital role that liberalism has 
played in· history. No single word, other than more general 
expressions like "rights," "freedom," and "justice," has played 
a more important role in America's political development. By 
telling us what has happened to a word, Ronald Rotunda has 
illuminated what has happened to America. It is done with me-
ticulous regard for historical scholarship. Some day liberalism 
may make a comeback, but for now this book will serve as its 
epitaph. 
The Politics of Language 
Symbols in Politics and Law 
Introduction 
The ancients knew the importance of words. 
Genesis tells us that after the Lord "fashioned all the wild beasts 
and all the birds of heaven," the first order of priority was 'to 
bring them to Adam, "to see what he would call them; each one 
was to bear the name the man would give it. The man gave 
names to all the cattle, all the birds of heaven, and all the wild 
beasts." Naming things is important business. 
This book is about naming things-about symbols and labels, 
the importance of words, their power to manipulate, and why 
people fight over them. In particular, it is a study of a specific 
word, "liberal." 
The liberal label has been a very significant symbol in modern 
American political and legal history. And for most of this mod-
ern period, when we have spoken of liberal judges, the Ameri-
can liberal tradition, and liberal politicians, the adjective has 
had favorable connotations. In fact, the late Senator Robert Taft, 
as recently as 1950, argued that he was really liberal; he rejected 
the conservative tag in favor of the word that then had more 
favorable connotations. 
In the 198os liberalism seems to be in disarray, and many poli-
ticians who formerly embraced the liberal label now want to 
unpeel the tag. In 1964, when Barry Goldwater, an avowedly 
conservative Republican candidate, ran against a self-described 
liberal candidate, President Lyndon Johnson and his Great So-
ciety won a stunning victory. Yet only two decades later, the un-
abashedly conservative Ronald Reagan won an equally stunning 
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reelection victory against the candidate of the liberals, Walter F. 
Mondale. 
Much had changed in twenty years. Actually, more had 
changed than many people realize, for it is not generally remem-
bered that "liberalism" is a relatively new term in American poli-
tics. The British liberals go back many years, but when the Brit-
ish Liberal party was in the ascendency in the early part of this 
century, there were no American politicians who called them-
selves liberal. Not until Franklin D. Roosevelt battled Herbert 
Hoover did the liberal label become important in the American 
lexicon; then both Hoover and Roosevelt claimed to be the true 
liberals, and the fight over the label dominated intellectual de-
bate for much of the New Deal. Each politician sensed the favor-
able connotations of the word, and each tried to capture it. 
Roosevelt won, and since then the word has been used to 
describe such diverse groups as certain types of politicians, 
judges, and theologians. 
The fascinating story of the rise and decline of the liberal label 
is not just a study in intellectual history; it is also a story of the 
importance of the use of symbols generally-how they reflect 
and mold the way we think and act. And it is the story of the 
limits on the power and use of symbols. 
The Importance of Symbols 
The "symbols of government" 1 are of funda-
mental importance in the study of politics and law. Perhaps 
because we have passed 1984 unscathed, we often ignore the 
significance of George Orwell's Newspeak. But governments 
know better. For example, in the large ancient governments-
Alexander's empire, the Seleucids' monarchy, and the Roman 
empire-political, legal, and religious symbols generated loy-
alty. Sheldin Wolin has observed that "the use of symbolism was 
particularly important because it showed how valuable symbols 
can be in bridging vast distances. They serve to evoke the pres-
ence of authority despite the physical reality being far removed." 2 
In the Middle Ages as well, leaders turned to symbols, some-
times ancient ones, to justify their rule. 3 
Symbols in Politics and Law · 5 
Symbols are still useful for generating loyalty in more modern 
governments. Professor Murray Edelman has astutely noted that 
"the most conspicuously democratic institutions are largely 
symbolic and expressive in function." 4 The English historian 
Walter Bagehot dem.onstrated how important the symbols of the 
monarch and the constitution are for the British. Justice Frank-
furter recognized that the state must use symbols to inculcate in-
dispensable feelings toward government because "symbolism is 
inescapable. Even the most sophisticated live by symbols." 5 
A symbol can carry great significance for an individual. That 
symbol becomes particularly significant whenever it has spe-
cial meaning for a large number of people. Although there are 
those who belittle argument over mere words, one should real-
ize that words are seldom innocuous, for they are our primary 
form of communication. Crucial concepts often lie in shades of 
meaning. 
The disagreement in the late 196os over the phrase "black 
power" was, in many respects, an argument over definition. In 
one Senate subcommittee hearing, for example, Senator Abra-
ham Ribicoff warned Floyd McKissick, head of CORE and a black 
power advocate, "You make our job very hard when you put us 
up against such a slogan." McKissick replied that the slogan 
would not be changed. Senator Robert Kennedy then argued 
that "if people can't meet your definition, you read them out." 
McKissick retorted that he was not throwing anyone out of the 
movement and that he believed "black power" would be ac-
cepted just as "Irish power" had been accepted. 6 Two little words 
and what they represented split the civil-rights movement for a 
time, creating increased advocacy in some quarters and making 
new enemies out of former friends in others. 
Symbols also enable leaders to give the appearance of action. It 
is very advantageous for leaders, especially in our democratic 
society, to be able at least to appear to be taking action. People 
like to think that something is being done about their problems; 
for short-range popularity it does not make much difference if 
something is actually done. Much of the history of antitrust leg-
islation provides a beautiful example of the power of symbols to 
substitute for substance. 
In 1890, under popular pressure, Congress passed a vague law 
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against monopolies. The purpose of this Sherman Antitrust Act, 
a senator at that time said, was to pass "some bill headed: 'A bill 
to Punish Trusts' with which to go to the country." 7 Later, in 
1914, Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act, hailed as "La-
bor's Magna Carta" by Samuel Gompers, since he thought the 
bill exempted labor from antitrust laws. In fact the Clayton Act, 
for much of its history, was used more effectively against labor 
than against capital. 8 Thurmond Arnold, in The Folklore of Capi-
talism, saw very clearly that symbolic legislation against the 
trusts convinced the average citizen that action had been taken. 
It did not matter that for the first forty years of this century the 
laws had few teeth in them, that the controls that existed were 
often not used, and that the courts generally interpreted laws to 
favor the trusts whenever possible. Average people were not 
apathetic toward the problem; they honestly thought that this 
problem was solved. 9 
Yet another reason why symbols of government are important 
is that they reflect people's ideas, their perceptions of the world, 
and sometimes their innermost thoughts. Keith Baird, for ex-
ample, a Barbados-born high school teacher from Brooklyn, re-
vealed his perception of the civil-rights struggle through his use 
of symbols. When Baird introduced a resolution at the national 
meeting of the American Federation of Teachers in 1966 urging a 
campaign to substitute the term "Afro-American" for "Negro," 
he showed clearly his perception of the civil rights movement; 
he argued that "it was high time that Negroes moved up to hy-
phenated status such as the Italian-Americans and other minor-
ity groups." "Negro" to him had historically been used" 'solely 
to describe the enslaved and the enslavable."' 10 
Historically there was nothing inherently distasteful about the 
word "Negro." It had no pejorative connotations. Neither is it 
generally recognized that there is a high status in being a hy-
phenated American. Further, if Negroes had been called Afro-
Americans for two hundred years, Baird might well be arguing 
today that we should substitute the word "Negro." Baird's reso-
lution, however, did reveal his attitudes toward civil rights and 
his profound disturbance by all aspects of racism and bigotry. 
And so today, because of the urgings of modern civil rights lead-
ers, "Negro" is typically replaced by the term "black." 
Symbols in Politics and Law · 7 
George Kennan, in trying to determine the perception of 
Asians toward the world, depended on an analysis of their po-
litical symbols. His conclusion-that Asians are less fearful of 
communism than we would like them to be-is founded on two 
arguments. First, he says, "the power of these various semantic 
symbols [communism, imperialism, and colonialism] is entirely 
different in Asia than it is in Europe." The Asians fear imperial-
ism and colonialism, which they have fought against for two 
hundred years, more than they fear communism. Second, 
Asians are not conscious of losing "freedom" under commu-
nism. There is no freedom as we know it in many Asian and Af-
rican countries today. The "Chinese language has only one word 
which remotely resembles our word 'freedom,' and that conveys 
the sense of license and rather turbulent indiscipline." 11 
It is no wonder that Lasswell wrote, "It is apparent that change 
in the spread and frequency of exposure to key signs is an ex-
ceedingly significant indicator of important social processes. We 
can follow the dissemination of secular or sacred cults by survey-
ing trends in the geographical distribution of icons and other 
significant signs found in the whole complex. Similarly, we can 
establish the presumption of integrative or disintegrative trends 
within any society by observing sign frequencies." 12 
Although symbols are significant because people instinctively 
believe that they are important, because they can substitute for 
political action, and because they reflect people's innermost 
thoughts and ideas, symbols are also important because they de-
termine the very way people think. Symbols not only reflect; 
they mold. 
As trial lawyer$ have known for years, how a person asks a 
question can predetermine the answer he or she receives.13 Ap-
propriate words and symbols can determine not only the answer 
to a question, but also the way people think and the way they are 
able to ask their questions. For example, at the Unification Con-
gress of July-August 1903, V. I. Lenin was able to adopt a new 
name for his caucus. Out of dissatisfaction with the proceedings 
the Bund withdrew, leaving Lenin with a small majority. The 
name Lenin adopted then was Bolshinstvo ("Majority") or Bolshe-
viki ("Majorityites"). 
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Though but yesterday . . . he had been in a minority, and, 
more often than not would be in the minority in the future, 
he would never relinquish the psychological advantage of that 
name. A name, he knew, was a program, a distilled essence, 
more powerful in its impact upon the untutored mind than 
any propaganda slogan. What pride it could give to his cau-
cus. No matter how it might dwindle, always to call itself 
"Majorityites." What conviction, what an air of legality, of 
democratic majority sanction, it would give in appealing to 
the rank and file and the non-party masses. If he had re-
mained in a minority, he would have chosen some other 
banner name-like "True Iskrists" or "Orthodox Marxists" 
or "Revolutionary Wing of the Russian Social Democracy." 
But it is characteristic of the ineptness of his opponents that 
they permanently accepted the designation of Mensheviki 
(Minorityites) for their group [emphasis added]. 14 
In Russia, as in the United States, it is important to join the 
"bandwagon" or the "wave of the future." Lenin, by preempting 
the label Majorityites, determined the perceptions of his audi-
ence so that they thought of Lenin's caucus as having majority 
sanction. 
It was no accident that during the Vietnam War, the admin-
istration labeled American bombing raids into North Vietnam 
"protective retaliation" raids. A verb such as "to protect" has 
more favorable connotations than the more blunt, "to bomb." 
The introduction of United States troops into Laos was an "in-
cursion," a much more limiting-sounding word than the tradi-
tional term "invasion." A retreat became a "mobile maneuver," 
and thus lost some of the implications of defeat. As the term 
"military advisors" began to acquire negative connotations, the 
imagemakers relabeled them "delivery team auditors." 15 To mur-
der an enemy spy became the more antiseptic-sounding, "toter-
minate with extreme prejudice." And defoliation was called the 
more neutral "resources control program." 16 In 1968 the Army 
Digest, quoting the Judge Advocate General's Office, insisted that 
the fighting in Vietnam was an "international armed conflict," 
not a war. 17 
More recently the opponents of sex discrimination have recog-
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nized that in order to change people's attitudes toward women 
and their roles, it is necessary to change the words used: the 
head of a committee is the "chairperson"; the secretary is no 
longer a "girl." At first the change in words may be only symp-
tomatic of the new attitudes toward sex discrimination. But the 
purpose of the verbal play is to affect future attitudes toward sex-
ual stereotyping. 
Modern linguistic research supports this theory: language in 
general and symbols in particular mold the manner in which 
people think. People think and talk by using words, and even 
when they think without using words but by using "ideas," lan-
guage still structures their thoughts. Benjamin Whorf, after 
studying the language patterns of Hopi (an American Indian 
tongue) and some modern European languages-mainly En-
glish, French, and German-concluded that even very abstract 
concepts like "time" and "matter" are "not given in substantially 
the same form by experience to all men but depend on the 
nature of the language or languages through which they have 
been developed." 18 Another linguist, Edward Sapir, makes es-
sentially the same observation: "Though language is not or-
dinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of 
social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about so-
cial problems and processes." 19 
The Importance of the Symbol"Liberal" 
Though all widespread symbols are important, 
certain symbols, at various times, carry particular significance. 
In fact, much of United States political history can be interpreted 
as a rivalry for the possession of certain words. In the early days 
of our Republic, the Hamiltonians-those in favor of a strong 
national government-called themselves Federalists, though at 
that time "federation" meant what "confederation" means today. 
The "true federalists" found themselves at a tactical disadvan-
tage : they were in the position of arguing against federalism be-
cause they had accepted the label Anti-Federalist. 20 
Shortly after 18oo the value of the federal symbol declined. 
The decline occurred partly because the debate was over; the fed-
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eral Constitution had been adopted, and few people advocated 
its repeal. The term also lost value because it acquired bad con-
notations: the rigidity of the Federalist party associated its in-
flexibility with the term "federalist." 
"Democracy" then became a useful symbol, because the next 
issue on the agenda was the question of democracy. For ex-
ample, in the post-Civil War Gilded Age, some argued that in a 
true democracy the government, not big business, should make 
the basic economic decisions, while the proponents of laissez 
faire contended that their economic doctrines represented true 
democracy. 21 Since virtually everyone in the United States now 
believes in democracy and all Republicans and Democrats are 
recognized to be true democrats, there is no longer any political 
advantage in proclaiming oneself a democrat. 
While democracy is no longer the basis for rivalry in this coun-
try, in the outside world democracy is not universally a matter of 
faith. There, this word, together with socialism, communism, 
and liberalism, "are the labels which sum up the basic terms of 
the political contest of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," 
states Giovanni Sartori. 22 In the United States, however, democ-
racy offers its holders no great advantage, since everyone holds 
it. Socialism and communism are derogatory labels here, falling 
as they do outside the American tradition. 23 The only modern 
label of world importance that has also been important in this 
country is liberal or liberalism. 
As a case study, the word "liberal" represents an important 
symbol to illustrate the use of political symbols and their rise 
and decline, because it is a peculiarly powerful word. Although 
liberalism has no precise meaning in this country, whenever 
people have tried to give it meaning they have often included 
themselves in the definition, or in the "true definition" 24-at 
least until very recently, when "conservative" has become a 
much more fashionable word. 25 Whatever its meaning, no one 
wants to be considered illiberal in the United States. Adam Ulam 
.claimed that everyone "in the West who is not a self-declared fas-
cist lays claim to being a liberal of sorts and programs ranging 
from extreme conservatism to communism are advocated in the 
name of 'liberalism."' 26 Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
and Robert Taft, among many others, have all strongly claimed 
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that they were liberals. 27 Hoover and Taft were as positive that 
the New Deal did not represent liberalism as Roosevelt was cer-
tain that it did. Even as the term "conservative" has become 
more popular, with. "liberal" in the decline, the new conser-
vatives often call themselves libertarians. 
Such respect for the power of this political symbol makes itself 
clear "in the qualifying adjectives which those who attack 'liber-
als' usually take the trouble to use," says Charles Frankel. 28 Even 
in 1958, when President Eisenhower was campaigning for the 
very conservative William Knowland of California, Ike attacked 
the "self-styled liberals . . . [with] the irresistible impulse . . . to 
squander money-your money" (emphasis added). 29 Only the 
self-styled liberals are under attack; the true liberals are, by im-
plication, fine people. One commentator has elaborated on this 
peculiar American habit of attacking only qualified liberals. 
Southern Senators who are proud to be known as conser-
vatives normally train their guns not on "liberals" but on 
"Northern liberals." And they not infrequently add that 
they are themselves as liberal as the next man in matters 
of foreign policy or social welfare. Even the late Senator 
McCarthy handled the word gingerly. His memorably modu-
lated remarks were usually studded with the phrase nphony 
liberals." This carried the convenient suggestion, to be sure, 
that all liberals were phonies. But it also left the inference 
open that he had nothing against genuine liberals, if he 
could only find any. 30 
Of course, the fact that "liberal" is a favorable political symbol in 
the United States does not mean that a person is at an advantage 
being labeled too liberal. For example, Spiro Agnew, while vice-
president, attacked the "radical liberals." 31 Extremism is a vice 
and not a virtue for most Americans. But the unqualified symbol 
"liberal" is recognized by many politicians to have some political 
drawing power. 
When we look at public opinion polls of the middle 196os, 
when the liberal label was very popular, we can see that poli-
ticians were correct about the drawing power of liberalism. In 
one poll of the 20,546 students enrolled on the campus of Michi-
gan State University, 42 percent declared themselves to be Demo-
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crats or leaning in that direction, and 51 percent said they were 
Republicans or leaning in that direction. Although this. sch~ol, 
which is supposed to be a typical large midwestern uniVersity, 
was more Republican than Democratic, 53 percent of the stu-
dents declared themselves to be very or moderately liberal. 32 
Candidates who emphasize that they are liberal would have 
more drawing power than those who try to draw merely Demo-
cratic votes. 
An even earlier poll also demonstrated the drawing power of 
the liberal symbol. After following area-sampling procedures; 
interviewing 3,o68 respondents in California, Illinois, and New 
Mexico; considering only voting data for the 1944, 1946, and 1948 
elections; and allowing voters to classify themselves as libera~ or 
conservative, the pollsters concluded, "Liberali~m-conserv~hsm 
suggest at least a partial explanation of non-vohng and ~f dissat-
isfaction of respondents from their favored party. Thus It can be 
inferred from our data that the liberal Republican and the con-
servative Democrat did not feel as much at home in their respec-
tive parties as did conservative Republicans and liberal Demo-
crats, and they expressed their divergence by a smaller turno~t 
at the polls and by voting less often for the candidates of theu 
favored party."33 • • 
These two older polls show another important pmnt, besides 
the former drawing power of the liberal symbol: in spite of 
the fact that many politicians of different beliefs claimed that 
they were liberal, the average person, at least since. 19~4, gener-
ally agrees as to who is liberal. When the 1962 Michi?a~ Stat~ 
University Poll asked an open-ended question-who IS hberal. 
who is conservative?-64 percent of the students picked Barry 
Goldwater as a known conservative and 62 percent spontane-
ously said that John F. Kennedy was a known liberal. 34 The se.c-
ond poll, based on the elections of the late 1940s, stated t~at In 
general those people who considered the~selves conservative-
whether they were Democrats or Repubhcans-thought. the Re-
publican party to be more their home than ~he Democratic party; 
those who considered themselves to be hberal felt the Demo-
cratic party to be more their home. These findings are especially 
important when we remember that the symbol "liberal" has to 
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operate often as a cross-pressure against the very significant fac-
tor of party identification. 
A Case Study in the Use of the 
Liberal Label 
That most people now agree that Herbert 
Hoover was not a liberal does not explain why he honestly called 
himself a liberal until his death. And, even if we grant that 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was a recognized liberal of the New Deal 
days, what about other important figures of the New Deal? Were 
they liberal? Is Walter Lippmann a liberal? Is Governor LaFollette 
a liberal? Is Justice Black a liberal? Max Lerner says that we ask 
these questions with "desperate amusement" because all these 
men share in the liberal heritage and yet have important differ-
ences among themselves. 35 Alan P. Grimes, after considering the 
very different men who have called themselves liberal, asks, 
"Must we then despair of definition? Is a liberal nothing more 
than any man who calls himself one? Or is called one?" 36 Grimes 
answers "no" to this question and then tries to classify the con-
cepts that form his definition of liberalism. Any such definition, 
however, is by its nature normative and not descriptive; such a 
definition excludes many people who claim to be liberal and 
have convinced others that they are liberal. 
For the purpose of this case study, I will use a very descrip-
tive, functional, and operational definition: a person is a liberal 
who can convince other people that he or she is a liberal. Given 
this definition, which does not arbitrarily exclude anyone from 
being labeled liberal, the immediate question one should ask is 
why Roosevelt came to be identified as a liberal and Hoover did 
not. Both were self-declared liberals. Given that both Hoover 
and Roosevelt honestly considered themselves to be liberal, and 
that "liberal" is a potent political symbol with which many poli-
ticians have wanted to identify, why is there now a general con-
sensus that Hoover was no liberal? Why was it that Hoover was 
so unsuccessful in capturing this word? 
An immediate answer to such questions would probably 
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assume that usage in the United States of the political symbol 
"liberal" has generally followed British usage. Given this as-
sumption, one could explain that British liberalism has, over the 
years, changed its meaning, especially with L. T. Hobhouse's for-
mulation of a new liberalism in 1911. 37 This new British liberal-
ism tried to establish a middle course between socialism and clas-
sical liberalism. The new British welfare liberals, says Thomas P. 
Neill, "insisted against the socialists that wealth was produced 
by individual initiative, and they insisted against the individual-
ists that the site value of real property depended almost entirely 
on the community, that the right of ownership to even personal 
property was meaningless without social approval and mainte-
nance." 38 In line with this new liberalism, Winston Churchill, 
while a member of the Liberal party, argued in 1908 that he 
"should like to see the state undertaking new functions, step-
ping forward into new spheres of activity, particularly in ser-
vices which are in the nature of monopolies." 39 These new En-
glish liberals still believed in liberty, but they also believed that 
the right to a living wage was as important a liberty as the right 
to property and personalliberty. 40 Further, they believed that the 
state could pass laws to ensure the former without denying the 
latter liberty. 41 
Given this background, Herbert Hoover would have had to 
overthrow a generation of opinion to persuade people to accept 
his nineteenth-century laissez-faire definition of liberalism. 
Hence, it was to be expected that he would fail to capture this 
favorable political label. 
However, this immediate answer makes a very important but 
incorrect assumption: that the United States had followed En-
glish use of the political symbol"liberal"; that for thirty years the 
great majority of Americans knew what "liberal" meant; and that 
therefore Hoover and his conservative contemporaries tried to 
steal this important symbol of the New Deal. Yet all available evi-
dence suggests that "liberal" was not an important political sym-
bol in the United States until the 1930s. This is not to say that 
"liberal" was never used before the New Deal; rather, it was not 
an important symbol before the New Deal. For the great majority 
of Americans, the word "liberal'' was literally born in the early 
New Deal. 
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The term "liberal" was not a favorite American political label of 
earlier eras. An examination of the political symbols used in some 
early political literature demonstrates this fact. Herbert Croly's 
book, The Promise of American Life, is certainly one of these 
books. It, was first published in November 1909 and was re-
printed in June 1910 and April 1911. Although at that time it 
did not sell more than 7,500 copies, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
states that "it had immediate and extensive influence on what 
historians have come to call the Progressive era." 42 To add to 
Croly's liberal credentials, I should also point out that he 
founded the New Republic. Yet, after analyzing the symbols used 
in The Promise, Samuel H. Beer concluded: "Only occasionally 
in this book ... he uses the term liberal or liberalism. No more 
frequently he used conservatism-but in a formula that op-
posed it to radicalism. The term with which he, like his hero 
Theodore Roosevelt, identified himself and his views, was, of 
course, 'progressivism.'" 43 
Croly's infrequent use of the term "liberal" is made even more 
dramatic if we briefly compare the Democratic Roosevelt's use of 
the term. In the first volume of Roosevelt's public papers, repre-
senting the years 1928 to 1932, there are no references to "liber-
alism" in the index. Yet a few years later we find that FOR titles 
Volume 7, representing the year 1938, The Continuing Struggle for 
Liberalism. 44 A dramatic shift had taken place in FOR's vocabu-
lary-a shift that was not foreseen in the political terminology of 
Croly's The Promise. 
In the pre-Croly era, in the eighteenth century, Beer observes 
that "generic terms-such as 'democratic' -are used in addition 
to party labels to designate important viewpoints. But 'liberal' is 
not among them." 45 One cannot argue that "liberal" was never 
used but rather that in quantitative terms this symbol was insig-
nificant. A review of political symbols in popular magazines 46 
and newspapers 47 also demonstrates that the increased use of 
the liberal label coincided with the New Deal. 
Some of the more important figures of the early New Deal also 
recall that it was during this period that the word "liberal" be-
came an important political symbol. Raymond Moley writes that 
on March 8, 1933, he prepared Roosevelt's message that went to 
Congress on March 10. In this speech Moley remembers using 
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the expression "liberal." 48 "The word 'liberal' in its present 
meaning was then only beginning to supplant the old word 'pro-
gressive."' 49 Arthur Krock of the New York Times, also a very po-
litically aware actor of the New Deal era, says that he agrees with 
Moley that around 1933 "liberalism" started to replace "progres-
sivism." 50 A very influential brain-truster, Rexford G. Tugwell, 
also remembers that "liberalism" emerged as an important 
political symbol in the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 51 
Tugwell, in fact, describes the New Deal as "a time of confusion, 
of trying to attain collectivistic organization under individu-
alistic labels." 52 
Not until the early 1930s did "liberal" become a very important 
political symbol. This symbol had been used before in American 
history, but never in any significant way. Then suddenly poli-
ticians, publicists, and articulate people in general began ex-
pressing themselves and thinking in terms of this new label. In 
the 1930s there was a great debate in America over whether 
Hoover or FDR properly owned the symbol. Even long after the 
New Deal, the very conservative John T. Flynn, refusing to admit 
defeat, pleaded in Hoover-like language for the Hoover-like ar-
gument that "the Communist, the fascist and the planner, who 
is really a fascist,· have reversed all this. [Previously, the central 
state was the enemy of liberalism.] They propose to make the 
State more powerful than ever with its arsenal of economic 
weapons. They call this the dream of liberalism. I say they have 
stolen a grand old word and are running amuck with their plundered 
property" (emphasis added). 53 
The symbol "liberal" is especially important for the New Deal 
period because, as it emerged, it seemed to represent something 
new. The new symbol implied new action. Second, the new 
symbol and the debate it caused reflected the intellectual turmoil 
of a nation trying to decide whether to accept or reject a new 
deal in politics. Third, this new symbol, unlike a geographical 
term, allowed people to think in terms of classes, not sections of 
the country-that is, to think in liberal-conservative terms and 
not in northern-southern terms. Finally, this symbol was espe-
cially important for people who lived at the time of the New Deal 
because they thought that the debate over who owned the new 
liberal label was an important debate. In fact, by 1936 the editors 
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of the New York Times, reflecting public concern, could write that 
the fight for the liberal label "is coming forward as an issue in the 
national campaign. Both New Deal and anti-administration 
spokesmen declare their devotion to the liberal ideal of freedom 
and democracy; both assail each other as opponents of true 
liberalism." 54 
We may grant that symbols are important; that the syml;>ol "lib-
eral" is especially important in the United States; and that by the 
end of the 1930s "liberal" had become a viable symbol used to 
identify New Deal programs. Yet the birth and maturation of the 
liberal label raises more difficult questions. How and why did 
this political symbol gain such wide usage in the United States in 
such a short period of time? Why did this symbol remain viable 
when others such as New Freedom, New Deal, Normalcy, and 
more recent ones such as Fair Deal and New Frontier are now 
anachronistic? Did FDR choose the symbol "liberal" to designate 
his programs? How consciously did he make this choice? If FDR 
did choose the symbol, why did he choose it and not some other 
symbol such as "progressive"? How was Roosevelt able to con-
vince the public that he, and not Hoover, was the "true liberal"? 
In the period during which both Hoover and Roosevelt claimed 
that they were each liberal, how confused was the public? And 
why, in more recent times, did the liberal label decline in impor-
tance, as more politicians unabashedly began to call themselves 
conservative? 
This study seeks to determine how and why this viable politi-
cal symbol emerged, what the public's attitude was toward it, and 
how powerful this symbol was at the time of the New Deal. Why 
did this symbol rise in importance, and why did it decline? After 
studying the British analogy, the American background until the 
debate of the 1930s, the great debate itself, and post-1940 atti-
tudes toward liberalism, we should be in a much better position 
to determine the answers to these questions. These conclusions 
should then enable us to understand the importance and useful-
ness, in the legal and political arenas, of symbols generally. 
The British Analogy 
The Emergence of Liberalism in England 
Giovanni Sartori correctly observes that "while 
the thing liberalism has been-according to Harold Laski, an un-
impeachable witness-the outstanding doctrine of the West for 
four centuries, the word is much more recent." 1 Liberalism was 
conceived in 1811 when a group of Spaniards proposed the adop-
tion of a new constitution based on the French constitution of 
1781, which in turn was based on the radical thought of les phi-
losophes. The proponents of this radical constitution called them-
selves Liberales, and because the origins of the Liberales were in 
the Enlightenment, their thought included anticlericalism as an 
essential ingredient from the very beginning. 2 
The Liberales became even more anticlerical in their debate over 
the new constitution with the monarchists and the clerical and 
lay supporters of the Catholic church; these opponents of the 
Liberales condemned the constitution as an unworkable docu-
ment based on false theological and philosophical assumptions. 3 
While the Spanish right wing was certainly not admirable, one 
could hardly consider these new Spanish Liberales paragons of 
virtue, either. Thomas P. Neill has called their philosophy "doc-
trinaire, as only the Spanish can be doctrinaire; arbitrary, and, 
paradoxically, quite illiberal." 4 
From Spain the term "liberal" traveled to Italy, appearing as 
liberalismo, and to France, as liberalisme, where it was used to de-
scribe certain local political beliefs. 5 It is important to realize that 
in each case the new label was being applied to beliefs that 
already existed. The term "liberalism" came after the thing liber-
alism had been born and-since the word followed the fact-
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there was no necessity for any ideological similarities in the 
different countries' use of the term. In some countries-for ex-
ample, Germany-"people began to speak of 'liberalism' when 
they had ceased, or were ceasing, to be liberal." 6 Although it 
turned out that liberalism in the Latin countries generally im-
plied anticlericalism, there was nothing in the label "liberal" that 
required this relationship to exist. In fact, although English lib-
eralism had some theological implications, it was not really anti-
clerical; its concerns were primarily economic and secondarily 
political. 7 
The manner in which the term "liberalism" took root in En-
gland from the Continent is especially instructive. From 1811 to 
1830 the term "liberalism" had been traveling around the Conti-
nent acquiring connotations of revolution, anticlericalism, ar-
bitrariness-in short, what Americans today would generally 
call extremism. Then, around 1830, the left wing of the Whig 
party combined with Radicals and businessmen to campaign for 
what was to become the Reform Bill of 1832, a proposal to extend 
the franchise to include the business class and to redistrict the 
country in order to give the growing industrial centers a fairer 
representation. 8 Macaulay called it "this second Bill of Rights, 
this Greatest Charter of the Liberties of England," but the land-
owners did not favor a second Magna Carta that would reduce 
the powers that they had obtained from the first one. 
It is difficult for us now-in an age where even the most totali-
tarian regimes pay lip service to democracy-to appreciate ex-
actly how worried the landed gentry really was. Their worry 
turned to outright fear when Daniel O'Connell suggested carry-
ing the proposed reform even further, to include a secret ballot 
and universal male suffrage. The Annual Register attacked his 
idea as being based on the "simple, but mad proposition, that 
every man who pays a tax, or is liable to serve in the militia, is 
entitled to have a voice in the representation." 9 The Annual Reg-
ister should not have been so frightened, because the left-wing 
Whigs and the businessmen believed that only the middle class 
with sufficient property should have the vote. However, under 
either the Reform Bill of 1832 or O'Connell's proposed amend-
ment to that reform, the landowners would lose considerable 
power, and they opposed the reform vehemently. 10 
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As one method of opposing the reform, the landed gentry 
and their representatives in Parliament, the Tories, decided to 
achieve what they thought would be the strategic advantage of 
calling their opponents "liberals," thereby (the Tories hoped) 
identifying them with the "un-English" revolutionaries of the 
Continent. 11 "Liberal" in England, then, was first applied with 
the intention of being a derogatory term. 
But "liberal" seemed to be a word with inherently good im-
plications. In England, since before 16oo, the adjective "liberal" 
has meant "free from prejudice or orthodox zeal." 12 "Liberal" 
implies "liberality" and "liberty"; all these words are derived 
from the same Latin word: liber, meaning "free." 
In another era, the Roman government had found liberalitas-
meaning "liberality" -a very good symbol to place on their 
coins as a method of winning and retaining political support 
from the people. 13 As Thomas P. Neill correctly observes, "'Lib-
erty' is a beautiful word in any language. Its connotations have 
always been appealing, noble, high-minded .... The adjective 
'liberal' imputes loftiness of view, concern with the things of the 
spirit, a respect for human decency. 'Illiberal,' on the other 
hand, is a word of ugly connotations. It implies smallness of 
soul, pettiness of outlook, selfishness of nature. Everyone, then, 
wants to be considered liberal in this sense."14 
"Liberal" was a particularly favorable symbol for the advanced 
Whigs because of the moment at which it was introduced. Over 
the entire Continent there was agitation for reform. The word 
captured this drift of modern history, for it implied liberty, re-
moval of restraint, and progress. 15 In nineteenth-century En-
gland, "liberal" was an advantageous word to use for political 
purposes. The advanced Whigs did exactly that; because the 
adjective "liberal" had such laudatory implications in England-
regardless of Continental ferment-they readily accepted the 
so-called un-English, foreign label "liberal." 16 
The opponents of the new liberal wing of the Whig party were 
at an obvious disadvantage. Not only did their plan to attach the 
term "liberal" to the advanced Whigs as a derogatory label back-
fire, but their own appellation, "Tory," was considered a re-
proachful designation at that time. Then J. W. Croker, in an ar-
ticle dated January 1, 1830, used a new label: "conservative." He 
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used this term in a political sense, meaning the maintenance of 
existing political and ecclesiastical institutions. Many Tories 
who had disapproved of old Tory reaction immediately began 
showing preference for the new term, "conservative." 17 
The new liberals thought that "conservative" was not as proper 
a word for their opponents as the pejorative "Tory," so at first the 
liberals ridiculed this new label. 18 However, at that time .there 
was a shift not only in party names but also in party principles. 
The liberal Whigs, fighting for the middle class rather than the 
farmers or laborers, began to draw support from many Tories 
who were manufacturers or members of the educated middle 
class. For a while there were three major groups in Parliament: 
the Tories, the Whigs, and the Liberals. "The traditional parlia-
mentary system seemed unable to admit by the side of the Whig 
and Tory parties a third not reducible to either," says Guido De 
Ruggiero. "But in time the more active and vital mentality of the 
free trade party drew the antiquated Liberalism of the Whigs 
into its own orbit and so restored the old two-party system, 
though giving its form a new content." 19 The old content was a 
contest between two parties, both of which were based on a 
single aristocratic tradition, and both of which were grounded in 
the same privileges of birth. The new content was politics based 
on class interest. 20 And so the new division in Parliament was no 
longer Whig/Tory but instead Liberal/Conservative. 21 
Because the new party names reflected a fundamental change 
in political substance, they proved durable. Since the new Liber-
als represented different policies and drew their support from 
the middle class-because, in short, they were not really Whigs-
it made sense for people to call them liberal. And since the new 
Conservatives were more than just Tories, this label also proved 
lasting, even though the Liberals argued that the new Conser-
vatives should continue to be called Tories. 
The Conservatives in England had lost the chance to be called 
liberal. Though they tried often to become associated with the 
word, 22 it became the name of a politically distinct party, the Lib-
eral party. Hence, in England the political label could have a 
fairly precise meaning; "liberal" was not so vague an appellation 
that many different people of different parties could attach them-
selves to it. 
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The Elements of English Liberalism 
and the Seeds of Change 
That "liberalism" was attached to one of En-
gland's two major parties and thus had a fairly specific political 
meaning did not imply that the definition of liberalism could not 
change. There were three basic elements of classical liberalism 
that contained within themselves the seeds of welfare liber-
alism: the Radical element, the economic element, and the reli-
gious element. 23 
The primary representative of Radical thought was Jeremy 
Bentham. Bentham was extremely efficient, extremely individu-
alistic, extremely rationalistic, and extremely cold. It was said of 
him that he "sinned against the imagination." Ruggiero states, 
"All law is to him an evil, because an infraction of the liberty of 
the individual; and, in general, every function of government is 
an evil." 24 
Bentham believed that society is in harmony when people act 
according to their self-interest. However, sometimes individuals 
do not follow their self-interest. Hence, government is justified in 
passing laws to prevent them from following a false self-interest 
and thus infringing on another's liberty. But there is no such 
thing as natural law; rather, all law is made by government and 
all law properly "draws its inspiration from the interest of the 
greatest number, as against a narrowly selfish interest falsely so 
called." 25 
Bentham's principle was readily adopted by the bourgeoisie, 
who used it against the selfishness of the landowning class. The 
manufacturers were not the only ones, however, who could use 
Bentham's principles. Although radicalism was in part a liberal, 
middle-class philosophy, in the sense that the self-interest prin-
ciple meant individualism and protection of individual liberties, 
radicalism could also be democratic, since the happiness of the 
greatest number was the justification of laws. Also within 
Bentham's philosophy was the seed of welfare and socialism: if 
the workers received the franchise, the state -in the name of the 
greatest-happiness principle and uninhibited by thoughts of 
natural property rights-could be very socialistic.26 
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We can more easily see the capacity for welfare liberalism and 
even socialism in Bentham's principles if we quickly turn to John 
Ruskin's Unto This Last, one of the most influential books for 
British politics at the turn of the century. According to John D. 
Rosenburg, "Clement Attlee, who became a socialist after read-
ing the works of Ruskin and William Morris, wrote that the 
modern Labour Party was born in 1906, when twenty-nine inde-
pendent Labourites were returned to the House of Commons; 
according to a questionnaire circulated among them, the book 
which most profoundly influenced their thoughts was Unto This 
Last." 27 Yet the same author who was so influential with the first 
members of England's great socialist party was able to argue con-
sistently that the political economy should strive for "the great-
est number of human beings noble and happy." 28 
The second major element of classical liberalism that had 
within it this germ of welfare liberalism was the philosophy of 
the Economists. The Economists were related to the Benthamite 
Radicals, but they were also descendants of Adam Smith. Smith's 
followers believed in homo oeconomicus but then kept him in a labo-
ratory. Economic Man was not sent "into the streets like a man of 
flesh and blood to make laws for his fellow men." 29 The second 
important distinction between the Radicals and the Economists 
was that these descendants of Adam Smith did not believe in 
natural harmony if all people would follow their self-interest. In-
stead they believed in inevitable conflict in society. 
Malthus voiced one aspect of this conflict in his Essay on Popu-
lation. A large population, he declared, is not always good. He 
thought that the increase in population was much faster than the 
proportional increase in production of food from land. The 
group responsible for the misery caused by the overproduction 
of people was the laboring class. He seemed to be saying to the 
workers, "Your ... lack of self-control has led you to multiply to 
the point of murderous mutual competition." 30 Ricardo took 
Malthus's argument one step further. His villain was not the pro-
letariat but the landowner. More land would have to be farmed 
as the population increased. Also, since some lands were more 
fertile than others, the more fertile lands would increase in value 
as the population grew. The few landowners who had the good 
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fortune to own these more fertile lands would become wealthy 
merely by waiting; such landowners would grow richer without 
working any harder. 
The industrial bourgeoisie used Ricardo's theory to show that 
not they but the landowners were the selfish members of society 
responsible for the workers' misery. Yet this argument of the 
business interests still had within it the seeds of welfare: if the 
land's value is created by society, then society should obviously 
own the land. Expropriate the villains! Says De Ruggiero, "The 
working man soon ... quoted Ricardo against Ricardo." 31 
The American Henry George was one major figure who used 
Ricardo's argument to justify exclusive state possession of rent. 
George believed that Ricardo's law of rent was a "geometric 
axiom." He argued that rent, because it increases faster than 
the productive power of labor and capital, forces down wages 
and interest, thereby causing depressions and more poverty. 
George's simple solution to the problem was to have the state 
appropriate rent. With the continually increasing revenues from 
the single tax on land, the state could operate a whole new set of 
programs. He predicted, "We would reach the ideal of the social-
ist but not through government repression. Government would 
become the administration of a great co-operative society." 32 
The third major element of classical liberalism that had within 
it the seeds of change was the religious one. Religious Non-
conformity, Gladstone had said, was "the backbone of British 
Liberalism." Individual initiative, competition, and the spirit of 
Calvinism were in each of the Nonconformist sects. Their orga-
nization was congregational and their members were, in the 
main, drawn from the middle class and the elite of the working 
class. 33 These revived Nonconformist sects served to make radi-
calism more humane. The homo oeconomicus and the Good Sa-
maritan became bedfellows. Parallel to Nonconformity, which 
was inspired by Methodism, was the Evangelical movement, 
which worked within the Church of England and produced 
many of the same moral and social results of Methodism. 
The result of these religious developments, said John Dewey, 
was that there was a general humanitarian movement "insti-
gated by religion [that] was active in attack upon slavery, upon 
the abuses of prison life, upon brutal and mechanical methods 
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f administering charity, and through the factory laws, upon the ~nhuman conditions of labor of women and children in mines 
and factories. In every one of these movements evangelical zeal 
was the motive force." 34 This humanitarian zeal was, of course, 
the seed of a new liberalism. 
By the end of the 186os, the Classical Liberal party h~d op-
osed the Crimean War, eventually favored the North 1n the ~merican Civil War (because the liberals saw the North fighting 
against slavery), cut government budgets, ins~ituted d~rec~ taxes, 
encouraged more independence of the colon1es-wh1ch 1n turn 
paved the way for a Commonwealth-and encourage~ religi?us 
freedom. But the Liberal party as yet had no education pohcy; 
they opposed the Factory Acts and state protection for workers; 
and they had a pedantic reverence for freedom of contract which 
operated greatly to the advantage of the owners of the means of 
d . 35 pro uctlon. 
The Seeds of the New Liberalism 
Grow, Mature, and Wither 
As we have seen, the liberal label had a fairly 
precise meaning in England because it was associated with a 
definite political party. Yet this fairly precise meaning was able to 
develop because the doctrine of liberalism had within it the 
seeds of change. Simply because seeds are planted, however, 
does not assure that they will grow; there must be an appropri-
ate climate. England after around 1870 supplied that climate. 
One of the most important climatic changes was the different 
attitude of the workers. Many liberals had argued that poverty is 
incurable. However, since industrialized England was quite 
prosperous, it became increasingly difficult to convince the poor 
that their poverty was natural. Many argued that "if 'natural 
laws' of economics condemned them to poverty in a prosperous 
milieu, then it was time to adopt a system with different laws of 
operation." 36 The workers took the three major elements of clas-
sical liberalism outlined in the previous section and carried the 
arguments within them to their logical conclusion. 
The workers also adopted and developed the other arguments 
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?f cl~s.si~al liberalism: the majority rule and universal suffrage 
ImphCit In extending the franchise; emphasizing the freedom 
of their jobs more than the freedom of trade; the individual lib-
erty to organize politically and economically as workers. They 
wanted economic progress, but by progress they meant human-
kind's collective control over economic life. 37 
What the workers thought was now more important because 
they had the vote. The Conservatives had advocated labor legis:-
lation and a widened franchise in order to capture the labor vote, 
which they proceeded to do for a time. Hence, after the second 
electoral reform of 1867, the Conservatives were able to defeat 
Gladstone's cabinet in 1874.38 The Conservatives' more benevo-
lent attitude pressured the Liberals to change, in order to be able 
to recapture power. In 1884 it was the Liberal government that 
tried to win labor's votes by extending the suffrage to rural work-
ers, thus making adult male suffrage almost universal. 39 
Not only were the workers' attitudes changing, but the liber-
als' attitudes were also changing, a shift prompted in part by the 
need to win workers' votes. Another reason for the change was 
simply that the society of small capitalists that the liberal phi-
losophy postulated no longer existed. In response to the new 
large corporations, unions grew up. 40 Eventually liberals began 
to realize that unions were an appropriate form of organization 
because they were spontaneous bodies of free workers and be-
~ause they enabled workers to compete on equal terms. 41 Many 
hberals also began to realize that because of the growing com-
plexities of society-education, public works, banking activi-
ties, railways, and shipping companies-all these activities were 
taking on the functions of public services and therefore should 
be regulated, controlled, or owned by the state. 42 Since the time 
of Bentham, liberals had used the legislature to enact reform; 
thus many liberals were not shocked when they found them-
selves using the legislature in a positive manner. 43 
We can most easily see this dramatic shift in the meaning of 
"liberal" if we look briefly at the effects of that shift in John 
Stuart Mill. Mill was at first the loyal follower of Bentham. He 
wrote Utilitarianism primarily to defend Bentham's "greatest 
happiness principle," and in the course of that defense he modi-
fied that doctrine in order to make it more powerful. Yet this 
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same Mill could write, by the end of his life, that even if he 
would suddenly achieve all the changes in institutions and opin-
ions that his utilitarian philosophy desired, he would still not be 
happy. 
After utilitarianism gave him a mental crisis, Mill decided to 
abandon that cold philosophy of the radicals: "If I am asked, 
what system of political philosophy I substituted for that which, 
as a philosophy, I had abandoned, I answer, No system: only a 
conviction that the true system was something much more com-
plex and many-sided than I had previously had any idea of." 44 
This same Mill also surprisingly concluded, "If the choice were 
to be made between communism with all its chances, and the 
present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices, if 
this, or communism, were the alternative, all the difficulties 
great or small of communism would be as dust in the balance." 45 
In short, liberalism was changing. The philosophy that was 
adequate in the first half of the nineteenth century in England 
was no longer tolerable in the second half. The major philoso-
phers of liberalism, exemplified by J. S. Mill, changed their be-
liefs in response to the new situation, and the seeds of change 
thrived in the new climate. 
Old classical liberalism was poured out of the bottle and wel-
fare liberalism was poured in; but although the contents were 
new, the label"liberalism" was not changed. Since welfare liber-
alism grew out of basic elements of classical liberalism, it seemed 
reasonable to many that the same label would be used to de-
scribe both philosophies. 
However reasonable the retention of the old label was, we 
must remember that liberalism had already shown itself to be a 
very important symbol for members of a political party to use. 
Therefore we would expect that those proponents of classical lib-
eralism would object to the capture of this symbol by the advo-
cates of a welfare state. They did indeed object. 
The major representative of the Manchester liberals, who did 
not want to lose their liberal label, was Herbert Spencer. Spencer 
was such a great believer in laissez faire that he even wanted pri-
vate enterprise to run the highway and sewer systems. Spencer 
agreed that quack doctors could cause the loss of life, but to use 
the state to forbid them to practice "is directly to violate the 
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moral law." 46 This very inflexible classical liberal strongly ob-
jected in 1884 that the new so-called liberalism was in reality a 
kind of Toryism, since it had given up the idea of the freedom of 
contract and voluntary cooperation that distinguished it from a 
"coercive military organization." 47 To protect their label from 
misuse, says Thomas P. Neill, Spencer and the other Manchester 
liberals formed "the Liberty and Property Defense League, 
much like the American Liberty League of 1934, that set forth on 
a crusade to defend liberty and property from the attacks of the 
new 'welfare' liberalism .... Each group laid claim to the title 
liberalism and accused the other of 'spurious liberalism' or 
'blind conservatism.'" 48 
There were two major reasons why Spencer failed to recapture 
the liberal label. First, it was quite logical for the welfare liberals 
to be called liberal, since their beliefs about welfare grew out of 
the elements of classical liberalism. Second, "liberal" had been 
historically associated in England with the name of a political 
party. When the new liberals won control of the party, they won 
control of the label. Those who clung to the tenets of laissez faire 
were simply read out of the party. The protesters were called 
"conservative." 49 
The new welfare liberalism developed and eventually stood 
for. a whole period of social progress. For example, before World 
War I there was a burst of social reform under the Campbell-
Bannerman and Asquith governments that was "in many ways 
like the New Deal and in fact providing specific models for some 
of its legislation." 50 By the second decade of this century, the 
transition to this new liberalism was complete. It was now a 
fairly mature doctrine. The welfare liberals in general saw them-
selves as beyond the era of the Manchester school. In political 
beliefs they saw themselves as between the Tories and the So-
cialists. They were the middle road. 
Hobhouse explained how the new liberalism went beyond the 
beliefs of laissez faire: "If we grant . . . that it is demanded of all 
sane adult men and women that they should live as civilized be-
ings, as industrious workers, as good parents, as orderly and 
efficient citizens, it is, on the other side, the function of the eco-
nomic organization of society to secure them the material means 
of living such a life ... and if they are not secure without the 
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deliberate action of the state, they must be secured by the delib-
erate action of the state." 51 Liberalism also distinguished itself 
from Toryism; as Chamberlain explained, the Tories allowed in-
tervention because of "patronage" while the Liberals intervened 
because they believed "all people shall be assisted to govern 
themselves." 52 
The new liberalism was also distinct from socialism because, 
as Churchill explained in 1908, "Socialism seeks to put down 
wealth; Liberalism would preserve private interests in the only 
way in which they can be safely and justly preserved, namely, by 
reconciling them with public right. Socialism would kill enter-
prise; Liberalism would rescue enterprise from the trammels of 
privilege and preference. Socialism assails the pre-eminence of 
the individual; Liberalism seeks, and shall seek more in the fu-
ture, to build up a minimum standard for the mass. Socialism 
exalts the rule; Liberalism exalts the man. Socialism attacks capi-
tal; Liberalism attacks monopoly." 53 
Meanwhile the Labour party had been formed in 1891 and 
rapidly made progress. 54 The workers understood Churchill's 
distinction between socialism and liberalism, and they chose so-
cialism. Although when "liberal" was first introduced into En-
gland it proved itself to be an advantageous political symbol, by 
the 1920s the word had lost some of its natural power because it 
was so connected with the Liberal party. The word had come to 
be the party platform. When the voters rejected the platform, 
they rejected the symbol that stood for the platform. By the time 
the New Deal was appearing in America, the electoral support of 
the Liberal party in England was withering. 
John Maynard Keynes tried to bring new life into the Liberal 
party. In the late 1920s and in the early 1930s he was proposing 
new policies that the Liberal party should adopt. Though these 
policies failed to resurrect the Liberal party in Britain, it is of in-
terest to consider Keynes's pleas. He argued that he could never 
bring himself to be a Conservative because "they offer me ... 
neither intellectual nor spiritual consolation." What some Con-
servatives stood for "promotes neither my self-interest or the 
public good." Neither could he become a member of the Labour 
party because it was a class party, "and the class is not my class. 
. . . The Class war will find me on the side of the educated bour-
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geoisie." 55 By the process of elimination, "the Liberal Party is still 
the best instrument of future progress-if only it had strong 
leadership and the right programme." 56 
An important part of this right program was of course the eco-
nomic program. Keynes warned his contemporaries: "The tran-
sition from economic anarchy to a regime which deliberately 
aims at controlling and directing economic forces in the interests 
of social justice and social stability, will present enormous diffi-
culties both technical and political. I suggest, nevertheless, that 
the true destiny of New Liberalism is to seek their solution." 57 
Keynes saw the Liberal party as the true middle ground for 
controlling economic forces. On the one side of it was fascism 
and on the other bolshevism. Socialism and conservatism of-
fered no middle course: "Just as the Conservative Party will al-
ways have its Die-Hard wing, so the Labour Party will be always 
flanked by the Party of Catastrophe-Jacobins, Communists, 
Bolshevists, whatever you choose to call them." Keynes placed 
his hopes with the Liberal party, "the home of Economic Indi-
vidualism and Social Liberty." 58 
Lessons from English History 
This brief analysis of the history of the political 
term "liberal" in England enables us to draw some important 
conclusions for the study of the American symbol "liberal." In 
the first place, "liberal" -even before it had a chance to acquire a 
political meaning-had shown itself to have inherently good 
connotations in the English language. Even when, in 1830, the 
symbol was used in a derogatory sense, the naturally favorable 
connotations of the word easily triumphed over the pejorative 
foreign implications. Since both the British and Americans 
speak the same language, we can assume that "liberal" by it-
self-that is, at the introduction of the political symbol, before it 
has had a chance to acquire historical connotations through 
years of use-is also a very favorable word for a politician to 
capture. 
The word in England also showed itself to be a fairly durable 
political symbol. Its permanence can be attributed to the fact that 
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the introduction of "liberal" and "conservative" were accom-
anied by policy changes and the introduction of class politics. 
~ecause the new labels stood for something new, they became 
fairly permanent and would not easily become anachronistic. 
In addition, the label "liberal" in England had had a fairly pre-
cise political meaning, because it was the actual name of a party. 
When the party carried the liberal doctrine to its logicaLconclu-
sion and adopted a welfare program, the party also carried with 
it the label "liberal." Spencer's objections proved futile partly be-
cause the new liberalism grew out of the old; to apply the same 
name to both philosophies was logical. Spencer also failed to 
prevent the shift in the meaning of "liberal" because the New 
Liberals won control of the party, legitimating the capture of the 
symbol. In the United States, because no major party is called 
the Liberal party, we would expect the label "liberal" to be much 
more vague. Since there is no party platform to pour meaning 
into the liberal label, we would also expect that controversies 
surrounding its proper use would not be settled easily. 
Keeping in mind the conclusions drawn from this background 
study of the liberal symbol in England, we can now turn to the 
study of the symbol in the United States. 
The United States Backgroun.d 
until1932 
Liberalism in the United States I 
1776-1870 
As explained in Chapter 1, "liberal" did not be-
come a viable or important political symbol in America until the 
introduction of the New Deal. However, while the liberal label 
was imported here without any historical connotations, 1 like a 
courier without luggage, the term had still been used sporadi-
cally in the United States before 1932. This chapter analyzes 
thes~ scattered uses of the term in order to determine why this 
particular symbol was chosen at particular times in the past; why 
the label did not become important in any of these past in-
stances; and what-if any-general meaning was given to "lib-
eral" in these past cases. 
As noted in the previous chapter, "liberal" in a political sense 
did not even appear in the English language until183o. When, 
around 18oo, Hamilton advocated "a liberal construction of the 
Constitution," 2 he was arguing for a loose or free construction; 
that is, he used "liberal" in the grammatical sense, as an adjec-
tive, and did not imply that it represented a clear, or even a 
vague, collection of political beliefs. 
After 1830, in spite of the fact the British Tories had intro-
duced "liberal" into the English language as a political symbol, 
Americans still used the term sparingly and without any real 
meaning. Some educated Americans, aware of politics abroad, 
borrowed the term; but they used it not as an American political 
label, but to identify their beliefs with those of Continental or 
British liberals. This was why Orestes Brownson called himself a 
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liberal for a few years, 3 for at this time period the term "liberal" 
was insignificant as an American political symbol. 
The Liberal Republicans, 1870-1872 
The first and the only important national poli-
tical movement before the New Deal that made definite and 
continued use of the symbol "liberal" was the Liberal Republi-
can party. 
History does not remember Ulysses S. Grant as one of our 
more adept presidents, for as his administration dragged on he 
made more and more enemies among independents and within 
the Republican ranks. In 1870 the disaffection with Grant and 
his policies became so serious that a new party, the Liberal Re-
publican party, was formed. There are two questions about the 
Liberal Republican party that concern us: Why did it call itself 
Liberal Republican? And why did the symbol and the movement 
quickly pass into history? If we can understand what conditions 
cause the symbol "liberal" to be quickly forgotten, then we will 
have a better idea of what conditions must exist in order for the 
label to become viable, lasting, and significant. 
The Republicans who bolted their party adopted the label "lib-
eral" largely, I believe, because of the influence of Carl Schurz. 
By the middle of Grant's first term in office, there were pockets of 
Republican unrest all over the country, but it was Schurz's Mis-
souri that gave birth to the actual split in the party. It was in 
Missouri, argues one student of the period, "that factional strife 
led most directly to a national Liberal movement." 4 The two lead-
ers of Liberal Republicanism in Missouri were B. Gratz Brown 5 
and Carl Schurz, an "efficient champion of the cause." 6 
It is easy enough to understand why Schurz and his follow-
ers called themselves Liberal Republicans. Although Schurz dis-
agreed with many Republican policies, he had hoped to prevent 
a break with the administration. 7 For example, in the Missouri 
political campaign of 1870, an address written by Schurz charac-
terized his faction as the "true Republican party" of Missouri. 
Schurz apparently considered himself a Republican, but Presi-
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dent Grant "could see nothing but party treason in the ,.,,r.""--
of the Liberals." 8 
Why the Schurz faction called itself Liberal Republican is a 
more difficult question. The group could have continued to call 
themselves "true Republicans"; in fact, a minor revolt of dissatis-
fied Republicans in Virginia in 1869 had called themselves the 
"True Republicans" as the only party label. 9 Perhaps Schurz real-
ized that it would have been a tactical error to adopt "True Re .. 
publican" as the only party label. "True Republican" is not that 
easily distinguished from "Republican": "true" is not really 
scriptive, and it does not sound like a party name. Such a name 
would also have prompted much useless debate over who the 
true Republicans were. The discussion of real issues would then 
have been ignored. 
The other label that presented itself to Schurz was "Liberal Re-
publican." In Arkansas, also in 1869, a faction of the Republican 
party that was later to become the basis of support for the na-
tional Liberal Republican party had taken the name Liberal Re-
publican party. This Arkansas faction was composed of mem-: 
bers of the legislature who were "'old Whigs and disaffected 
Republicans."110 Since the old American Whigs had borrowed 
their label from Britain, it is not surprising that in later years 
these Whigs would once again turn to Britain and borrow the 
new label that many former British Whigs owned. 
The "liberal" tag of the Arkansas faction must have imme-
diately appealed to Schurz, a liberal German who was an active 
participant in the revolution of 1848/49. This appeal was prob .. 
ably reinforced because Schurz identified his free trade position 
with British Liberal party policy. Schurz was one of the leading 
members of the American Free Trade League, formed in 1869 to 
encourage tariff reduction. 11 Not only Schurz but also Missouri 
Liberal Republicans in general favored free trade: 
The action of the tariff seemed an especial challenge to 
the reformers. The forcing out of David A. Wells, a con-
spicuous figure in the reform group, from the position of 
special revenue agent was resented as a victory for the pro-
tected interests in Congress. As a result the attacks on the 
citadel of protection became more persistent than ever. In 
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1870 the Free Trade League waged a most aggressive cam-
paign. . . . The Liberal Republican campaign in Missouri 
that fall was in part a free-trade demonstration. Governor 
McClurg, the regular Republican candidate, was said to 
have been one of the objectionable high tariff men marked 
for defeat. Grosvenor, of the Missouri Democrat, was an ar-
dent free-trader (the author of the League's publication, 
"Does Protection Protect?"), and he put forward this issue 
so prominently in the Liberal program that the New York 
Tribune characterized the whole Missouri movement as a 
free-trade conspiracy. 12 
Schurz also may have taken on this label because he under-
stood the favorable connotations of the word. Schurz certainly 
used the symbol "liberal" as if he understood its power, for 
in the election of 1870, the Missouri Liberal Republicans "issued 
an address, written by Schurz, in which they unsparingly ar-
raigned the Radicals [the Republican faction opposing the Liber-
als] for their illiberality, party trickery, and corruption in office; 
and they claimed themselves to represent the true Republican 
party of Missouri" (emphasis added). 13 
Certainly no one likes to be attacked as illiberal, but those who 
opposed the Liberal Republicans were, by implication and direct 
charge, exactly that. We would expect that the Radical Republi-
cans would object to being labeled illiberal; in fact, when we ex-
amine the editorial pages of the New York Times in the days im-
mediately preceding the election of 1872-the year of the first 
and last Liberal Republican presidential campaign-we quickly 
justify the reasonableness of our expectation. 
In 1872 the Times was Republican and strongly supported 
Grant for president. In accordance with this support, they con-
ducted an unrestrained, vituperative attack against the Liberal 
nominee, Horace Greeley. In the five-day period under study, 
whenever the Times called the Greeley supporters "liberal," they 
would very often place the word within quotation marks, imply-
ing that these "liberals" were not really liberal, that their label 
was an improper designation. 14 
The Times also tried to counteract the implication that the Lib-
eral Republicans were a better type of Republicans: while the 
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paper referred to the Greeley supporters as liberals eleven times 
in this five-day period, they called them Liberal Republicans 
only twice. Once they even called them Liberal Democrats! All in 
all, the favorite method the Radical Republicans, whom the 
paper favored, used to meet the challenge of their opponents' 
adoption of a favorable symbol was to try to avoid using it and to 
find another label. In the period under study, the Times called 
their opponents liberal eleven times, while they associated them 
in some way with Greeley (Greeleyites, Greeleyism, or Gree-
levites) twenty-six times. Since-as we shall soon see-the name 
Greeley had some very unfavorable connotations, the Times 
battled symbols with symbols. 
We now come to the second question. Why did the Liberal Re-
publican movement and the liberal symbol very quickly and un-
ceremoniously fade into history? The first reason was that the 
only common factor uniting all Liberal Republicans was their 
universal hatred of Grant. 15 Although Schurz's belief in a free 
trade policy, shared with the Missouri faction, was an important 
factor in naming the movement, it was not an important factor in 
determining who would compose the national party bolt. In 
fact, Horace Greeley himself was a protectionist, 16 and his nomi-
nation served to alienate many of the more ardent free-traders. 
A great weakness of the Liberal Republicans was that their differ-
ent motives for bolting produced constant disagreements. The 
former secretary of the Liberal Republican National Committee 
complained a few days before the election of 1872: 
Our party was made up of a "shake hands across the 
chasm" of all the soreheads and disaffected elements of the 
United States. It may be it would have taken superior general-
ship to have half the Secessionists, and Union Leaguers, and 
Pro-slavery men, and Abolitionists, and new Nationalists 
and States Righters, and Peace Democrats and War Demo-
crats and Protectionists and Free-Traders, and Manufactur-
ers, and Labor Reformers, and Woman's Righters, and Spiri-
tualists and Internationals, and Catholics and the United 
Sons of America into our party: but I think it could have 
been done, as well as to have caught a part of the negro vote. 
But it is too late now. The Woman's Righters, and Spiritual-
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ists, and "Reformers" of all grades and ideas are against us: 
and even the Democrats won't vote the ticket. 17 
Some people became Liberal Republicans because they dis-
liked Grant's undignified style, his crude manners and inept 
conduct, 18 while others opposed Grant's support of carpetbag 
governments and favored a more conciliatory attitude toward the 
South. Still others objected to Grant's slow action toward civil-
service reform or (for various and not necessarily consistent rea-
sons) dissented from Grant's currency and trade policies. 19 This 
incoherence of the party toward currency and trade questions 
has been called its greatest weakness. The Liberal Republicans 
"held almost every economic view then in vogue. Some were 
conservative and some radical, some for a high tariff, some for a 
low, some were gold men and some were greenbackers. To com-
plicate the confusion, a number of professional politicians who 
were on the outs with Grant and had no interest in reform at-
tached themselves to the party. With its only unifying factor 
being opposition to Grant, the Liberal movement lacked a basis 
for either success or permanence." 20 
The other major reason for the failure of the Liberal Repub-
licans was their nomination of Horace Greeley for the presidency 
in 1872. The Liberals might have nominated Charles Francis 
Adams or some respected leader, 21 but the managers of Greeley's 
campaign, to the dismay of Schurz and other reformers, were 
able to start a stampede at the convention for Greeley. 22 Greeley's 
nomination was a tragic mistake. It was said of Greeley that "his 
odd appearance-throat whiskers framing a pink face; white 
overcoat and socks-his peculiar mannerisms, his advocacy 
of queer causes, gave him the reputation, fatal in politics, of 
being an eccentric. The object of cruel abuse in the campaign 
of 1872, he wondered if he was running for the Presidency or 
the penitentiary." 23 Given this portrait of the nominee, it is not 
difficult to understand why the Times called its opponents not 
liberals, but Greeleyites. 
The party bolters of 1872 designated themselves as liberal 
partly because the leaders, either by intuition or conscious plan, 
grasped the advantage of being called liberal and partly because 
their original leaders identified themselves to some extent with 
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the Liberal party in England. However favorable this symbol 
was, it was not powerful enough to compensate for a completely 
disunited party led by a vilified eccentric. Given its inadequate 
program and leader, the movement and its identifying symbol 
never became viable. Grant won by a landslide over the Liberal 
Republicans; Greeley carried only two southern states and four 
border states, and against Grant's 186 electoral votes he won 
only 62. 24 For many years afterward no important group would 
choose to call itself liberal, because this label had become identi-
fied with such a losing cause. 
Progressivism and the New Republic 
The next important moment in the history of lib-
eralism in the United States occurred in 1916. In order to under-
stand the significance of this mom.ent, we should review the 
relevant background. 
Walter Weyl, Herbert Croly, and Walter Lippmann were three 
intellectual fathers of the Progressive movement. They were 
very close to Theodore Roosevelt. 25 When Roosevelt ran for the 
presidency on the Bull Moose ticket in 1912, Weyl, Croly, and 
Lippmann were his loyal supporters. After his defeat, Roosevelt 
accepted the failure of the third-party movement, saying, "The 
fight is over. We are beaten. There is only one thing to do and 
that is to go back to the Republican party." 26 But Weyl, Croly, and 
Lippmann, as they came together to form the New Republic, felt 
that the new party could become permanent. 27 Croly, for ex-
ample, wrote to Roosevelt, "Now that the first skirmish is over 
and the long campaign begun, I feel that the moment has arrived 
to consider the question of organizing the party on a permanent,· 
democratic, and self-supporting basis." 28 
The new magazine editors at first extolled Roosevelt's virtues, 
but it became clear that Roosevelt would not be won over to the 
New Republic's ideas. Yet the editors were not enamored of the in-
cumbent president, Woodrow Wilson, either. "Their progressive 
philosophy demanded a strong leader to promote democracy 
and nationalism. But the New Republic had no leader." 29 
For the election of 1916 the New Republic decided at first to sup-
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port the Republican nominee, Charles Evans Hughes/0 and de-
fended him against the charge that a justice of the Supreme 
Court should not run for president. But the magazine wanted a 
strong leader, and it was not long before its editors criticized 
Hughes's mildness. Their dissatisfaction with Hughes increased 
by the end of July. 31 
Meanwhile, Colonel Edward House and other supporters of 
Wilson saw the advantage of winning Progressive votes. 32 Al-
though by 1916 the New Republic's circulation was only about 
24,ooo, it was quite influential, and its contributors and support-
ers included Charles Beard, Randolph Bourne, John Dewey, 
Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand, and George Santayana. "The 
New Republic had already a name for itself among intellectuals, 
and upon the intellectuals the independent and progressive vote 
in part depended," says Charles Forcey. 33 Particularly on the East 
Coast, the magazine was an element to consider. 
Responding to this influence, Wilson began to adopt the poli-
cies of Roosevelt's New Nationalism. The first sign of this shift in 
policy was Wilson's nomination of Louis Brandeis to the Su-
preme Court on January 28, which the New Republic heartily ap-
proved. Then Wilson supported the Hollis-Bulkley farm credits 
bill; the New Republic had favored this measure since 1914- By the 
autumn of 1916, Wilson's Democratic Congress had, in fact, en-
acted into law virtually every important plank of the New Na-
tionalism of 1912, and by August the New Republic had cleariy 
shifted to Wilson's support. 34 
In July, while the New Republic still had some misgivings, the 
magazine stated: "What liberals need to obtain from Mr. Wilson 
is some assurance . . . that his later preference for a governing 
government will not prove to be as fugitive as his earlier prefer-
ence for doctrinaire freedom." Charles Forcey, an astute student 
of this period, comments: "The use of the word 'liberals' in this 
instance is the first the author has noted in the New Republic's 
pages." 35 He has also observed: 
Croly, Weyl, and Lippmann ... had betrayed a subtle 
shift in their own thought even as they recited their mis-
givings. They were now talking about "liberal," not as 
always before, "progressives." The shift in terms showed 
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the strength of the lure of Wilson's power, but, to the sub-
sequent confusion of American political thought, it also 
marked the piracy of a word that belonged rightfully to the 
Jeffersonians. By August, when Hughes made his accep-
tance speech, the editors could without blush complain that 
the Republican had "not yet justified the faith of liberals." 
"Liberals" now suited the New Republic men better than 
"progressives," because the old name was redolent enough 
of the Bull Moose to embarrass any rally around a new 
leader. 36 
Forcey argues that since the Jeffersonians believed in a limited 
central government, it is only proper to call them liberal, but 
"liberal" could "rightfully" belong to the Jeffersonians only if 
words cannot change their meaning. But words do change their 
meaning. As Justice Holmes acknowledged in 1918: "A word is 
not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a liv-
ing thought and may vary greatly in color and content according 
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." 37 
Around the turn of the century in the United States, "liber-
alism" probably implied Manchester economics. It is because of 
this implication that one author has argued that Americans had 
to use the term "progressive" to describe their reform move-
ment. 38 In England, by 1916, Hob house's definition of the new 
liberalism had clearly triumphed. To those Americans such as 
Weyl, Croly, and Lippmann who were in touch with British poli-
tics, it was not strange to use the word "liberal" by 1916, because 
that term no longer needed to have Manchester connotations. 
Because the new tag was appropriate, and because the old term, 
"progressive," was inappropriate due to its close association 
with their former ally Roosevelt, it was natural for the New Re-
public editors to begin to use the new symbol. "Liberal" was a 
good and unencumbered word. 
President Wilson, of course, continued to refer to himself as 
"progressive." However, Wilson and his associates (including, 
presumably, Franklin D. Roosevelt) did read the New Republic. 
By 1932 the columns of that magazine, but not yet the general 
press, fully embraced the terminology of "liberal" and "conser-
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vative," giving those words much the meaning they later pos-
sessed under the New Deal and in succeeding years. 39 
Liberalism in the United States, 
1919-1932 
Although the liberal symbol was not yet com-
monly used in political debate by the general press or by the 
great majority of the people before 1932, certain left-wing politi-
cal organizations began to adopt the new term with increasing 
frequency. Why these organizations-which were very small, 
generally very local in scope, and very uninfluential-chose to 
identify themselves with liberalism is a question easier to ask 
than to answer. Perhaps they identified themselves with Conti-
nental or British liberals, or they may have been influenced by 
the New Republic's use of the term. Perhaps all of these groups, 
which sought to increase their own liberty, called themselves lib-
eral becausle they associated liberalism with liberty and freedom 
from restraint. 
The first time that the New York Times reported a political group 
using the name "liberal" was in 1921. The Times announced that 
the president of the Liberal League of Negro Americans urged 
blacks in New York to arm themselves. 40 The insignificance of 
this league is indicated by the fact that this first short announce-
ment of its activities was also the last. The next year the Times 
informed the voters, in two short notices, that the Massachusetts 
Liberal Republican League opposed the reelection of Senator 
Lodge. 41 The effectiveness of this organization is reflected in the 
Times observation: "This move is of great surprise, but is not ex-
pected to hurt Senator Lodge, even though the League has con-
ducted a vigorous campaign." 42 After November 1922, we hear 
no more of this league. 
Later the Times reported that yet another league, the Liberal 
League of Mid-West Colleges, was planning a conference of stu-
dents and workers "to take steps for the abolition of war." 43 This 
group also was insignificant, for if the conference was ever held, 
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it was not newsworthy enough to be reported. (And if it was 
held, it quite obviously failed.) 
In 1924 the Times indicated that a Liberal Immigration League 
existed and that it advocated immigration from Europe "without 
regard to number and independent of our immigrant popula-
tion." 44 Three years later the Liberal Civic League of Massachu-
setts was briefly able to win news coverage when it presented a 
petition to the Massachusetts legislature suggesting repeal of 
the Prohibition amendment. 45 
None of these leagues was significant, either individually or as 
a group, but it is significant that left-wing organizations chose to 
place the term "liberal" in their titles. It indicated that "liberal" 
no longer had connotations of Manchester economics, not only 
for the New Republic editors, but also for various reform groups. 
While all of these leagues were quite local in scope, in the 
years before 1932 there were two major attempts to form national 
liberal parties. In terms of political activity, both were utter fail-
ures, although each reflected pockets of discontent with the po-
litical life in the 1920s and possibly made easier the realignment 
of political forces during the 1930s. 
The first group that tried to form a Liberal party called them-
selves the Forty-eighters. In 1919 this group formed the Commit-
tee of Forty-eight, which was to organize a Liberal party in order 
"to avert on one hand the extremes of radicalism and on the 
other the extremes of reaction." 46 The brief history of the Forty-
eighters' attempts to form a new party reads something like a 
comic opera. 47 By the middle of 1920, Non-Partisan League dele-
gates from South Dakota broke from the Forty-eighters in favor 
of the Labor party convention, soon after the Forty-eighters quit 
the Farmer-Labor party. 48 Finally, while Robert LaFollette was 
considering whether he would accept the nomination for presi-
dent on the Liberal party ticket, there was a third bolt in the 
party when Forty-eighters who opposed LaFollette's nomination 
formed their own Liberal party. 49 This anti-LaFollette convention 
held in Chicago drew only about fifty delegates, and they 
expected that they would name no presidential ticket. Lester 
Barlow, the leader of the World War Veterans who was notal-
lowed to make an address to the convention, threatened to call 
still another convention. He charged: "I have never seen so 
The U.S. Background until1932 · 43 
many nuts collected in Chicago as during the past few days." 5° 
This third-party movement failed completely, and in 1924, when 
LaFollette did run as a third-party candidate, he ran under the 
Progressive label. 51 
In 1930 the Times reported that a second group was attempting 
to form a national liberal party. Samuel H. Church, president of 
the Carnegie Institute, announced the "creation of a new political 
party, to be known as the Liberal Party, whose chief aim would 
be to divorce the government from every form of religious dicta-
tion and seeking the dissolution of every society which aims 
to subordinate any part of the citizenship because of race or 
creed." 52 Church added that he was very much against Prohi-
bition and that the "noble experiment" should be repealed. 
Church claimed that his proposal for a Liberal party was a great 
success: 
A new party-the Liberal Party-had been proposed, 
and its reasons for being had been clearly demonstrated. 
The men whose names had appeared in the discussion 
received hundreds of telegrams and thousands of letters, 
from every State in the Union, and virtually from every 
town in every State. "We want the Liberal Party," they said. 
"We need the Liberal Party. The soul has gone out of the 
old parties. Liberty is dead. America is perishing. Go on! 
The country is with you. God bless you!" These were the 
things which the people were saying from their deepest 
emotions. 53 
The Times, in a more somber mood, reported the cold recep-
tion that Church received. A Pennsylvania representative, who 
was leader of the wet bloc in Congress and who warned that the 
Republican party would disappear if it continued to support 
Prohibition, still opposed a Liberal party, and Senator Borah 
commented, "Third parties, where do they go?" 54 
The Times proposed two main reasons for the easy rejection of 
this third-party movement, one focused on history and the other, 
interestingly enough, on labels. First, reasoned the Times, politi-
cians remembered that Teddy Roosevelt's and Robert LaFollette's 
Progressive parties had failed; and second, politicians realized 
that "their policies are better advanced by adhering to the old 
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party names and party organizations, even when these politi-
cians are opposed to everything that their party stands for." 55 
Although liberalism did not yet have an important role in 
American political debate, these two third-party attempts did 
prepare the way for (and help cloud the meaning of) the new 
symbol. The first group, the Forty-eighters, by calling them-
selves liberal, contributed to the confusion of that term. The 
original Forty-eighters were a splinter group of expelled German 
liberals who came to the United States and continued their 
polemics against Catholic groups here. 56 The new Forty-eighters 
were apparently their intellectual descendants. The greater part 
of their membership, their secretary said, was from the business 
and professional classes, 57 and they favored, among other things, 
the reduction of the president's powers in foreign relations, re-
duction of the Supreme Court's power to declare laws uncon-
stitutional, public ownership of the transportation system, and 
"literal restoration of the constitutional rights of free press, free-
dom of speech, and public assemblage." 58 
The meaning read into the word "liberal" by the actions of the 
Forty-eighters was essentially different from the liberalism of 
Church's party. Church's liberals were not intellectual descen-
dants of expelled Germans but generally were Republican busi-
nessmen. Church himself was an active Republican, 59 and Pierre 
DuPont, chairman of the executive committee of the Association 
Against the Prohibition Amendment, endorsed Church's pro-
posal for a new Liberal party. 60 Among the approximately one 
hundred men at the meeting held in New York City during 
which the proposal was made to create the Liberal party, there 
were "captains of industry, railroad presidents, college teachers, 
steamship officials, bankers, [and] merchants." 61 This Liberal 
party platform, very unlike that of the Forty-eighters', placed 
much emphasis on opposition to Prohibition, blue laws, and 
"those egotistical bigots who leave their cheerless pulpits and go 
to Washington and the State capitals to demand laws for controll-
ing the conduct of their fellow men." 62 When one group of 
Forty-eighters and another group of anti-Prohibition business-
men laid claim to the favorable symbol of liberalism, the net 
effect was to help introduce and help obscure the meaning of 
the word. 
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One might expect that if "liberal" is a favorable political symbol, 
and that if politicians realize the advantage of owning that sym-
bol, then some people would object to the attempted expropria-
tion of it by the organizations just discussed. The discussion that 
one would expect to ensue would, of course, be on a small scale, 
since these organizations were small and somewhat less than 
significant. In fact, such a small debate did actually occur. 
One of the foremost advocates of his type of liberalism was Dr. 
Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University dur-
ing the 1920s. It may not be easy to summarize his political phi-
losophy in one paragraph, but I think it would be fair to argue 
that many of Butler's beliefs would be considered conservative 
today. Rexford Tugwell has called him a "paragon of reaction," 
and a student under Murray's presidency reminisced: 
The president of our university had forfeited our serious 
attention when he annually affirmed his opposition to the 
child-labor amendment. Moreover, we were always being re-
minded of his harshness toward such distinguished faculty 
members as Beard, Dana and Cattell when they refused to 
join the academic goose step in World War I. ... 
He did have an extraordinary capacity for saying things 
that invited derision. "Child labor does not exist in the 
United States .... This is the undoubted fact despite the 
quite irrelevant statistics marshalled in opposition to it," 
the papers quoted him as saying one day during state hear-
ings on the child-labor amendment. On another day we 
woke up to read that he had said, "Much of the talk of mal-
distribution of wealth is sheer invention ... mischievously 
devised by radicals" and on still another he observed that 
"capitalism is a debating term invented by Karl Marx." 63 
But Butler considered himself to be a very good example of a 
liberal. In 1923 he passionately felt that "liberalism is in eclipse in 
the United States and throughout the greater part of the world," 
and complained that because liberalism was dying, it was pos-
sible for its enemies to struggle for its name: "There are those 
who by striving to lay hands on the name of liberal and to apply 
it to illiberal and anti-liberal doctrines of every sort have already 
brought it into contempt, so that the followers of the great liber-
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als in the history of the English-speaking peoples are confused 
and ashamed .... Not a few liberals are discouraged, and what 
wonder! They see their name stolen by their critics and their ene-
mies because of its noble associations." 64 
Although Butler never really made clear what he meant by lib-
eralism, he did say that liberals are by necessity progressives and 
cannot be reactionary because the powers and satisfaction of lib-
erty never stand still. A progressive, he also added, is not one 
who fixes prices by law, puts government chains on commerce 
and industry, attempts to control the personal habits and con-
duct of men, or by law relieves any group of citizens from the 
responsibility of paying taxes. 65 
Two years later, in a symposium, "Liberalism: The Gospel of 
the Open Mind," Butler no longer declared that liberals must be 
progressive; liberals may occasionally be conservative, or even 
radicat depending on changing conditions, he argued. The es-
sence of liberalism now was not progressivism but "the holding 
fast to [the liberal's] faith and liberty/' since the "true liberal is a 
believer in liberty, whether that liberty be intellectuat civic, po-
litical, economic, or religious." 66 
Dr. E. Martin Hopkins, president of Dartmouth College, 
seemed to agree with Butler that left-wing elements were steal-
ing the word "liberal." In his opening address to the two thou-
sand students of Dartmouth in 1923 he warned: "We have ... at 
the present time . . . extremists who style themselves 'liberal/ 
with a capital 'L/ . . . [who] exploit in their interests the field of 
liberal thought. This professionalized group, arrogating to itself 
all virtue and good intent and denying these qualities to all 
others . . . is doing more to breed suspicion of true liberalism 
than is being done or could be done by all available forms of 
reaction if combined in militant array" (emphasis added). 67 
Hopkins, like Butler, feared that the label of liberalism was 
being stolen, but, unlike Butler's liberalism, Hopkins's was 
narrowly defined as tolerance. It had significantly fewer eco-
nomic implications. 
William Allen White was a far different person from Butler. As 
early as 1917, White argued for railroad nationalization, federal 
old-age pensions, and public operation of the natural resources 
"along socialistic lines." 68 Speaking at the same symposium at 
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which Butler spoke, White did not noticeably differ in rhetoric 
from Butler's vague brand of liberalism, saying, "I am a liberal. I 
have always felt that God gave us a mind not to close but to open 
to truth." 69 There is no evidence that White ever claimed in the 
1920s that radical elements were stealing the title of liberal. 
Alfred E. Smith had an even more amorphous concept of lib-
eralism. At the same symposium with Butler and White,, Smith 
told his audience that he believed in "the fostering of good-will 
and tolerance." He also added optimistically, "Civilization is in 
itself progressive and it cannot go forward without the liberals 
who lead the way. It is an old accepted truism that the cranks of 
one generation are the leaders of the next." 70 
Several of these intellectuals thought that liberalism was being 
exploited by left-wing groups, and although all of these men 
had generally vague definitions of liberalism, they all thought 
that liberalism was good and that they were liberals. In the entire 
decade of the twenties there were apparently only two major fig-
ures who explicitly attacked liberalism. On the extreme right, 
Mussolini denounced liberalism and parliamentarianism, 71 and 
on 'the far left, the Socialist Norman Thomas, after differentia-
ting liberalism as a doctrine of tolerance and liberalism as the 
doctrine of laissez faire, claimed that laissez-faire liberalism had 
"definitely collapsed." He added, "Much that passes for liber-
alism or progressivism, especially in the Middle West, was really 
retrogressive." 72 
In the few instances in which liberalism was discussed in the 
1920s, all respectable public opinion leaders declared themselves 
to be liberal. The propitiousness of the liberal symbol was proba-
bly increased by the fact that in this period of normalcy the only 
significant people who attacked liberalism were a Fascist and 
a Socialist. Both Mussolini and Thomas meant different things 
by liberalism, of course, but they both attacked the same label. 
This debate over the proper use of "liberalism" was very re-
strained, and most readers of the newspapers probably took 
little notice of it, though the Times did write several editorials on 
the subject. These editorials give the general impression of frus-
trated resignation. The Times objected to the more left-wing ele-
ments of society who proclaimed themselves to be liberal. Writ-
ing in an era in which people did not realize that many of these 
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apparently extreme ideas would someday become common-
place, the Times argued that these left-wing elements would have 
been more appropriately labeled "radical" or "red." However, 
while objecting to the expropriation of "liberal" by the radicals, 
the editorials seem resigned to new uses for the old label. While 
the Times argued that the new liberals should be called radicals, 
it appeared to accept calling them liberals. 
In 1922, for example, the Times attacked those "self-styled 
liberals" who cried, "'Liberalism' is in decay." These liberals 
did not blame their doctrine, as they should have, said the 
newspaper; instead, they claimed that the "fault lies with a 
world turned suddenly narrow and reactionary." The editorial 
recommended: 
A manly candor would compel the self-styled liberals to 
confess the tyranny of trade-union domination, the de-
structive blindness of "industrial democracy," and seek new 
light, new leading. The lines of hopeful experiment are 
striking out in many directions. Employe or "company" 
unions contain the seed of truly representative institutions 
in industry .... While attacking the most modern problems 
of human welfare, the new liberalism is true to the spirit of 
the Fathers-most of all in the fact that it looks steadily, cou-
rageously forward. But the professional liberals will have 
nothing to do with it. They stand apart, with minds open at 
both ends, wailing from time to time that liberalism is 
in decay. 73 
Although the editorial objected to these self-styled liberals, 
and although it considered company-union liberalism to be 
a better liberalism, the editorial did continue to call its oppo-
nents liberals. 
In 1923, an editorial referred to the formation of a Liberal 
League and called its preliminary declaration of principles 
"highly respectable." These principles included the halting of 
the "tendency of Government interference in every domain of 
life," the maintenance of individualism, and the. assertion of the 
dght and duty of the people's representatives to vote according 
to their judgment and conviction. The editorial approved of the 
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principles but called then: conservati~e. "Persons who call them-
selves 'Liberals' at Washington and In the several states try to 
quicken instead of halting Gove~n~~nt i~terference in e:ery do-
main of life. Government by maJonhes, If not outworn, IS a con-
servative principle." The editorial concluded: "The only trouble 
with the Liberal League is its name. It might better frankly 
call itself the Conservative League." 74 In another editorial, when 
advocating the "waiting for proof of the new before aban-
doning the old," the Times bluntly called such scientific skep-
ticism "conservative." 75 
In 1924 the Times sadly argued that since the World War, "there 
has ... been a change in names and labels. One such notable 
change has been the expropriation of the time-honored word 
'Liberal.'" Since the armistice, "in the newspaper headlines it 
was merely a question of space whether something was Liberal, 
Radical or Red." The editorial concluded with a hope that even-
tually "the Radical-Red school of thought might be compelled to 
hand back the word 'Liberal' to its original owners." 76 The Times 
objected but also resigned itself to the expropriation of that "time-
honored word." 
Six years later the Times repeated almost exactly this editorial 
of 1924. Once again the editorial argued that since the war a 
great amount of violence had been done to the "historic name" 
of liberalism. Once again the editorial pointed out that for "sev-
eral years after the Armistice it seemed to be entirely a matter of 
headline space whether the police took cognizance of a Liberal 
meeting, a Radical meeting or a Red meeting." 77 That practically 
the same argument that had been presented in 1924 was pre-
sented again in 1930 shows the Times's continual recognition of 
and resignation to the expropriation of the liberal symbol by a 
number of left-wing elements. 
In the 1920s Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler would never have sur-
rendered the title "liberal" without a fight; yet the Times, per-
haps reflecting and molding the views of its readers, was more 
easily resigned to the new meaning of liberalism. Perhaps, un-
like a skilled politician such as Butler, the Times did not realize 
the irnportance of liberalism and the increased significance that 
was being attached to the label. 
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Since liberal was a vague but favorable symbol, and since this 
symbol had not yet been widely used, it appears possible that 
Herbert Hoover, given the national platform of an incumbent 
president, might have been able to win designation as a liberal 
before Roosevelt had a chance to introduce and popularize the 
symbol for a wide audience. In fact, before 1932 Hoover did 
claim that he was a liberal. In 1928, for example, he attacked-in 
the name of liberalism-Governor Smith's advocacy of govern-
ment intervention: "Every step of bureaucratizing of the busi-
ness of our country poisons the very roots of liberalism-that is, 
political equality, free speech, free assembly, free press, and 
equality of opportunity." 78 
However, before the New Deal, although Hoover occasionally 
referred to himself as liberal, he did not make any intensive ef-
fort to capture the label-that is, to popularize it and give it mean-
ing so that it referred solely to his philosophy. What little 
evidence there is during this period indicates that Hoover both 
recognized and accepted the fact that many elements that he 
considered illiberal were calling themselves liberal. Hoover 
argued: 
It is these human rights and the success of government 
which has maintained them that have stimulated the ini-
tiative and effort in each individual, the sum of which has 
been the gigantic achievement of the nation .... 
Never had these principles and ideals been assembled 
elsewhere and combined in government. This is the Ameri-
can system. 
We have lived and breathed it. We have seldom tried even 
to name it. Perhaps we might well abandon efforts to define 
it-for things of the spirit can be little defined. Some have 
called it liberalism, but that term has become corrupted by 
political use .... 
Ours is a system unique with America-an expression 
of the spirit and environment of our people-it is just 
American. 79 
When the newspapers reported the speech, liberalism was, of 
course, unmentioned. A typical article could say only that 
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Hoover supported the American system, something that could 
not be defined. 80 
Perhaps Hoover did not yet realize the advantage of being able 
to apply the liberal label solely to his own philosophy. Another 
possible, and I think very likely, explanation for Hoover's appar-
ent resignation at this time is that "liberal," as explained in 
Chapter 1, was not yet an in1portant political tag. The label ex-
isted, and intellectuals and major politicians were aware of it 
and occasionally used it; however, the term had not yet become 
an important symbol of common speech. Hence it would have 
been unusual for Hoover to have placed great emphasis on it. 
We have seen the circumstances under which the influential New 
Republic looked to the British Liberal party and introduced the 
term "liberal" into American politics. After this introduction, 
several left-wing or protesting organizations adopted the term, 
while people we would today call conservative objected to this 
new American use of "liberal." The New York Times editorials 
and President Hoover objected-but not strongly-to what they 
thought was a misuse of a time-honored word. All of these 
activities occurred, of course, on a very small scale and were the 
preparation for the much more widespread discussion of liber-
alism in the 1930s. 
The Great Debate: 1932-1940 
The Antagonists: Hoover and Roosevelt 
Herbert Hoover was truly a great Progressive. 
Though a registered Republican, he sent a campaign contribu-
tion to Theodore Roosevelt and publicly supported his Bull 
Moose party in 1912.1 During World War I Hoover began to earn 
much respect from people such as Louis Brandeis and Woodrow 
Wilson-first because of his aid to Americans stranded in Bel-
gium, and then because of his administration of relief in that 
country. By 1918, Hoover had made such a national reputation 
as an effective war food administrator that his name had become 
a household word. In 1920 Brandeis and the New Republic began 
a Hoover-for-President campaign. 2 At this time Franklin D. 
Roosevelt wrote of Hoover: "He is certainly a wo'nder, and I 
wish that we could make him President of the United States. 
There could be no better one." 3 During the 1920s, when the 
country endured the administrations of Warren G. Harding and 
Calvin Coolidge, and when progressivism had disappeared 
from the White House and no longer had a majority in Con-
gress, Hoover was considered one of the progressive champions 
of the national government. 4 
Yet Herbert Hoover had a tragic flaw. Hoover the great Pro-
gressive, the great engineer, and the great humanitarian was also 
the great dogmatist. He had in his mind a very dear idea of what 
progressivism was; to venture one step beyond that idea was to 
him absolutely un-American. Hoover would use .federal govern-
mental power in a negative manner-for example, traditional 
trust-busting-but would be reluctant to use such government 
power in a positive way-for example, to feed people. 5 In 1931 
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he declared that desperately poor people should be fed but that 
this care was a voluntary and local responsibility, for "if we start 
appropriations of this character we have not only impaired 
something infinitely valuable in the life of the American people 
but have struck at the roots of self-government." 6 
Hoover practiced what he preached. During World War I he 
had tried to run Wilson's Food Administration as far as possible 
on a voluntary basis. 7 Later, while secretary of commerce, he 
induced Harding to persuade the steel companies to grant 
an eight-hour day. Notice that the steel companies granted the 
eight-hour day; Hoover did not press for a law to regulate hours 
but urged voluntary regulation. 8 Later, as secretary of commerce 
under Coolidge, Hoover established some two thousand volun-
tary trade associations to aid small businesses-associations 
that could in theory "establish codes of ethics, standardize pro-
duction, establish efficiency, and make substantial savings." In 
practice many members of the voluntary associations did not 
abide by their rules, as Franklin D. Roosevelt, head of the Ameri-
can Construction Council, soon discovered. 9 
Rexford Tugwell has succinctly summarized Hoover's person-
ality: "Hoover was not an engineer at all in any factual sense, 
but a man of principle. . . . There was almost no distinction, in 
his mind, between federal relief for the unemployed, for in-
stance, and Communism." 10 
While Hoover was dogmatic, Roosevelt was flexible. For ex-
ample, although Roosevelt believed in government economy so 
strongly that he objected, while governor of New York, to even 
such small expenses as per diem compensation to the Nassau 
County mosquito extermination commission, and while he en-
thusiastically accepted the Democratic platform's economy plank 
in 1932,11 he also could argue in that year, "I believe that we are at 
the threshold of a fundamental change in popular economic 
thought .... The country needs and, unless I mistake its tem-
per, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation .... 
Above all, try something." 12 
Both Hoover and Roosevelt imitated the methods that the Pro-
gressives had used to direct the economy in World War I, but 
Roosevelt was not bound by Hoover's dogmas. Both Hoover and 
Roosevelt were ready "to label these measures as voluntary-
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but in contrast to Hoover, ... [Roosevelt] was ready to put int 
them in fact the teeth of compulsion. Voluntary methods ha~ 
not worked very well." 13 
Roosevelt and Hoover each represented a major school of 
thought in t~e 1_930~. Hoover and his followers objected strongly 
to Roosevelt s v10lation of the dogma that it is wrong for govern-
ment to act positively. 14 While Hoover was certainly no Herbert 
Spencer, yet had the same fanatical zeal of a Spencer, he and his 
followers argued that Roosevelt's program was a precursor to so-
cialism, or even worse was socialism itself, masked under the 
name of liberalism. 
Rexford Tugwell observed that both Hoover and Roosevelt "re-
garded themselves as liberal capitalists, even if the Roosevelt 
d~finition would have included planning and direction. They 
differed on a question of instrumentalism-what was end and 
what was means and what could therefore properly be manipu-
lated and what had to be regarded as untouchable. If this seems 
narrow ground for so epic a struggle it is nevertheless the 
ground on which it is taking place. It was-and is-that kind of 
struggle. And it is by no means yet settled." 15 In this chapter we 
shall analyze a part of the struggle that for a great majority of 
people is settled; that is, we shall examine Hoover's attempt to 
"unmask" Roosevelt as a false liberal. 
Roosevelt's Need for a Symbol 
In order for President Roosevelt to engage effec-
tively in "bold, persistent experimentation," he had to capture a 
favorable symbol that would help to ward off expected attacks la-
beling his programs as "communistic" or "socialistic." Tugwell 
pointed out that, in order to win support in their struggle 
against change, reactionaries have to impute "to their oppo-
nents either rascality or non-conformance so that their own 
moral superiority could be urged in indignant language." This 
Roosevelt adviser then elaborated: "But, political machines be-
ing what they were, rascality was usually more available to 
reformers .... Non-conformity was the great resource of the 
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h SI.de What heretics were to the Middle Ages, 'reds' be-ot er · . . . 
e to the twentieth century. This was an effective competmg ~:ctive .... The danger that he might be tagged 'Red' wit~ all 
hat follows from such labeling, made Mr. Roosevelt cautious t h I • f • about stating any objective except t e preser_vation o capi-
1. m ' a renunciation in which other progressiVe leaders also ta IS ' 
felt forced to join." 16 FDR's political sense was keen enough to 
realize that in the United States the label "Red," or even "so-
cialist," is the sign of opprobrium. 
"Socialist" is such a reproachful term here because of what 
Louis Hartz calls our liberal tradition. 17 Because there has never 
been feudalism in America, no aristocracy has developed with 
an ideology to support its privileges, and therefore, no Far Left 
could develop in opposition. This Far Left, where it does de-
velop, has to form a counterideology (in order to justify its posi-
tion) that rests on fundamentals contradictory to those beliefs of 
the aristocracy. In the United States both Toryism and socialism, 
and the labels that represent these philosophies, are unnatural 
and foreign. Applying America's liberal tradition to the New 
Deal, Hartz observes: "Had Roosevelt said, 'we have to go 
beyond Locke but not as far as Marx,' and had he translated 
Locke into 'Americanism,' which was of course its meaning 
here, he would have alienated many of his followers from him. 
... 'Americanism' was gospel, the very thing which made so-
cialism alien, and any conscious transgression of it . . . was 
highly unpalatable." 18 Roosevelt therefore needed an appropri-
ate symbol so that he would be able to justify his new policies in 
terms other than socialism. 
It also would have been advantageous for Roosevelt to capture 
a favorable, "forward-looking" word as a means of counteracting 
the wealth of conservative symbols that for years were being built 
into society. Both Rexford Tugwell and Thurmond Arnold have 
listed several"sacred words" that had been captured by the con-
servatives. "Individualism," Tugwell and Arnold believed, was 
used by some as a justification for not caring for the indigent; 
"independence" was taken to prevent union membership; and 
"freedom and liberty" were twisted by some to mean that corpo-
rations were individuals that had to be protected at all costs. 
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"Liberty of contract" meant that it was unconstitutional for Con-: 
gress to enact a minimum wage for women and children work-
ing in Washington, D.C. 19 
Roosevelt had to counteract these old sacred words partly 
by redefining them and partly by introducing a new symbot 
He had to understand the functions of symbols in order, in 
Thurmond Arnold's words, to "make men as enthusiastic about 
sensible things as they have been in the past about mad and de-
structive enterprises." It was not enough for the government 
to aid the indigent, encourage union membership, or support 
unemployment insurance-measures that could be justified 
on pragmatic or humanitarian grounds. Roosevelt also had to 
justify these measures on a symbolic level. As Arnold realized, 
"the humanitarian values which [many of Roosevelt's measures] 
represent, and which prevent us from abandoning them, . . . 
[should be] tied up with . . . [a] theological structure which 
gives us peace and certainty for the future." 20 
The third major reason why it was particularly important for 
Roosevelt to be identified with a term of favorable connotations 
was that he could use that label to win electoral support outside 
of the Democratic party. Roosevelt needed to introduce a politi-
cal label that would allow voters to think in terms other than Re-
publican or Democrat. By associating his policies with a word 
such as "liberal," instead of "Democratic," a sympathetic Repub-
lican could more easily justify his vote for FOR because he could 
mentally say to himself, "I am for Roosevelt, not because he is a 
Democrat, but because he is a liberal." Roosevelt used the liberal 
label to operate as cross-pressure against the significant factor of 
party identification. 
Roosevelt must have been acutely aware that his party was 
in a distinct minority position. In 1920 the Democratic presi-
dential ticket, with Roosevelt running as vice-president, had 
won only 34.1 percent of the total vote. Four years later this fig-
ure dropped even lower, to 28.8 percent, and in 1928 the Demo-
crats, although raising their total presidential vote, were still 
soundly defeated and polled only 40.8 percent. 21 While all poli-
ticians generally appeal to voters outside their own party, it was 
essential for Roosevelt to win many Republican votes. 
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While Roosevelt was governor of New York, he explicitly or-
dered Samuel Rosenman, his speechwriter, never to attack Re-
ublicans or even the Republican party, because this would alien-~te the many Republicans whose votes he needed. Roosevelt, 
who continued this policy throughout his career, explained to 
Rosenman: "There are thousands of people who call themselves 
Republicans who think as you and I do about government. They 
are enrolled as Republicans because their families have been Re-
publicans for generations .... So never attack the Republicans 
or the Republican party, only the Republican leaders. Then any 
Republican voter who hears it will say to himself: 'Well, he 
doesn't mean me, I don't believe in the things Machold and 
McGinnies and Knight and the other reactionaries up in Albany 
believe in either."' 22 
This policy of Roosevelt's assured that he would not automat-
ically repel Republican votes; yet, to win elections he had to at-
tract Republicans. The logical extension of FOR's policy, then, 
would be to introduce a term that could identify his ideas on 
government and still not be so attached to the Democratic party 
that it could not be used to attract Republicans. Roosevelt under-
stood this and stated explicitly: 
I have always believed, and I have frequently stated, that 
my own party can succeed at the polls so long as it con-
tinues to be the party of militant liberalism. . . . There is a 
vast number of independent voters who are unwilling to be-
come affiliated with either party, but whose social and po-
litical outlook is definitely liberal, and whose votes have 
been cast for liberal candidates. On the other hand, millions 
of enrolled Republican voters-affiliated under the conser-
vative Republican leadership for one reason or another-
have nevertheless consistently voted for the type of govern-
ment and candidates who appear under the liberal banner. 23 
President Roosevelt realized that in order to ward off more effec-
tively the attacks that he was a "Red," to negate conservative 
symbols, to make men and women enthusiastic about his pro-
grams, and to widen his basis of electoral support, he had to 
capture a favorable political label. 
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Inappropriate Symbols for 
Roosevelt's Program 
There were several possible terms with which 
it would have been unfavorable for Roosevelt to identify. He 
could have called himself a Socialist, but such a foreign tag 
would have alienated many followers. "Democratic" was a pos-
sible label, but emphasis on this word would have made it 
more difficult for him to attract much Republican support. "So-
cial Democratic" had the disadvantage of both worlds, for it 
sounded "faintly un-American" and also would not draw Re-
publicans. 24 
Roosevelt could have relied solely on the phrase "New Deal" 
to identify his program, and in fact this term-to which Roose-
velt attached no special significance when he introduced it in his 
acceptance speech to the Democratic convention-did become 
the hallmark of his program, even though it was the press, and 
not FOR's premeditation, that endowed the phrase with impor-
tance. 25 The great advantage of "New Deal" was that, since it had 
no historical definition, Roosevelt's actions would automatically 
breathe into this pliable term its entire meaning. Yet this advan-
tage was also a disadvantage; because the word was born with 
no meaning of its own, either good or bad, it was less useful as a 
means of counteracting conservative symbols and winning sup-
port from those who did not want to be so closely tied to his ad-
ministration. For these reasons, it was to FOR's advantage not to 
rely solely on the tag "New Deal" but also to introduce a symbol 
that had inherently favorable connotations, even though such a 
word might be more difficult to capture. 
No doubt a label that was a prime contender was "progres-
sive"; in fact, Rexford Tugwell, an adviser to Roosevelt, pre-
ferred this term because of his "not liking the English 'Lib-
eral."' 26 However, the great disadvantage of identifying with 
progressivism was that the term was not an empty enough word 
to be in the public domain. That is, the word was closely iden-
tified with the Progressive movement led by many Republi-
cans such as Theodore Roosevelt and Robert LaFollette. Even 
Herbert Hoover was well known as the Great Progressive. Also, 
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Roosevelt wanted to experiment, but "the economics of Ameri-
can progressives was anything but experimental." 27 Rather than 
attempt to change the meaning of a well-used word and risk 
the possibility of association with Hoover, it was much more 
logical for Roosevelt to try to capture a term that was favorable 
but not well used and that did not have any publicly agreed-
upon definition. 
Roosevelt Chooses a Symbol 
Roosevelt instinctively chose to capture "liberal" 
and identify his programs with that term. We will never know 
for certain exactly why he chose that particular label, but we can 
make some reasonable guesses. Tugwell recalled once talking to 
Roosevelt about the origin of his use of "liberal," but Roosevelt 
did not answer him, though "he laughed and asked if it mat-
tered." 28 Roosevelt probably did not answer because he had not 
consciously chosen the liberal symbol, just as he had not con-
sciously chosen the label "New Deal." Rather, as Raymond 
Moley believes, "the use of the term at that time was not arrived 
at with any premeditation or precision." Moley adds, "I speak 
with some authority on this because I did assemble and direct 
the group upon which Roosevelt depended for the development 
of campaign policies in 1932 and I was very close to him in 1933 
when the programs were being formulated and presented to 
Congress." 29 
It was not particularly surprising for Roosevelt to identify with 
the word "liberal," for he must have been reading the New Re-
public and would have understood that magazine's use of "lib-
eral" and "conservative." Further, he was probably aware that 
several reformist elements of society had been using the term. 
Roosevelt had been using the term before the New Deal, but 
he had not made it his own. As early as 1919, at a banquet of 
the Democratic National Committee, he spoke of "conservatism, 
special privilege, partisanship, destruction on the one hand-
liberalism, common-sense idealism, progress, on the other." 30 
Yet he had not popularized this liberal-conservative dichotomy, 
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for as late as 1931 we can find Roosevelt comparing and con-
trasting conservative politicians or ideas to Progressive (rather 
than liberal) politicians or ideas. 31 Apparently it was not until 
1932 that Roosevelt began to popularize the liberal-conservati 
terminology. 
Just as it was Roosevelt's style instinctively to understand the 
need for a symbol that would allow him to engage in bold and 
persistent experimentation, he probably also instinctively un-
derstood what I argued in Chapter 2-that "liberal" was an in-
herently favorable term for a politician to adopt, that this label 
had laudatory implications, and that it captured the drift of mod-
ern history. 
Probably the main reason why FOR chose "liberal" was that he 
identified with the philosophy of the British Liberal party. We 
have seen how both the Liberal Republicans of 1872 and the New 
Republic of 1916 looked to England when they searched for a 
political label. Roosevelt very likely followed this tradition. Dr. 
Maley states that "perhaps it [liberal] was [used] because we felt 
that the philosophy we were suggesting was rather close to that 
of the Liberal Party in England-the party of Gladstone and 
Lloyd George." 32 
We have already seen how the Campbell-Bannerman and 
Asquith governments in England provided models for some 
New Deal legislation and that Keynes, during the time of the 
New Deal, perceived the Liberal party to be the middle ground 
for controlling and directing economic forces. Roosevelt and 
many of his advisers also saw their philosophy as being the 
middle way; they had the same perceptions as Keynes. 33 
Roosevelt wanted the middle way, and he made clear that 
to him "the middle course is, and I quote what I have said be-
fore, 'just a little bit left of center.'" 34 Like the Liberals of En-
gland, every member of the Brain Trust rejected laissez faire, 
trust-busting, or socialism. Instead they favored various forms 
of business-government cooperation and believed that no ele-
ment in society should hold a preponderant power. 35 
If we could imagine Roosevelt in England, .we could more 
easily appreciate how similar his philosophy was to that of the 
British Liberals. Louis Hartz asks, 
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What would he have said had the American Socialist party 
been the English Labor party . . . ? Obviously under such 
circumstances Roosevelt would be speaking very strange 
language indeed. He would be defending private property, 
he would be assailing too much "bureaucracy," he would be 
criticizing the utopian mood in politics. After pleading for 
the TVA and the SEC and the HOLC, he would proceed. to 
qualify his faith in the state by an attack on the larg~r radi-
calism which faced him to the left. In .other words, Instead 
of being "radical," he would be half radical and half conser-
vative, which is precisely the unfortunate position that the 
Liberal reformers of Europe were compelled to occupy. In-
stead of enlisting the vigorous passions of youth, he might 
easily be described as a tired man who could not make up 
his mind; a liberal who tried to break with Adam Smith but 
could not really do so. 36 
1 am not contending that Roosevelt was directly influenced by 
Keynes's perceptions of liberalism, for these two men really did 
not even understand each other. 37 Yet both Keynes and Roosevelt 
were free of a dogmatic belief that government cannot act in a 
positive manner, and both perceived themselves as seeking a 
solution to the Great Depression, a solution that they saw as 
middle-of-the-road. Hence Maley's supposition-that in 1932 the 
New Dealers felt their philosophy to be close to that of the Lib-
eral party in England and therefore called themselves liberals-
is logical and reasonable. 
Instinctively, for FOR had good instincts, Roosevelt had seen 
the need for an advantageous label and had chosen it; yet 
this decision did not end the story of the term "liberal." Rexford 
Tugwell was at least one Brain Truster who appreciated the prob-
lem: "In the transition from an old to a new progressivism . . . 
great care had to be used .... To be progressive was respectable 
enough; but the enemy's game was to prove that individual pro-
gressives were 'radicals.' Any wine therefore had to be put care-
fully into the old bottles and the size of the letters on the label 
had to be increased in proportion to the dilution of the con-
tents." 38 The struggle to capture the word "liberal" had begun. 
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The Beginnings of the Debate: 
1932-1933 
From the very beginning of the New Deal, Roose-
velt adopted the liberal tag. When accepting the Democratic 
party's nomination for president, for example, he called that 
party "the bearer of liberalism and of progress." 39 In his second 
message to Congress, on March 10, 1933, in a speech written by 
Moley, 4° FOR justified his request for powers to slash $5oo mil-
lion from the budget by warning, "too often in recent history, 
liberal governments have been wrecked on the rocks of loose 
fiscal policy." 41 
Americans were not really concerned with what Roosevelt was 
calling himself at this time. This was the period, until June 15, 
1933, in which the country was experiencing the frenzy and mo-
tion of the Hundred Days. The president could do no wrong. 
In May 1933, Anne O'Hare McCormick reported the mood of 
America: "Something far more positive than acquiescence vests 
the President with the authority of a dictator. This authority is a 
free gift, a sort of unanimous power of attorney .... Industry, 
commerce, finance, labor, farmer and householder, state and 
city-virtually abdicate in his favor." 42 Some of the president's 
measures, even deflationary ones such as budget cuts, were not 
questioned but were accepted as "surgical measures for chronic 
tumors in the political and financial systems." 43 
On the whole, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., says, "the feeling 
of movement was irresistible," and there were few signs of pro-
test. 44 The Des Moines Register was one of the rare harbingers of 
later dissent. "The world today," its editorial argued, "does not 
know what true liberalism as applied to conditions of now really 
is." It continued: "In this country we are in the midst of the diz-
ziest period as to that question that we have ever known. This 
much is certainly true, that it is the Hoover type of mind that is 
still standing in these times for the individualistic dogma that 
was the fundamental of original liberalism, and that it is the 
Roosevelt type of mind that is insisting on far-reaching measures 
which are the reverse of individualism. Yet practically every-
body, without dissent, rightly or wrongly, looks on Hoover as 
the conservative and on Roosevelt as the liberal." 45 
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Actually, not everyone did look on Roosevelt as the liberal; we 
find that for the first time the issue of what liberalism really 
meant became important enough that a reader of the New York 
Times was prompted to write a letter to the editor concerning the 
proper definition of liberalism. Roosevelt had wanted bold and 
persistent experimentation, but it was in the name of liberalism 
itself that the reader objected, categorically asserting that "the 
liberal is not an experimenter." 46 For the most part, however, the 
issue of what Roosevelt was doing to that grand old word "lib-
eral" was being ignored, and even one major corporate business 
magazine-probably not understanding what Roosevelt meant 
or would mean by "liberalism" -proudly announced to its em-
ployees: "If you are lacking in confidence in our President's 
understanding of the many problems that must be solved in 
staying this drastic liquidation and bringing about definite and 
wholesome improvement, read a book just published, Looking 
Forward, by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The cover sheet carries the 
following: 'We are about to enter upon a new period of liber-
alism and of sane reform in the United States .... As President 
of the United States I shall do my utmost.'" 47 
Willard Kiplinger, who wrote an influential business news-
letter, argued that it was not until March 1, 1934, that business 
reaction against Roosevelt became significant. 48 That this thun-
der on the right did not appear until1934 was of great advantage 
to the New Deal, for it furnished a period of grace in which 
Roosevelt's programs could be identified with liberalism unham-
pered by any serious challenge to the New Deal's power to define 
this term. 
The First Round of Debate: 
The Election of 1934 
Since 1934 was an election year, the attack by the 
Right greatly increased in an attempt to convince the American 
people that they (the Right) were the true liberals. It was in this 
64 • THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE 
year that a group of very conservative Democrats and so 
members ~f big busine~s such as Alfred P. Sloan-"find:; 
the. R~pu.bhca~ p~rty an Inadequate vehicle for the expression of 
their Indignation -established the Liberty League to save th 
country by launching a direct attack on the New Deal. The Lib~ 
erty Leaguers would have preferred a new McKinley to a New 
Deal, and they probably would have preferred a new Mark 
Hanna to either. 49 (Mark Hanna, the prominent nineteenth-
century captain of industry, Republican National Party chair-
man,. and political kingmake~, typified the turn-of-the-century 
marnage between the Repubhcan party and big business.) 
I am not really concerned with the activities of this group, be-
cause the league was so extremist and represented such a small 
~~~t of public ~pinio~ that even Herbert Hoover refused to join 
It. More~ver~ Its main emphasis in political debate, the symbol 
upon which It focused, was not liberalism but the American 
Constitution. As one member of the league's executive commit-
tee, speaking of the Constitution, contended: "I do not believe 
that many issues could command more support or evoke more 
enthu~iasm .among our people [than the Constitution] .... 
The~e Is a m1ghty-though vague-affection for it. The people, 
I beheve, need merely to be led and instructed." 51 
A more important, and more interesting, attack came from the 
less .extreme conservatives, led by Hoover. Hoover's The Challenge 
~~ Lzbe:ty appeared in 1934 and, says Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
.pro~1ded a comprehensive statement of the conservative posi-
tion. 52 Hoover claimed: 
Liberalism holds that man is master of the state, not the 
servant; that the sole purpose of the government is to nur-
~ure and assur~ thes~ liberties. All others insist that Liberty 
1s not a God-giVen nght; that the state is the master of the 
man .... 
. On other occasions I have commented upon the perver-
s~on and assumption of the term "Liberalism" by the theo-
~~es of every ilk-whether National Regimentation, Fas-
cism, Socialism, Communism, or what not. I have pointed 
out that these philosophies are the very negation of Ameri-
can Liberalism. 
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And I may add a word to that group of people in and out 
of government who are playing with Socialist fire without 
expecting it really to burn. The penetration of Socialist 
methods even to a partial degree will demoralize the eco-
nomic system, the legislative bodies, and in fact the whole 
system of ordered Liberty .... In the United States the reac-
tion from such chaos will not be more Socialism but will be 
toward Fascism. 53 
Hoover and his followers carried this argument to the people, 
shouting that Roosevelt's policies were socialistic. 
What was really liberalism? This question was actively dis-
cussed on a popular level by a great number of people. We saw in 
the previous chapter that in 1924 and 1930 two Times editorials 
argued that the time-honored word "liberal" had been expro-
priated after the war. For the third time the newspaper repeated 
this argument, claiming, "The good old pre-war word, liberal, 
standing for progress with order, was captured by a much 
tougher crew after the armistice, so that Liberal, Radical and Red 
became interchangeable." 54 For the first time the editorial pro-
voked a response from the readership: "One reads that 'the 
good old prewar word Liberal has been captured by a much 
tougher crew.' Is this not an ungenerous characterization of such 
men as Herbert Hoover and John W. Davis-about the only citi-
zens nowadays who are willing to make public proclamation of 
their liberalism?'' 55 
Another disturbed reader quickly replied. His answer is worth 
quoting in its entirety: 
By what right and on what basis does Elmer Davis [the 
author of the previous letter] speak of Herbert Hoover and 
John W. Davis as "Liberals"? There is nothing in the known 
policies and actions of these men that will in any sense jus-
tify the title . 
The word "liberal" has been taken in vain by a great many 
persons since the World War but surely it is vainest of all to 
apply it to men whose points of view are out of accord with 
that characteristic of liberal-mindedness. 
The liberal attitude is certainly that of belief in the im-
provability of human situations by means of specific legisla-
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tion without being scared off by foolish and irrelevant cries 
such as "regimentation" and "socialistic." The liberal is fur-
ther willing to let the other fellow shoot off his mouth with 
his political opinions. 56 
Professor John Dewey, during a symposium entitled "The Fu-
ture of Liberalism," added that those who oppose basic reform 
ub}' d S are In and stubborn reactionaries." 57 Yet the Times sarcasti-
cally charged that "a 'Liberal' administration is one that comes 
down with the cash. A 'liberal' is a patriot who wants all he can 
get from 'liberal' Uncle Sam, turning his pockets and those of 
the taxpayers inside out." 58 The debate was on. 
Since Roosevelt and Hoover and their followers were all claim-
ing to be liberals, there must have been great confusion. Samuel 
Beer hypothesizes that to end this semantic problem the New 
Deal liberals called their opponents "conservatives." 59 That 
~ewey was trying to label the Hoover school of thought as reac-
tionary and that the opponents of FDR complained that Hoover 
was be~ng unjustly tagged as a conservative does support Beer's 
reasoning. However, since Hoover did not readily accept the ap-
pellation of "conservative," and since the United States did not 
have a Liberal party that had the right to define "liberal," the 
confusion continued-as we shall see-for some time. 
An article that appeared in the New York Times Magazine dur-
ing this period probably reflected quite accurately the general 
populace's confused notion of liberalism in the early 193os. It 
could hardly have been written today. It was titled "Liberalism 
Faces a World Challenge," and its author wasP. W. Wilson. 60 
Wilson immediately presents the problem: America is con-
fronted by a "sharp issue .... It is an issue that has been stated 
in the plainest terms. According to Secretary Wallace, the nation 
has to decide whether it will or will not surrender certain liber-
ti~s of the people to economic necessity. In the Old World, 
Liberalism has been largely abandoned. Has Liberalism become 
impossible in the New World?" 
. Wilson the~ notes that there had never been so "many orga-
niz,~d expresswns of what was understood to be Liberalism" as 
there were in 1934. In Geneva there was the League of Nations, 
and "even in Asia we find parliaments." The number of schools 
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had multiplied. This was the era of opportunity; yet somehow 
"over much of the civilized world the very Liberalism which pro-
moted our civilization should now be stamped out by the police 
as an evil thing." 
Liberalism apparently had triumphed and yet had not tri-
umphed. Attempting to explain this paradox, Wilson says: 
"Clearly we need to rid our minds of confusion and ask. our-
selves what Liberalism really means." He claims that "Liberalism 
is a charter of liberty for the individual" that applies to all gov-
ernments of whatever form. This charter guarantees that there 
are certain matters, such as those of conscience, "in which the 
free citizen has the right and duty to be his own master." Wilson 
seems to be arguing that liberalism means tolerance. 
Then, while describing what wonders this doctrine of liberal-
ism achieved in the past, Wilson gives us another definition: "It 
was Liberalism that put through the great schemes of old age 
pensions and national insurance against unemployment, sick-
ness and maternity. It was Liberalism that threw open the uni-
versities of Oxford and Cambridge to all classes and races, that 
carried the first and fundamental scheme of national education." 
Liberalism now seems to mean state welfare activities. As if to 
give justification to this interpretation, Wilson later says, "No 
grievance need arise if the State extends its functions by under-
taking responsibility in an elaborated community for the regular 
supply of necessities like gas, water and electricity. It is not a 
grievance that the State should supervise railways and banks in 
so far as such supervision is necessary to safeguard the interest 
of the public." 
Liberalism now means much more than tolerance. Yet Wilson 
contradicts himself when he explains what is the liberal eco-
nomic philosophy: 
In economics the teaching of Liberals has been no less 
clear. They have accepted the dictum of Adam Smith that 
the wealth of nations is interdependent; that commerce be-
tween nations is of general benefit to all and special benefits 
to each .... 
Deficits on budgets, fluctuations of currencies, repudia-
tion of financial obligations-all these evidences of chaos 
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would have been unthinkable to the great financiers in Brit-
ain: Pitt, Peet Gladstone and the rest, who, whatever may 
have been their party label, applied Liberal ideas to the ad-
ministration of the Exchequer. 
In short, liberalism is tolerance and individualism, but it is 
also a state administering welfare and regulating the business in 
the public interest-and doing all of this under the rules of clas-
sical economics. 
While presenting his definitions of liberalism, Wilson also 
classified several people as liberal. One might guess that such a 
list would lessen the confusion over the meaning of liberalism. 
In fact, the opposite effect is achieved. Wilson classifies John 
Stuart Mill as a liberal, and somehow Thomas Carlyle-who at-
tacked Mill, liberalism, and the greatest happiness principle-
also qualifies as a liberal. We discover that Abraham Lincoln "be-
came a symbol [of liberalism] for all mankind," and that Thomas 
Jefferson was "perhaps the greatest Liberal of them all." Walt 
Whitman, Charles Dickens, and several others are liberals, too. 
What Wilson says in effect is that anyone who is well remem-
bered was a liberal. His notion of who liberals are is as confused 
as his notion of what liberalism is. 
The American people on the whole were probably just as con-
fused about the proper meaning of liberalism as was Wilson. 
Roosevelt sensed their confusion and tried to persuade them 
that positive government is not dictatorship. Minimizing the 
differences with American tradition that the New Deal repre-
sented, Roosevelt pointed out that "the conservative British 
press has told us with pardonable irony that much of our New 
Deal program is only an attempt to catch up with English re-
forms that go back ten years or more." 
Responding to Hoover's challenge, Roosevelt replied in kind: 
"My friends, I still believe in ideals. I am not for a return to that 
definition of liberty under which for many years a free people 
were being gradually regimented into the service of the privi-
leged few. I prefer and I am sure you prefer that broader defini-
tion of liberty under which we are moving forward to greater 
freedom, to greater security for the average man than he has 
ever known before in the history of America." 61 
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1 am certain that the great majority of Americans were still 
confused; they would not have been able to agree on what true 
liberalism actually was. Yet Roosevelt appeared to be taking 
ositive action to fight the depression, and it was clear that free-~om had not yet been subverted. "Most people simply could not 
accept the portrait of the American government as a totalitarian 
dictatorship," says Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 62 In the midterm 
elections, the Democrats did not lose seats, which would have 
been normal in an off-year. Instead they gained ten seats each in 
the House and Senate. 63 
The debate was not yet over, but the New Dealers had won the 
first round. 
The Second Round: 1935-1936 
From the very beginning of the New Deal, Roose-
velt's policies differed from Hoover's and from those of the other 
Progressives. Tugwell saw the New Deal policies as so dissimilar 
that he concluded, "Looking back from the beginning of the 
New Deal in 1933, the radical movements preceding it seem to 
have been pretty mild, usually-deserving the name radical 
only by courtesy, certainly not by comparison." 64 After the 1934 
election, which inaugurated what was to be called the Sec-
ond New Deal, it became even clearer to Americans that Roose-
velt's policies were transcending much American tradition. 
He was now beginning to give more emphasis to reform not only 
to achieve economic recovery but also for its own sake. This 
Second New Deal was far to the left of the First Hundred Days, 
and it enabled Roosevelt to become the "champion of the 
new political coalition of farmers, laborers, and millions of 
underprivileged.'' 65 
Although from the very beginning Roosevelt was doing some-
thing different in American politics, his divergence from past 
policies became much more apparent to the articulate public in 
general during this Second New Deal, for Roosevelt was re-
sponding with new proposals to a more class-oriented elector-
ate. It was in this period, specifically in the 1935 session of Con-
gress, says Raymond Maley, that Roosevelt powerfully urged 
70 ·THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE 
"social security, aimed essentially at urban wage-earners; the 
Holding Company Act, which undermined the strength of the 
big power companies; and the Wagner Act, which put govern-
ment squarely behind the labor movement. Roosevelt's major 
messages and speeches took on a flavor of strong opposition to 
business interests." 66 
Tugwell has observed that Roosevelt's "departure from tradi-
tion followed practical necessities for some time before it be-
came apparent that the design being created would have seemed 
strange to Wilson or the predecessor Roosevelt." 67 Arthur Krock, 
a discerning witness of this time, was one of the first to sense the 
new design and to realize that the New Deal was shifting gears. 
Commenting on Roosevelt's first appearance before Congress in 
1935, Krock noted: "In his opening message this week to the 
first Congress elected on a referendum of the New Deal-a Con-
gress overwhelmingly pledged to support him and his maturing 
policies-the President chartered a definite course for what may 
in time be known as twentieth-century American liberalism" ( empha-
sis added). 68 Krock predicted that Roosevelt's new policies might 
capture the title of "liberal," and added that, in Washington at 
least, the great majority of public thought favored the president 
"not apparently or solely as Democrats or New Dealers ... but 
as subscribers to his permanent character of liberalism. Respon-
sible legislators and administrators in the mass seemed to find in 
it no socialism." 
Although Washington agreed that the new policies should be 
called liberal, the rest of the country was not as convinced, for 
Krock admitted: "Liberalism has never been defined to the com-
plete satisfaction of any liberal." However, Krock tried to pre-
sent the "correct" definition: 
The Britannica gives what it considers the best definition, 
and, if the President's message is examined in the light 
of this description, it will be seen to reflect many of its 
principles: 
Liberalism is a belief in the value of human personality, 
and a conviction that the source of progress lies in the 
free exercise of individual energy; it produces an eager-
ness to emancipate all individuals or groups so that they 
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may freely exercise their powers, so far as this can be 
done without injury to others; and it therefore involves a 
readiness to use the power of the State for the purposes 
of creating the conditions within which individual en-
ergy can thrive, of preventing all abuses of power, of af-
fording to every citizen the means of acquiring mastery 
of his own capacities, and of establishing a real equality 
of opportunity for all. These aims are compatible with 
a very active policy of social reorganization, involving 
a great enlargement of the functions of the State. They 
are not compatible with socialism, which, strictly inter-
preted, would banish free individual initiative and 
responsibility from the economic sphere. 
While the comment can be made that one advanced section 
of liberalism would oppose the limitations on individual acquisition 
and power which the President pledged himself to impose, 
another liberal group has always held that the State must, in 
varying degree, protect the many weak from the full devel-
opment of the economic and political strength of the strong. 
This was the President's thesis and he fortified it with more 
detail than he has ever given before [emphasis added]. 69 
Krock, like Roosevelt, used the definition of liberalism as a 
justification of the New Deal. Although he admitted that there 
were. some who called themselves liberal and yet allowed un-
limited individual acquisition and power, he dismissed them. 
They refused to be dismissed, however, and for the 1936 election 
they made a desperate effort to seize the label "liberal." 
The Republican platform for the 1936 election, declaring that 
"America was in peril," dedicated the party to "the preservation 
of ... political liberty." Old-age annuities and unemployment 
insurance were condemned as "unworkable," and Republicans 
"pledged themselves to maintain the Constitution and to pre-
serve free enterprise." 70 The presidential nominee who had to 
face Roosevelt was Alfred Landon, governor of Kansas, who had 
bolted the party in 1912 to support the Bull Moose Progressives. 
But although Landon was the nominee, Hoover had hardly dis-
appeared from the scene. It "was ex-President Hoover who in 
speech and in writing attacked the procedures of the Democrats 
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and formulated again and again the Republican case," says 
Denis W. Brogan. 71 
Representing the anti-New Deal position, Hoover told theRe-
publican party that it had had "the greatest responsibility" since 
the days of Lincoln, for it had had to uphold "the standard of 
American principle." There is "one issue that is never outworn," 
he argued. "That is human liberty. The party must become the 
true liberal party of America." Hoover was specific in his attack. 
"Today the term liberalism is claimed by every sect that would 
limit human freedom and stagnate the human soul, whether 
they be Fascists, Socialists or New Dealers." The New Deal, he 
said, was a "false liberalism" that regimented men and extended 
bureaucracy. He went on, "Liberty and opportunity do not 
flourish on a deficit of three billions a year." 72 
In another speech, in which he was introduced as "a real liber-
alist, not the anarchistic, communistic, socialistic type that 
we have now," Hoover warned that the New Deal's ideas "are 
dipped from cauldrons of European fascism or socialism." In 
this speech Hoover suddenly changed topics and devoted most 
of the remainder of his time to a discussion of the symbol "liber-
alism." He complained: 
We hear much as to who is a Tory, a reactionary, a conser-
vative, a liberal or a radical. ... You can elect yourself to 
any one of these groups if you say it often enough. If you do 
not like anybody you can consign him to the one which is 
most hated by your listener. 
Taking a compound of definitions coming out of Washing-
ton, the impression would be that ... the liberals have the 
exclusive right to define the opinions of others .... 
As a matter of serious fact, these terms have been used 
mostly for camouflage and for political assassination. The 
natural choice of youth is toward true liberalism .... 
It is false liberalism that interprets itself into dictation 
by government. 73 
Roosevelt clearly understood that the Republican leaders had 
decided to "base their campaign upon the charge that the New 
Deal was an 'alien' form of philosophy," so FOR decided to 
assault this issue frontally. Therefore, in his very first speech of 
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the campaign he assured the people: "I have not sought, I do 
not seek, I repudiate the support of any advocate of communism 
or of any other alien 'ism' which would by fair means or foul 
change our American democracy. That is my position. It has al-
ways been my position. It always will be my position." 74 
Roosevelt's supporters joined with him in defending the New 
Deal in terms of the symbol "liberalism." John Dewey, fm; ex-
ample, wrote a historical summary of liberalism, contending 
that liberalism had two strains: humanitarianism and laissez 
faire. In the United States, he argued, "liberalism has been iden-
tified largely with the ideal of the use of governmental agencies 
to remedy evils from which the less-fortunate classes suffer." He 
charged Hoover and the Liberty League with "identifying the 
meaning of liberty and rugged individualism with the mainte-
nance of the system under which they prospered." Dewey con-
cluded, as had Roosevelt, that "laissez-faire liberalism is played 
out," but the remedy for a better society is not violence but 
rather liberalism, which is not afraid to use state action. 75 Even 
the New York Times, which earlier had been lamenting the loss of 
that word, now published an editorial that differentiated be-
tween liberals and Communists, even though it said that many 
liberals look "forward ultimately to a classless society, demo-
cratically controlled, in which collectivism coexists with full lib-
erty for the individual." 76 
Although Hoover continually insisted that he was the true lib-
eral, the 1936 election offered the first instances of some Hoover-
like liberals who began to call themselves conservatives. In re-
plying to Dewey's defense of liberalism, one reader insisted-as 
we would expect-that "true liberals" are "vehemently opposed 
to government control of daily affairs of citizens" and that no 
new legislation is needed. However, he also added that "true lib-
eralism and conservatism merge." 77 
We are told in another article that "your true liberal may be 
toward many ideas and ideals most conservative, but he ... 
presses on. With him there are imperishable values in history 
and experience which no age can afford to ignore." 78 Except 
for diehards such as Hoover, some conservatives in 1936 were be-
ginning to abandon the liberal symbol and claim the conser-
vative label. 
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In 1936 the people had to decide if Roosevelt's policies meant 
greater liberty or tyranny. The design of his policies was then 
much clearer than in 1934. Roosevelt, of course, won every state 
but Maine and Vermont. Unlike the 1932 election, in which 
people of all classes deserted the Republican banner, the New 
Deal in 1936 won "each successively lower-income group ... in 
larger proportions.'' 79 
We saw in Chapter 2 how the advanced Whigs captured the 
tag "liberal" and were able to make it viable and lasting because 
their name change was accompanied by a fundamental change 
in policies and the introduction of class politics. For somewhat 
similar reasons, although the dichotomies of America are more 
moderate than those of England, the New Deal won the battle for 
the word ''liberal.'' 
As it became clearer that the New Deal was going beyond 
American tradition, it became logical to apply a new name to 
those new policies. The new name was "liberal" and not "So-
cialist," partly because Roosevelt's political instinct rejected the 
Socialist label and instructed him to insist that he was a liberal, 
operating under a definition of liberty that allowed positive 
government action, and partly because the Hoover school of 
thought was insisting that socialism meant regimentation and 
tyranny. Since the great majority of people had not felt ·any great 
loss of freedom, they would not, by Hoover's definition, equate 
socialism with the New Deal. · 
Before 1932 most people had not been calling Hoover liberal, 
for he was a Progressive. Since his policies had not changed, it 
was unreasonable for people to give him the new label. By 1936 
most people probably also agreed that Hoover was not liberal. 
Raymond Maley summarized the process by which "liberal" 
came to identify Roosevelt's proposals. It was in the Second New 
Deal, he said, that "the trade name 'Democratic' was kept, but 
the substance of the party's heritage ... [underwent] a meta-
morphosis. And with the change there came into use the word 
'liberal' to describe an ideology based on the enlargement of the 
power of the Federal government and an abundance of welfare 
programs." 80 
The debate to capture the liberal symbol logically should have 
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ended with the 1936 election; in the next section we shall see 
why it actually continued. 
The Third Round: 
The Court-Packing Plan 
The 1936 election results were fairly convincing 
evidence that the great majority of people accepted FOR's new 
policies and the new name he applied to them. Conservative Re-
publicans should have realized the futility of their insistence that 
they (the conservatives) were the true liberals. Indeed, the de-
bate might have ended except for Roosevelt's attempt to pack the 
Supreme Court. 
Because of the Court's many anti-New Deal judicial decisions, 
and after FOR's tremendous vote of confidence, the president be-
came determined to alter the Supreme Court. 81 On February 5, 
1937, he proposed that Congress give a Supreme Court justice or 
lower federal court judge past the age of seventy six months in 
which to retire. If the judge or justice failed to retire within the 
appointed time, he could not be removed from the bench, be-
cause the Constitution grants lifetime tenure. But under FOR's 
proposal, the president would be able to appoint an additional 
judge or justice, who-in theory-would be younger and more 
able to handle the judicial work load. The maximum number of 
additional judges who could be appointed was fifty, and the 
total maximum membership to which the Supreme Court could 
be expanded would be fifteen, a maximum that would in fact be 
reached, since six justices were then over seventy years old. 
Roosevelt would then have up to six new appointments on the 
High Court.82 Though Roosevelt presented the plan as a means 
of getting new blood in the judiciary, the opposition and the 
general public found this argument disingenuous and labeled 
the proposal with the pejorative epithet, "Court-packing plan." 
From the very beginning this plan ran into tremendous op-
position from many congressmen, a great majority of the news-
papers, and, of course, the American Bar Association, for the 
Supreme Court was an important symbol in itself, a symbol of 
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liberty in a world that was seeing Hitler's rise to power. The gen-
eral public, who just a short time before had given the New Deal 
a great margin of victory at the polls, also joined vigorously in 
the opposition to the plan, for "through the years, and despite 
increasing evidence that judicial interpretations and not Funda-
mental Law shackled the power to govern, the American people 
had come to regard the Court as the symbol of their freedom."83 
Most people know the end of this story: Roosevelt did not 
pack the Court, and the Court stopped trying to repeal the New 
Deal. 84 The significance of the episode in the liberal debate is that 
because of this Court plan, conservatives could join with liberals 
in attacking the proposal as illiberal. This was not the major 
ground for the attack on the Court plan, but it was one basis. 
Although liberalism was hardly the decisive factor in the Court 
fight, the fight was a major factor in the debate over liberalism. 
In the Senate, for example, the leader of the opposition to 
Roosevelt's proposal was no conservative but the liberal Senator 
Burton K. Wheeler, who justified his opposition in terms of lib-
eralism. "A liberal cause was never won by stacking a deck of 
cards, by stuffing a ballot box or packing a Court." 85 Since even 
liberals were attacking Roosevelt in the name of liberalism, con-
servatives could make the same attack and once again claim that 
they themselves were the true liberals. 
Looking at the pages of the New York Times for this period, we 
find that by far the greatest number of articles discussing lib-
eralism appear to be in response to Roosevelt's Court proposal. 
For example, the former secretary of state, Bainbridge Colby, 
"warned against misuse of the term liberal." After presenting 
the usual incantations such as, "Liberalism is the cooperation of 
voluntary association, toryism is the cooperation of coercion," 
he became more specific and instructed that liberalism "involves 
absolute independence of the judiciary. Toryism is the integra-
tion of power, and such a coercive regime seems the very anti-
thesis of liberalism." 86 His implications must have been clear. 
Later the Times printed a long editorial titled, "Liberalism and 
Tempo." 87 The beginning of this editorial presented general at-
tacks on the new liberals : "Liberals may defend a Klansman on 
the Supreme Court [Hugo Black for a time had been a member of 
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the KKK] because he is sound on the Administration's economic 
program. The new Liberal will condone labor violence on the 
ground that employers have long practiced violence in strikes, 
and it is now our turn." That "fine old word 'liberal,' with a small 
'1,'" said the editorial, has been "sometimes thrown out of the 
window, by the Liberal with a capital 'L."' While liberals be-
lieved in moderation, "the new Liberal is in a hurry." 
Given this introduction, the Times editorial then launched into 
a strong attack, in the name of liberalism, on the Court-packing 
proposal. Roosevelt's New Deal reforms were good, the article 
said, but the true liberals would rather accept the delay of these 
reforms than accept Roosevelt's plan for the Court. Because 
of the Court, America might have lagged in social justice, but 
the lag has not been a denial. Concluding, the Times warned: 
"How dangerous anti-democratic speed may become has been 
amply demonstrated in those countries where despotism pre-
sides over tempo." 
This editorial, perhaps because it reflected contemporary pub-
lic opinion so well, was greeted with a tremendous number of 
responses. One reader warned that "the so-called new liberals" 
are moving in a "blind rush." Another reader, agreeing with the 
Supreme Court that many New Deal programs were "in viola-
tion of the accepted principles of government of the people," 
added that the Court proposal was a product of "self-conceived 
'liberal' thought" that at the very least established a precedent 
that provided "a grave fear of future danger." Another called the 
editorial an excellent "example of liberal thinking," and yet 
another observed: "Jefferson, truly liberal if ever man was, after 
advising a correspondent in a letter of July 12, 1816, that al-
though Constitutions should be amended when necessary, 
added: 'I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried 
changes in laws and Constitutions."' 88 
Of course, not all the responses to the editorial were favorable. 
Many of those who approved of the Court plan justified it in the 
name of liberalism. Speaking of the same editorial, one reader 
charged, "It is the old story of the laissez-faire school denounc-
ing the fighters for social progress as radicals and revolution-
aries." Another reasoned, "Liberalism was gradualist when the 
78 • THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE 
world was gradualist. Can it afford to take one step at a time 
when progress, or at any rate change, on so many other fronts is 
made by leaps and lurches? Isn't liberalism forced to quicken its 
tempo if it is to survive at all?" Another simply suggested, ''For 
the editorial 'Liberalism and Tempo' you should go straight to 
bottomless perdition." 89 
Since much of the public-liberals and conservatives-op-
posed the Court plan because it was not thought to be in the 
spirit of liberalism, the debate over what should be called liberal 
and if Roosevelt should really be called a liberal, was artificially 
extended, even though Roosevelt had already logically captured 
the term. However, although the Court proposal extended the 
debate over "liberal," it also helped prepare the way for the ac-
ceptance of the label "conservative" by the conservatives. Be-
cause the Court plan to some extent discredited the New Deal in 
the minds of many people, by association the Court plan also 
tended to discredit New Deal liberalism. Since New Deal liber-
alism became suspect, the word "liberalism" became a little tar-
nished. It therefore became easier for conservatives to accept 
another label that in their eyes was not tainted. 
The Purge of 1938 
In 1938 the president was stunned by reversals 
in Congress, just two years after his overwhelming reelection. 
What most exasperated the New Dealers was their belief that the 
country was more liberal than the Congress, and that "many 
Democrats had won office on Roosevelt's popularity only to knife 
him as soon as the returns were counted." A council of liberals 
was formed to study the possibility of purging conservatives 
from the party. 90 
On June 24, impatient with conservatives of his own party and 
irritated by the election victory of Guy Gillette, a staunch anti-
New Deal Senator from Iowa, Roosevelt began the purge. Against 
his opponents he hurled a new (and yet old) symbol, when he 
charged that they were "copperheads" : "Never in our lifetime 
has such a concerted campaign of defeatism been thrown at 
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the heads of the President and Senators as in the case of this 
seventy-fifth Congress. Never before have .we had so many 
Perheads-and you will remember that It was the copper-cop S . d h . heads who, in the days of the War between ~he tates, tr~e t eir 
best to make Lincoln and his Congress give up the fight, let 
the nation remain split in two and return to peace-peace at 
any price." 
Roosevelt then argued that, not as president, but as head of 
the Democratic party, charged with carrying out its liberal plat-
form, he had the right to speak in Democratic primaries ~etween 
onservatives or liberals or in cases "involving a clear misuse of 
c . "h h Y own name." Liberals, Roosevelt argued, recognize t at t e 
m d' " new conditions throughout the world call for new rem~ Ies, 
while conservatives "do not recognize the need to step In and 
bl "91 take action to meet these new pro ems. 
Later Roosevelt went even further in his declaration and an-
nounced that he would prefer liberal Republicans to conser-
vatives of his own party, and that he would continue to cam-
paign for the election of liberals in national and state politics, 
regardless of their party affiliations. 92 • • 
The manner in which symbols were used In the purge Illus-
trate both FDR's awareness of their importance and his oppo-
nents' increasing recognition of the power of words. After Roose-
velt had tried to label all conservatives as "copperheads," the 
Herald Tribune, a Republican paper, responded with the charge 
that Roosevelt was pinning a new tag on his critics to "tar them 
with utterly undeserved prejudice." Significantly, the paper then 
queried, "Did the advocate of this technique, Mr. Thurmond 
Arnold, suggest the use of 'Copperhead,' we wonder?" 93 Since 
Arnold had written his own study of symbols, The Symbols of 
Government, in 1935, and had been appointed assistant attorney 
general in March 1938/4 the Tribune had good reason to wonder. 
Rather than argue who were the "true copperheads," FOR's 
conservative opponents, who by now had had several years 
of experience in battling symbols, called Roosevelt's actions a 
"purge." As William Leuchtenberg has pointed out, since the 
word "purge" quickly became the generic term for Roosevelt's 
actions, "the President [had] placed himself on what seemed the 
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wrong side of a 'moral' question." The word "summoned up im-
ages of the bloody extermination of Roehm and other Nazi lead-
ers by Hitler in 1934 ... [and] as the Czech crisis built toward 
the showdown at Munich, it was easy to represent t'\.u,os4F>V&:•!V..., 
move with the Saine unquenchable appetite for power that pos-
sessed the European dictators." 95 Although FOR objected to the 
tag and argued that the word "purge" was used "by those who 
were opposed to liberalism" in order "to misrepresent my 
duct ... ," the label stuck. 96 
Roosevelt campaigned for the election of liberals, but on the 
whole the purge was considered a failure. Of all the races in 
which he intervened, only in New York was the anti-New Deal 
candidate defeated. 97 
The purge failed for many reasons. For one, the New Deal's 
prestige was falling because of the Court-packing plan, union 
problems in 1937, and the Roosevelt recession in the fall of 
1937. 98 The purge itself was also badly handled and "executed in 
an amateurish and only half-committed fashion." 99 Probably an-
other main reason for the failure was that Roosevelt assumed 
that the country was much more ideological than it actually was. 
Though New Deal politics were more class-oriented than previ-
ous American politics, and although "liberal" was a useful label 
to justify actions and win support across party lines, Americans 
still lived with the liberal tradition, where politics were not 
solely class politics and ideological feelings were mild. As 
William E. Leuchtenburg has observed: 
Roosevelt had hoped that, by distinguishing between lib-
eral and conservative representatives, he could win popular 
support for the creation of a liberal Democratic party. Un-
happily, ideological issues that seemed clear in Washington 
blurred in South Carolina .... Liberalism and conservatism 
became confused in an encounter which pitched the might 
of the federal machine against the State House crowd, a con-
test in which each candidate sought to outdo the other in 
whipping up race hatred. In the end, Smith [South Caro-
lina's anti-New Deal candidate] won by splitting the vote of 
the millhands. "It takes a long, long time," the President 
commented wearily, "to bring the past up to the present." 100 
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The unsuccessful purge is useful not only to show ~he .limits ~f 
h ower of the symbol "liberal" but also because It gives evi-teP b'fl. d' dence of a trend that began in 1936 but was ne y Interrupte In 
1937
; that is, in 1938, often in response to the pur~e, we read that 
more conservatives than in 1936 were calling themselves 
even ·11 · · d th t 
rvative Some conservatives, to be sure, sti Insiste a conse · . . 
he were properly called liberal. One Republican senatonal can-
tY . II d 'th didate claimed that true liberalism was summe up In e sen-
tence that 'Those people are governed best who are gov~rned 
1 t , " and the Republican national chairman seconded this ob-eas, · f 
servation when he declared, "The true Republicans running or 
Congress this year are liberals and most of the Democrats seek-
1 . t "101 ing re-e ectwn are no . . 
To a very great extent, however, conservatives began accept-
. even embracing the label of "conservative" and argued that mg, , . . 
onservatism was better than liberalism. For the first time we 
c d that a man like Senator Glass, for example, defined a liberal 
rea b d 1 , "A 
as "a man who is willing to spend some o y e se s money. s 
we might expect, a conservative is defined as "a man with good 
sense." Elliott Roosevelt, who on some occasions had been 
sharply critical of his father's programs, "defined the liberal. as 
one who was ready to 'try anything once' and the conservative 
as one who 'stops, looks and listens before he leaps."' One 
reader attacked liberals by defining "a 'liberal' in Congress . . . 
[as] one who is always liberal in spending the ~~xpayer's.money," 
while another defended conservatives by wnting that 1t was on 
"the conservative American philosophy" that the foundation of 
this nation was built. 102 
More and more conservatives seemed no longer to be afraid of 
calling themselves conservatives and attacking liberals. Even ~he 
Des Moines Register, which was, as we saw earlier, one of the fust 
newspapers to complain that it was improper to call FOR a 
liberal, now happily accepted the new terminology and ho~ed 
that America would enter into "another sober-conservative 
period." One New York group, which was so reactionary :hat 
it thought Dewey would turn the state to the Commumsts, 
started a new party, and they did not hesitate to call it the Con-
servative party. 103 
Just as 1936 marked the logical end of the debate, 1938 marked 
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the beginning of the end of the actual debate. After this point 
there was a precipitous decline in the number of news articles on 
liberalism-not because people stopped using the term, but be-
cause it became less newsworthy. People were beginning to stop 
debating about it, and more and more conservatives were ac.; 
cepting the designation of conservative. 104 
The End of Public Debate: 1939-1940 
After 1938 the New Deal's interest turned much 
more to foreign affairs than previously. Roosevelt was becoming 
more concerned with the world crisis; as some historians have 
noted, "he had not abandoned the New Deal, but it was in 
abeyance." 105 As the president and the American people began 
to think more of possible war, they talked less about the term 
"liberal." In 1939 a headline announced that various Democratic 
officials, including Paul McNutt, the Social Security adminis-
trator, and Aubrey Williams, the National Youth administrator, 
predicted that liberalism would be the 1940 election issue; in 
fact, the issue was national defense. 106 
The issue of the proper ownership of liberalism was not 
completely settled, though, for few issues are ever completely 
settled. A poll taken in 1939 showed that "four out of ten voters 
have little idea of how to define a 'liberal,' a 'conservative,' and a 
'radical,' in spite of President Roosevelt's emphasis on the dis-
tinction."107 If we focus on the more articulate and well-read 
public, however, on those who were more politically aware and 
probably had some idea of what "liberal" meant, we should look 
at the opinions of the 6o percent who could detlne the labels. 
Only 1 percent of those who could give some definition of the 
terms and who had opinions thought of Roosevelt as a conser-
vative; 55 percent felt that he was a liberal, and 41 percent called 
him a radical. (The poll indicated that most of those who called 
him a radical were Republicans.) Only 5 percent of the people 
who could give some definition of the terms and who had opin-
iori~s thought Hoover was a liberal; somehow, 3 percent said he 
was a radical, although by far the great majority (92 percent) 
called him a conservative. 
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Roosevelt had won a sym o 
than "New Deal." 
Roosevelt and a National 
Liberal Party 
Several students of the Roosevelt era have ar-
gued that FOR desired to realign American politics so that all 
the conservatives would be in one party and all the liberals in 
the other. 1 The disastrous failure of the purge of 1938 clearly 
showed that this realignment would not take place. "That man 
Roosevelt" seemed to have learned his lesson after this debacle. 
For example, in 1940 he refused a request to speak out on behalf 
of Senator Harry Truman, who was opposed in the Missouri 
primary. Stephen Early, the White House secretary, explained 
to Truman that it was the president's "'invariable practice' to 
take no part in primary campaigns. 'The President must stand 
aloof,' said Early, 'regardless of any personal preference he 
might have."' 2 
Yet Samuel Rosenman contends that as late as 1944 Roosevelt 
actually believed that "from the liberals of both parties Willkie 
and I together can form a new, really liberal party in America." 3 
Rosenman explains that after Dewey won the nomination in the 
1944 convention, because of conservative Republican opposition 
to Willkie, Willkie then discussed with Governor Pinchot the 
possibility of the liberals in each party joining together and ex-
pelling all conservatives. Pinchot reported to Roosevelt, who 
told Rosenman that he agreed with Willkie's idea "one hundred 
percent and the time is now-right after the election. We ought 
to have two real parties-one liberal and one conservative." 
FOR then asked Rosenman to contact Willkie and discuss 
the proposed new liberal party. However, since many Republi-
can liberals had been urging Willkie to endorse Roosevelt, and 
since Willkie had chosen to remain silent, the president warned 
Rosenman to explain to Willkie that the meeting would have 
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thing to do with the 1944 election. Therefore Willkie would 
no f . h. 
not think the meeting was an effort or subter uge to w1n IS 
support. . . " . 
At the secret meeting Rosenman told Willkie, The President 
learned in 1938, the hard way, that he cannot beat them [the con-
servatives] in their own districts. He is now ready to form a new 
grouping, leaving them out of the ne:" liberal party. You see, you 
both are thinking along the same hnes. He wants t~ team up 
[with] you." Willkie agreed with Rosenman and smd that he 
thought that the work should begin immediately after :he 1944 
election. However, since Willkie died before the election a~~ 
FOR died shortly after, the "herculean task that these two pohti-
calleaders had thought of undertaking" was never even started. 
That is Rosenman's argument; but the facts that he gives allow 
a very different interpretation-that is, th~t Roosevelt.permitted 
Willkie to believe he was willing to start a hberal party 1n order to 
win, or imply that he had won, Willkie's support for the 1944 
election. 4 This 1944 episode with Willkie was really Roosevelt's 
last great use of the concept of liberal to bridge t~e gap caused by 
party labels and to win, or at least app~ar to Win, the endorse-
ment of a prominent Republican. Even If Roosevelt had no~ se-
cured Willkie's official endorsement, he would have neutralized 
his opposition during the 1944 election. 
This episode with Willkie took place from June .to Aug~st, 
shortly before the most active part of the campmgn ag~Inst 
Dewey began. At this point Roosevelt looked old and hr~d, 
while Dewey was young and energetic; in fact, "the campmgn 
showed signs of being dull, and perhaps of ending in a Republi-
can victory." 5 Roosevelt probably thought at this time that .he 
needed all the aid he could possibly obtain. As one means of In-
creasing his support, FOR appealed to Willkie, not, of cours~, on 
the basis of Republicanism or Democratism, but on the bas1s of 
liberalism. 
Rosenman explained that when he met with Willkie to discuss 
the formation of a third party, Willkie said that he wanted to talk 
about the plan in greater detail with the president, "but he was 
convinced that the meeting should not take place until after elec-
tion day. He did not want to appear that he was trading or ~eing 
traded with; and a meeting between the two before election-
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which could not possibly be kept secret-would give rise to 
many conjectures." 6 Rosenman relayed this information to 
Roosevelt; yet the president wrote to Willkie, his former Republi-
can opponent, that he wanted to meet with him before the 
election. 7 
This letter to Willkie was so secret that Rosenman says he did 
not learn of it until a month later, and that probably no one ex-
cept FDR and Grace Tully, who typed it, knew about it at the 
time it was sent. Then Rosenman significantly adds: "On this 
occasion, however, he could not keep the secret himself. He 
must have talked to someone about the letter, for the fact that it 
had been sent began to 'leak.' The Willkie adherents charged that 
the President had deliberately let it leak; the President's support-
ers insinuated that Willkie had let it leak. Although Roosevelt 
loved secrecy, he was often the one guilty of letting facts get out 
about which he had sworn others to silence." 8 
If Roosevelt really wanted to start a new party after the 1944 
election, we should ask, first, why would he insist on meeting 
with Willkie before the election? Rosenman argued that possibly 
the prospect of a new party was "too thrilling" to allow FDR to 
wait, but he also admitted that "maybe his motive was-as his 
hostile critics urged at the time-to give the impression that 
Willkie was going to support him in the coming 1944 election."9 
Second, we should ask why Roosevelt allowed news of his pro-
posed meeting with Willkie to leak. Rosenman guessed that the 
news leak was due probably to "some casual remark" of the 
president's. 10 I think the charge of the Willkie supporters, that 
the news leak was deliberate, was possibly closer to the truth. 
Roosevelt and Willkie never met before the election to discuss 
the proposal for a new party. However, the attempt to win this 
prominent Republican's support still partially succeeded. After 
his sudden death, reports Denis W. Brogan, "some leading Will-
kieites did come out for the President; others went further and 
declared that the dead leader had been planning to endorse 
Roosevelt." 11 
When the actual campaign began in September, the president 
proved ~to be a strenuous and inexhaustible man, not a tired 
old one. "This tour de force," says Frank Freidel, "seemingly 
proving Roosevelt's capacity to serve four more years, his inter-
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national leadership, and his promise to return to the New Deal 
after the war, were a winning combination." 12 When the results 
were in, the Roosevelt magic had marshalled 4 32 electoral votes 
to Dewey's 99· Although the belief by some that Willkie would 
have endorsed Roosevelt did not become a crucial factor in 
the election, the supposed endorsement did no doubt add to 
Roosevelt's margin of victory; and, in the dark campaign days of 
July and August, the winning of Willkie's support probably 
seemed important to FDR. It was certainly important to Dewey, 
who had felt, as the campaign reached its climax, that "a word 
from Willkie ... [was] a boon greatly to be desired." 13 
In a very subtle manner, Roosevelt had used the liberal label to 
attract, or appear to attract, a prominent Republican who would 
have been repelled by the term "Democratic." "Liberal," by 
Roosevelt's definition, stood for a loose system of ideas that al-
lowed some Republicans to justify their vote for a Democrat. 
86 • THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE 
which could not possibly be kept secret-would give rise to 
many conjectures." 6 Rosenman relayed this information to 
Roosevelt; yet the president wrote to Willkie, his former Republi-
can opponent, that he wanted to meet with him before the 
election. 7 
This letter to Willkie was so secret that Rosenman says he did 
not learn of it until a month later, and that probably no one ex-
cept FOR and Grace Tully, who typed it, knew about it at the 
time it was sent. Then Rosenman significantly adds: "On this 
occasion, however, he could not keep the secret himself. He 
must have talked to someone about the letter, for the fact that it 
had been sent began to 'leak.' The Willkie adherents charged that 
the President had deliberately let it leak; the President's support-
ers insinuated that Willkie had let it leak. Although Roosevelt 
loved secrecy, he was often the one guilty of letting facts get out 
about which he had sworn others to silence." 8 
If Roosevelt really wanted to start a new party after the 1944 
election, we should ask, first, why would he insist on meeting 
with Willkie before the election? Rosenman argued that possibly 
the prospect of a new party was "too thrilling" to allow FOR to 
wait, but he also admitted that "maybe his motive was-as his 
hostile critics urged at the time-to give the impression that 
Willkie was going to support him in the coming 1944 election."9 
Second, we should ask why Roosevelt allowed news of his pro-
posed meeting with Willkie to leak. Rosenman guessed that the 
news leak was due probably to "some casual remark" of the 
president's. 10 I think the charge of the Willkie supporters, that 
the news leak was deliberate, was possibly closer to the truth. 
Roosevelt and Willkie never met before the election to discuss 
the proposal for a new party. However, the attempt to win this 
prominent Republican's support still partially succeeded. After 
his sudden death, reports Denis W. Brogan, "some leading Will-
kieites did come out for the President; others went further and 
declared that the dead leader had been planning to endorse 
Roosevelt." 11 
When the actual campaign began in September, the president 
proved to be a strenuous and inexhaustible man, not a tired 
old one. "This tour de force," says Frank Freidel, "seemingly 
proving Roosevelt's capacity to serve four more years, his inter-
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national leadership, and his promise to return to the New Deal 
after the war, were a winning combination." 12 When the results 
ere in, the Roosevelt magic had marshalled 4 32 electoral votes 
:Dewey's 99· Although the belief by some that Willkie would 
have endorsed Roosevelt did not become a crucial factor in 
the election, the supposed endorsement did no doubt add to 
Roosevelt's margin of victory; and, in the dark campaign days of 
July and August, the winning of Willkie's support probably 
seemed important to FOR. It was certainly important to Dewey, 
who had felt, as the campaign reached its climax, that "a word 
from Willkie ... [was] a boon greatly to be desired." 13 
In a very subtle manner, Roosevelt had used the liberal label to 
attract, or appear to attract, a prominent Republican who would 
have been repelled by the term "Democratic." "Liberal," by 
Roosevelt's definition, stood for a loose system of ideas that al-
lowed some Republicans to justify their vote for a Democrat. 
The Epilogue to the 
Great Debate 
The Liberal Symbol after 
the Roosevelt Era 
" . , . As we h~ve seen, although the political label h~eral was Introduced Into England in 1830, the word was not 
an Important political symbol in the United States until the time 
?f the New Deal. The term had been used occasionally in Amer-
I~a before the New Deal, but it had not become a significant or 
viable word for the great majority of the people. 
. The New Republic did, however, begin using the word "liberal" 
In 1916 .. In the later 1920s some left-wing, reformist elements on 
the penphery of society also began to call themselves liberal. 
Because of these influences, because "liberal" is an inherent! 
good word_ that captures the drift of modern history, and als~ 
becau_se of Identification with the British Liberal party, FOR un-
conscwu_sly c~ose to call himself liberal. This political tag not 
only fulfilled Important functions, but it was also the basis for a 
great debate with the conservative elements of society, repre-
sented by I-Ierbert Hoover. 
Although Hoover always claimed that he was the true liberal 
by the 1936 election the articulate public generally probabl; 
agreed-even though the debate over the term continued until 
about 1940-that the new label "liberal" should be applied to 
Roosevelt's new policies, which transcended much American 
t:adition.' Since "liberal" had stood for Roosevelt's experimenta-
ho,~, ~hich led to his entire philosophy of positive governmen-
tal action, that political tag is still a frequently used symbol 
today· However, since "New Deal" has been associated, not with 
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Roosevelt's policies, but with Roosevelt's administration, that 
term is no longer important. 
Beginning in 1936, some conservatives admitted that Roosevelt 
had captured "liberal," and they accepted the label of "conser-
vative." The Court-packing plan of 1937 seemingly interrupted 
this trend, but it actually helped its continuance, because the 
Court proposal made New Deal liberalism even more suspect in 
the eyes of conservatives. After the failure of the Court-packing 
plan the trend resumed, and some conservatives began to ac\ept 
more readily the name of "conservative." 
By 1940, the actual debate was over for the great majority of 
people. The articulate public in general agreed that Roosevelt's 
policies should be called "liberal" and that Hoover's should 
properly be labeled "conservative." But as the term "liberal" be-
came more and more closely associated with the policies of the 
New Deal and the Fair Deal, the political tag became less seduc-
tive; it lost some of its inherent power. As conservatives accepted 
the fact that their opponents were named liberal, they reduced 
their effort to win the word "liberal" and instead focused their 
attacks on the substantive policies of the liberals. 
Early in 1949, for example, the New York Herald Tribune asked 
its readers to send in their own definitions of "liberal." Replies 
ranged from "one who wants someone else to support him, to 
think for him . . . to protect him from those who would impose 
on him responsibilities," to "a liberal is a man who is constantly 
and simultaneously being kicked in the teeth by the Commies 
and in the pants by the National Association of Manufacturers." 
Although the great majority still considered the term to be one 
of honor, a few thought the .label to be degrading. 1 "Liberal," 
then, was on the whole still an advantageous word to own, but 
the strong conservatives were able to reject what they felt was a 
derogatory designation. 
Later, when President Eisenhower assumed office, he con-
tinued this trend, for he "told us not to be afraid of the word 
'conservative."' However, he still tried to mitigate the impact of 
the symbol and conducted what James W. Prothro called an "in-
complete search, despite the assistance of some of the country's 
most efficient advertising. men, for an appropriate slogan to 
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describe his public philosophy-with 'progressive moderation' 
being replaced by the equally equivocal 'dynamic conserva-
tism' [reflecting] ... at least an uneasiness about the appeal of 
Hoover-style Republicanism." 2 
Though conservatives during the Eisenhower years rejected 
the term "liberal," they realized that the "conservative" tag then 
lacked the inherent drawing power of "liberal." Even Barry 
Goldwater, a man proud of his conservatism, revealed his frus-
tration that conservatives were not called liberal. As late as 1963, 
when addressing an enthusiastic audience of Young Republi-
cans, he charged that "the young people of America are sick and 
tired of the phoniness that has been going on under the false 
guise of liberalism for the last thirty years." Later in this speech 
he added, "Modern liberalism is only a form of rigor mortis. The 
old, respectable, sometimes noble liberalism of fifty years ago is 
gone for good." 3 
Indeed, Hoover's definition of liberalism seemed gone for 
good as far as the general public was concerned. The best the 
conservatives could do was to try to popularize their tag. Eisen-
hower and especially Goldwater in effect tried to do this. The 
business community represented by Fortune magazine also un-
derstood the need to breathe a better meaning into their "conser-
vative" label. As one author realized: 
One of the most important facts of life is that a rose by 
another name does not smell as sweet. It is time to get our 
labels clear. 
To sum up: If "conservative" means a love of adventure, a 
deep concern for opportunity, a recognition of the need for 
tolerance and change, then I say, "If this be conservatism-
make the most of it." But if "conservative" means a love of 
routine, a love of status and security, a denial of oppor-
tunity, reverence for the status quo, then like the other "Vir-
ginian" I say, "When you call me that, smile!" 4 
A clear sign that the general debate over the proper definition 
of liberalism was muted, if not virtually dead, is that attacks on 
the use of the word have been virtually ignored by the popular 
press. For example, Robert A. Taft, in 1946, argued that he was 
really liberal and that "self-styled liberals" advocated the con-
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tinuation of the Office of Price Administration, Truman's pro-
posal for compulsory federal health insu.rance, an~ p.eacetime 
conscription, which were "three essentially totahtanan mea-
sures." 5 Although a business newspaper proudly printed the 
entire speech in which he presented his contentions, the general 
public was not even stirred enough to ask, "Who is really lib-
eral?" Several years later one conservative writer charged that the 
word "liberal" no longer meant "a citizen who had a fixed and 
shining ideal, a man of honor, a man of logic and clear thought," 
but now meant "a somewhat confused and craven creature who 
spends most of his waking hours trying to 'see all sides of the 
question' and ends up as a confused and ineffectual pulp, whose 
greatest terror is of being called 'conservative."' 6 The general 
press also ignored that attack; it was no longer newsworthy. 
The Rise of the Conservative Label 
Today it seems that it is the liberals who are in 
disarray, with the conservative political tag in the ascendancy, 
along with current buzzwords such as supply-side economics, 
flat-rate income tax, balanced budgets, and static revenues. How 
did it come to be that a political label loaded with such favorable 
connotations could suffer so dramatic a reversal in popularity? 
The fashionable symbol today is not "liberal" but "conservative" 
or "libertarian." The pendulum has certainly shifted, but why? 
Roosevelt's capture of the liberal label has certainly been com-
plete, but the victory has proven hollow. Why? 
First, the symbol has become overused. As the breadth of its 
coverage has increased, the depth of its power has lessened. 
Like a currency that has become grossly inflated and diluted, 
the liberal tag has lost much of its power as it has been used 
to represent support of such widely divergent issues as mini-
mum wage laws, government funding of abortions, and the end 
of the prohibition of marijuana. 
Second, Roosevelt's substantive liberal philosophy has es-
sentially won. As the executive director of the Americans for 
Democratic Act! on acknowledged a few years ago, "a substantial 
number of people are really quite affluent now-economic is-
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sues don't impinge the way they did 20 or 30 years ago." The con-
cerns today are not breadlines, sweatshops, unpaid vacations, 
and excess profits. The focus is rather on bureaucracy, bloated 
government, overregulation, and high taxes. Liberalism has 
been one of the victims of its own success as the social agenda 
has shifted. 7 
In an article ominously entitled, "Update Liberalism, Or It's a 
6o's Relic," the junior Democratic senator from Massachusetts, 
Paul E. Tsongas, essentially agreed with the ADA evaluation: 
Liberals must take a fresh look at how to mobilize this 
new generation. The average young American takes for 
granted the social equities for which others fought. Young 
citizens have never known the abuses and injustices that 
molded older generations of liberals. They have never felt 
the anger and outrage that fueled the liberal cause. They 
have not grown up reading about hungry poor people; 
they have read about abuses in the food-stamp program. 
They have not grown up confident in an ever-expanding 
economy; they have seen sagging productivity, record inter-
est rates, and foreign dominance in trade ranging from 
crude oil to efficient cars. They may remember military ad-
venturism in Vietnam, but they can read every day about 
Soviet military adventurism in Afghanistan. 8 
Senator Tsongas ·has been widely regarded as a liberal, with a 
liberal voting record representing a liberal state. Yet he shifted 
labels. At first he called his political beliefs the "new liberalism." 
Then he called it "humane realism." Then he turned to "compas-
sionate realism." 9 The important point is that the various pro-
posed new labels drop the old label of liberal. 
Strong evidence demonstrating that FDR's brand of liberal 
politics has basically won is found in a wide variety of polls that 
show that many people who now label themselves as conser-
vative nonetheless favor government funding of abortions, fed-
eral efforts to provide Medicare and unemployment compensa-
tion, and federal regulation of employment safetyo 10 In 1964-the 
year of Barry Goldwater's massive defeat at the polls-only 30 
percent of the people called themselves "moderately conser-
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vative" or "very conservative." By 197S, 42 percent of the re-
spondents put themselves in this category. 11 However, while the 
number of self-described conservatives has risen, by 197S the 
substantive economic differences between those described as 
liberal versus those described as conservative seemed to have 
diminished. For example, about 90 percent of the self-styled lib-
erals believed that the government ought to help people get 
medical care at low cost. But slightly more than So percent of the 
self-styled conservatives agreed as well. About So percent of the 
self-styled liberals and 70 percent of the self-styled conservatives 
agreed that the government ought to see to it that everybody 
who wants a job can get one. 12 Only on a very few social issues 
was there sharp disagreement: about 65 percent of the self-
styled conservatives but only about 45 percent of the self-styled 
liberals believed that the government should restrict the sale of 
marijuana if the substance is dangerous. 13 Yesterday's battles be-
come today's truisms, as traditional liberalism becomes a victim 
of its own success. 
Third, the national focus has shifted from the liberal label sim-
ply because it is natural for the focus to shift. The tide in the 
affairs of humankind is not always high tide. As the historian 
Robert McElvaine has noted, the country's political history has 
been one of periods of liberal reform punctuated by what he 
calls "conservative breathing spaces." 14 As the national focus 
moved from Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty to the fight for a 
balanced budget, there was a need to change the arsenal of la-
bels to wage these very different political wars. 
Human life seems to revolve around cycles-the twenty-four-
hour day, the seven-day week, the four seasons, the twelve-
month year. Economics also has its cycles of boom and bust, in-
flation and recession. 
And politics too has its cycles. After the excitement of the Pro-
gressives like Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson came the 
normalcy of Coolidge and Harding. The New Deal of Roosevelt 
and Truman preceded the calmer Eisenhower years. After the era 
we now nostalgically remember as the 1950s came the elegance 
of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and the excitement of Camelot. 
Then came the Great Society and President Lyndon Johnson's 
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crushing victory over the Republican standard-bearer, the proud 
conservative, Barry Goldwater. Goldwater unashamedly em-
braced the conservative label, and Johnson tarred him with it. It 
seemed as though liberalism had reached new pinnacles. And 
so it had, but the next direction from a summit is down. 
The horrors of the Vietnam War soon eclipsed the Great So-
ciety and gave liberalism a bad name. Well-known liberals such 
as Hubert Humphrey and Lyndon Johnson embraced the war. 
Even when other liberals such as Robert Kennedy and Eugene 
McCarthy attacked it, those attacks also added some bad con-
notations to the liberal symbol, for some contemporaries labeled 
these attacks as unpatriotic. And the efforts of the liberals to pre-
vent escalation of the war were seen by some as efforts to have 
the United States fight with one hand tied behind its back. 
The Vietnam War continued under Richard Nixon. Nixon's 
vice-president, Spiro T. Agnew, knew the importance of words. 
Agnew spent a great deal of time trying to link "liberal" with 
"radical." Nixon's second term not only brought more war and 
Agnew's criminal indictment and resignation; it also brought 
Watergate-that American drama that the late Senator Sam Ervin 
thought was more tragic than even the Civil War, for the Civil 
War saw acts of heroism, honor, and bravery on both sides, and 
Watergate had no such redeeming features. 
After Nixon's near-impeachment and actual resignation, our 
country's first appointed president and vice-president took of-
fice. President Gerald Ford inherited unprecedented inflation, 
recession, and energy shortages. Ford's successor, Jimmy Carter, 
added to this triumvirate of problems the Iranian hostage crisis. 
It was the winter of his discontent. 
And then came the Great Communicator. Like Barry Gold-
water, Ronald Reagan was not afraid to call himself conservative. 
But unlike Goldwater, he spent no great effort seeking to dis-
mantle the Tennessee Valley Authority. Rather than refight the 
lost battles of the New Deal, Reagan unabashedly quoted FOR, 
while fighting for his new conservative agenda, which included 
Kennedy-style tax cuts. 
This "inherent cyclical rhythm in our public affairs," as Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said/5 is reflected in our current fashion 
in labels. The fact that "conservative" is now a more fashionable 
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word is strong evidence that President Reagan's election and de-
cisive reelection victory were not merely personal victories but 
portended possible fundamental changes in the political mood. 
Republicans such as Representative Jack Kemp and Democrats 
such as Senator Paul Tsongas have talked of such a realignment, 
and recent polls lend some support to that view. 16 
This cyclical rhythm is also reflected in the change in direction 
of the New Republic. As the New Republic turned seventy in 1984, 
President Reagan sent it words of praise, while Jeane Kirkpatrick 
and Henry Kissinger joined in. Many well-known liberals, such 
as Frank Mankiewicz, the former campaign manager for George 
McGovern, acknowledge that the New Republic has been "get-
ting conservative for some time, but now it's coming out of the 
closet." And Republican Representative Jack Kemp agrees: 
"There is no question that the New Republic is moving in the, 
shall we say, right direction." Liberal columnist Nicholas Von 
Hoffman bemoans the fact that "this society has no left-except 
in baseball. It's very hard to go against fashion-even at the New 
Republic." 17 
The importance of the liberal label has lessened as the word 
has been overused, as the traditional liberal policies have be-
come truisms and liberalism has become a victim of its own suc-
cess, and as the natural cyclical rhythm has progressed. There 
has thus been a dramatic decline in the power of the liberal sym-
bol. Yet it is a tribute to the potency of the liberal label that the 
New Right, the proselytizing conservatives, often call them-
selves "libertarians." Both the Left and the Right find their roots 
in the same symbol. And even today the liberal label occasionally 
sparks a dispute for its ownership. 
Lessons from History 
Liberals had won their label, although time has 
diminished the value of the victory. And conservatives, who ini-
tially merely accepted their appellation, now relish it. But before 
this period, the battle over these symbols reflected and helped 
mold the substantive policy disputes. 
Roosevelt's adviser, Thurmond Arnold, recognized the sig-
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nificance of the battle over the ownership of symbols when 
he noted: 
The question which confronts the student of government 
is what kind of social philosophy is required to make men 
free to experiment-to give them an understanding of the 
world, undistorted by the thick prismatic lenses of prin-
ciples and ideals, and at the same time undamaged by the 
disillusionment which comes from the abandonment of 
ideals. How may we make the truths of which men are 
dimly aware only in humorous or satirical moods into con-
structive forces to avoid senseless panic when old principles 
meet new conditions? How may we affect the attitude of that 
great mass of substantial, intelligent, idealistic, and kindly 
people whose opinions and actions count most in times of 
stability, so that they will cease to see impending moral 
chaos in practical and humanitarian action? 18 
Arnold's statement outlined Roosevelt's problem. The great ma-
jority of people had repudiated Hoover's policies in 1932; yet, 
FDR still needed a new symbol to make his "bold, persistent 
experimentation" acceptable. "Liberal" was the most appro-
priate symbol for Roosevelt's purposes and the one he uncon-
sciously chose. 
Reliance on the new label was an important means of warding 
off strong charges from the Right that the New Deal was social-
istic and that therefore Roosevelt was planning to regiment 
society and nationalize industry. If FDR had accepted the des-
ignation of Socialist instead of capturing "liberal," he would 
have lost many followers. The new and favorable term was also 
an important means of counteracting conservative symbols and 
of increasing Roosevelt's basis of electoral support. The sym-. 
bol acted as a counterpressure to the symbol of Republican 
party identification. 
Yet, while this symbol performed these important functions, it 
could not in itself be a substitute for good policies. "Liberal" 
pt:oved ~o be a good label to place on the New Deal package, but 
Roosevelt still had to prove that the package was worth buying. 
The use of the label, however, did allow the public in general 
to examine the New Deal's policies on its merits, "unencum-
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bered by constant thoughts of impending moral chaos."19 Roose-
velt's use of his political tag answered the questions that Arnold 
had asked~ 
Several of Roosevelt's contemporary critics asserted that FDR's 
capture of "liberal" was an important factor in his election victo-
ries. To be sure, "liberal" was an important and favorable politi-
cal term, but it had its limits. The failure of the purge of 1938 was 
one incident that clearly illustrated the limits of the power of the 
word, for Roosevelt's label proved to be an insufficient basis on 
which to realign American political parties. In modern times, as 
the national mood has become more conservative, we can more 
easily appreciate that the liberal label has lost much of its seduc-
tive power. 
An appreciation of the origins and development of the politi-
cal symbol "liberal" should also make us more cautious in apply-
ing modern labels, with all the verbal baggage that they carry, 
as a means of trying to unqerstand and interpret the past. 
Raymond Poincare, the president of France from 1913 to 1920, 
had warned that "we have to make use of language, which is 
made up necessarily of preconceived ideas. Such ideas uncon-
sciously held are the most dangerous of all." And Bentham 
added, "error is never so difficult to be destroyed as when it has 
its roots in language." 20 Words not only reflect but also _deter-
mine people's thinking. Hence, we must be aware of the impor-
tance of words in order to consider their power to determine our 
thoughts. For example, scholars have occasionally labeled a past 
historical figure as liberal, and have erroneously assumed that 
class-conscious electoral politics or similar aspects of the New 
Deal would naturally be exported along with the political label. 
As Thomas P. Neill has prudently warned: "Now an abstraction 
like ["liberal"] creates difficulties for the historian. He is con-
cerned with ideas as they are held by concrete persons at given 
times and places in history. He must be careful not to read his 
own or his age's understanding of a word back into the minds of 
men using the same word three or four generations ago .... If 
an historian were to do this he would fall into the trap of analyz-
ing the wine in the bottles. He must also be careful not to trans-
fer the contents of the term from one country to another." 21 
I would add that, while scholars must be careful not to read 
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a modern definition into the past's use of the word, they must 
also exercise great care when reading a modern word and all that 
it implies into a past that did not even use the word. Symbols 
are not only the hidden persuaders; they can be the hidden 
confusers. 
Our study of the rise and decline of the liberal label should 
demonstrate, in a very concrete way, the importance of sym-
bols in law and government. There are limits to the power of 
symbols. But there is also a magic in words: not the magic of 
"abracadabra," but magic nonetheless. Words have the ability to 
confuse and to clarify, to help legitimate policies, to generate 
loyalty, to give the appearance of action, to mold people's per-
ceptions of the world, to affect the way they approach a prob-
lem, and to reflect their innermost thoughts. 
When people argue about "mere words," they are talking 
about fundamentals, about infrastructure, not superstructure. 
As the prophet John said, "In the Beginning was the Word." 
Afterword: The Format of 
Legal and Political Discourse 
M. H. Hoeflich 
Normativity and Instrumentalism 
Several stimuli have sparked this essay and the 
case study that precedes it. First, they have developed from a 
close reading of H. L. A. Hart's now classic (and still controver-
sial) The Concept of Law 1 and two brief commentaries on it, A.M. 
Honore's "Real Laws" and R. S. Summers's "Naive Instrumental-
ism and the Law," both published in Professor Hart's festschrift, 
Law, Morality, and Society. 2 After twenty-one years Professor 
Hart's insights, expounded in The Concept of Law, remain fresh. It 
is the great genius of this book that his insights into the "social 
sources of law" are often not fully delineated and are even 
ambiguous, for it is this lack of final resolution that makes the 
book a starting point for discussion rather than the last word 
on the subject. The second impetus for this essay is a growing 
conviction that the economic approach to law, insofar as it points 
out the necessity of considering the economic logic of legal rules 
and doctrines, at least convinces us to focus upon issues such 
as the social cost of alternative legal mechanisms, the allocation 
of scarce societal resources, and indeed the efficiency of our 
whole legal structure, which for too long have been ignored 
by legal scholars. Third, it has grown from a reading of much 
of the recent output of those scholars who are members of 
the Critical Legal Studies Group and the attention they have 
drawn to the necessity of using semiological, structuralist, and 
other linguistic tools to understand law in its social context. 3 lt is 
thus the purpose of this essay to attempt, in a small way, a cross-
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fertilization of analytic jurisprudence and legal economics on 
the one hand, and analytic linguistics on the other, focused 
on the forms of legal discourse and how these forms functio 
within society. n 
Central to Professor Hart's idea of law is a rejection of the 
Benthamite and Austinian notion that law, stripped to its bare 
essent~als, is a series of commands, expressions of the will of a 
sovereign, backed by the threat of sanctions. 4 Professor Hart 
borrowing from the insights of modern sociologists, has re~ 
jected this simplistic definition of law and developed instead the 
notion of law as a system of normative rules. 5 This notion of nor-
mativity is extraordinarily fruitful. Normativity is, above all, a 
social concept. A rule is normative if it is one that a significant 
portion of a populace believes to state and create an obligation to 
behave in a certain way. 6 By "obligation" is meant that a sig-
nificant part of society accepts that the rule ought to be obeyed 
and that disobedience to the rule is ipso facto blameworthy and 
therefore worthy of censure. 7 A normative rule will be the focus 
of "serious social pressure" in favor of compliance. 8 Normativity 
does not guarantee that a rule will be obeyed. Rather, it means 
that members of the group for which the rule is normative 
possess what Professor Hart has called "an internal point of 
view" and can make comments upon the "internal aspect" of 
normative rules. 9 Thus, although normativity does not guaran-
tee compliance, it does signify that an individual violating a 
normative rule would recognize that, in the eyes of society, his 
act was wrong and blameworthy and that were he censured or 
sanctioned, he would deserve it. Normative rules, therefore, 
involve an internalization of a specific attitude inclining indi-
viduals to compliance and acceptance of situations where com-
pliance, at least in the short run, may run counter to specific per-
~onal goals. Acceptance of normative rules may, in fact, require 
Instances of renunciation or sacrifice or, in crude economic 
terms, nonutility maximization over the short term. 10 
The focus of this notion of normativity is society. Normativity 
is a social fact, discoverable by an external observer. In this view 
of law, normative rules may be seen as one interface between so-
ciety and society's ideas of how it wishes to shape itself. The dis-
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covery of a society's normative rules will tell us much about that 
society, how it functions, and how it sees itself. 
It is clear that normativity may take a number of forms in 
terms of obligation-creating statements. For instance, a rule may 
be morally normative or it may be legally normative. Professor 
Hart would make a distinction between these two types of nor-
mative rules based not on some difference in their "internal as-
pects," for there is none, but rather in their context. 11 He would 
suggest that a rule is legally normative because of its "system-
atic" nature, its place within the union of different types of rules 
that he labels primary and secondary. 12 It is this systematic as-
pect of some rules that leads Professor Hart to characterize them 
as legal. This distinction and its focus on the systematic nature 
of so-called legal rules has not been without its critics, but one 
might suggest that this distinction is neither always clear, even if 
it is fundamentally sound, nor necessarily significant. Many 
rules may be normative in more than one way. Thus a rule might 
be both morally normative and legally normative. Think, for in-
stance, of the general social prohibition of father-daughter incest 
in the United States. This prohibition is certainly legally nor-
mative, for it is a fundamental rule of criminal and family law 
and an integral part of our legal system. But it is also certainly 
morally normative, for even were there no legal prohibition 
of father-daughter incest, there would remain "serious social 
pressure" against such relations, springing from our common 
Judaeo-Christian morality. Indeed, one might argue that the 
particular strength of certain rules comes from their multiple 
normativity. Thus, rules prohibiting father-daughter incest are 
perhaps stronger in their social context than rules prohibiting 
insider stock trading, although both rules are legally normative. 
By "strength" I mean only the degree to which a sense of obliga-
tion attaches itself to a particular rule and the degree to which 
deviation from a particular rule will be held blameworthy. The 
stock trader may be sanctioned while the promoter of incest may 
be shunned. So, too, perhaps, if public morality ever develops 
strongly in a direction opposed to pollution of the environment, 
environmental laws may gain in strength. The question would 
seem to be one of degree. 
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Having now arrived at this simple concept of legal norma-
tivity, we may now add the next element: instrumentalism, in-
deed what Professor Summers has called "naive instrumen-
talism."13 Instrumentalism is the doctrine that laws should be 
oriented so as to achieve specific social goals. It is sociological 
teleology. "Naive instrumentalism," as Professor Summers de-
fines it, may be expressed as follows: "We have laws to serve so-
cial goals-communal functions. When officials set a goal and 
pass a law, the idea [is] to achieve, more or less directly, a specific 
end result (goal) by changing the behavior of people. The law 
tells people what to do (provides guidance) and says what will 
happen if they fail (usually some kind of punishment). Thus, 
every effective law brings about social change. And it is officials 
who make the law effective by enforcing it." 14 
This definition of naive instrumentalism clearly will not do 
if the purpose of the definition is to provide a complete descrip-
tion of law or legal system. However, the notion of naive instru-
mentalism can still be quite useful, for it does describe a particu-
lar approach to law and legal rules. 
American legal historians have demonstrated during the past 
decade that the attitudes of many American lawyers, legislators, 
and judges toward the law were highly instrumental. 15 In broad 
perspective, law was seen as a tool, a means, by which com-
merce, industry, and other commonly agreed-upon political and 
social goals could be facilitated. 16 To a large degree, it would ap-
pear that these individuals' attitudes toward law in the nine-
teenth century could easily be characterized as naive instrumen-
talism. Again, in the twentieth century, those individuals who 
used law in implementing the New Deal could easily be charac-
terized as naive instrumentalists. For them law was a primary 
means of effecting "social engineering." In short, one might sug-
gest that a fundamental difference between the attitude of naive 
instrumentalism and the more sophisticated and complex per-
spectives of modern legal philosophers is that the naive instru-
mentalist determines that law, in certain circumstances, may be 
us:d as an instrument of social control, as a means of effecting 
essentially political or economic ends. Obviously, this view of 
law is rather far removed from notions of law either as a system 
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of rules distinct from politics or morality or as a system of rules 
designed to facilitate populist, libertarian, and individualistic 
ends. Similarly, it seems at odds with any notion of law as a set 
of normative rules. On the contrary, it is a view that opponents 
might characterize as elitist. Nevertheless, it is a view that has 
been held by many individuals both earlier in our history and 
today. These people, the "educated laity," as Professor Summers 
calls them, see law as a social and political tool. 17 This view, one 
may argue, is one that is especially defensible today, on the 
grounds that our nation is entering a period of social hetero-
geneity and breakdown of traditional order, thereby requiring a 
reinforcement of "law and order." Indeed, one issue often taken 
with the Hartian, sociological perspective is that it lacks direc-
tion or teleology. It is essentially neutral, removed from politics 
and political goals. 
The great difficulty with the naive instrumentalist view, how-
ever, is that it perceives law to be an instrument of hierarchy, 
imposed upon a populace by its officials. Thus, naive instru-
mentalism hearkens back to the Benthamite and Austinian view 
of law as commands issued by a sovereign and backed by sanc-
tions. 18 One might suggest that this connection between the na-
ive instrumentalist view and the Benthamite "sanction theory" 
of law is not logically necessary or desirable, for the latter pre-
supposes a legal system wherein the costs of enforcement in a 
large, heterogeneous society may well be enormous and require 
the establishment of a state enforcement system that itself re-
quires a substantial portion of a society's resources. 19 In addition 
to these potentially enormous economic costs, there are other 
costs, such as the potential loss of individual privacy and the 
breakdown in trust in the disinterestedness of governmental 
and legal officials. The imposition of rules by authorities upon a 
populace that has not internalized a sense of obligation to obey 
such rules is economically and socially inefficient; if fear of sanc-
tions is the sole or even primary motivation for obedience, then 
this fear must be maintained. Maintenance of such a fear among 
a large population is simply too costly in its use of resources. Put 
differently, a system of imposed rules of behavior lacking the 
backing of a serious social pressure toward obedience simply 
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cannot be effectively maintained at an acceptable cost. Further-
more, .s~ch a system has echoes of totalitarianism and is likely to 
be pohhcally unacceptable in so blatant a form. 
To return to the nineteenth-century instrumentalist develop-
ment of law for a moment, it is necessary to understand the rea-
son why certain social groups were able to shape the law in 
directions that facilitated those groups' nonlegal ends. One can 
posit at least two possible scenarios. The first is that law was, in 
fact, an instrument of repression used by the more powerful ele-
ments in society against other social groups that were incapable 
of defending themselves or shaping the law to their different 
ends. Certainly laws oriented to the detriment of minorities 
such as blacks, would fit within this category. 20 Alternatively, on; 
may see the instrumental nature of the substantive legal changes 
as part of a broader package, including an ideology and frame-
work that made it acceptable to most people, regardless of their 
particular self-interest. In other words, one might suggest that 
the nineteenth-century instrumentalists were successful politi-
cally because they were able to clothe their legal prog1·ams in 
normativity, i.e., convince a substantial portion of the American 
populace that their legal program was what it wanted. 
It is at this point that we may return to the Hartian concept of 
normativity for assistance. Professor Hart notes in his preface to 
The Concept of Law that his study is one of legal sociology. The 
description of normative rule statements that he develops is not 
inductive; rather, it is empirical and based upon a close analysis 
of common, everyday language. Ultimately, norms are not theo-
retical constructs. They are social facts. A normative rule state-
ment is a verbal description of a social fact relating to accepted 
modes of social behavior and social obligations. Thus, the no-
tion of a normative rule statement is quite different from the 
notion of a rule as defined by a sanction theorist. Of course, Pro-
fessor Hart does not expect that all members of a society will 
share the "internal point of view" necessary to the existence of a 
valid norm in relation to all rule statements. Indeed, he avoids 
this absurd proposition by building two qualities into his de-
scription of law: a systematic quality and a hierarchic quality. 21 
He calls the systematic quality the "union of primary and sec-
ondary rules." 22 By this he means that a legal system will not 
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consist solely of normative rule statements giving rise to obliga-
tions but will also contain other types of rules-what he calls 
rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. 23 It is these 
rules-labeled "secondary" by Professor Hart-that give a sys-
tematic quality to law; they establish legal processes and proce-
dures for legal creation and enforcement. The hierarchic quality 
built into Professor Hart's theory of law derives from his belief 
that a group smaller than the whole of society may, in fact, rec-
ognize the normative aspect of rule statements, w~ile th~ .re-
mainder of society will obey such rules for fear of the 1mpos1hon 
of sanctions or similar forms of compulsion. Professor Hart pos-
tulates an extreme case where only the "official" class in society 
shares an internal point.of view towards rules, while all other 
members obey for other reasons. In his view, such a system is 
still a legal/normative system so long as the officials, those who 
must create and enforce legal rules, regard such rules as norms. 
In this extreme case, the normative rule statements are social 
facts within this official class alone. 
It becomes clear that in the extreme case the view of law in so-
ciety espoused by Professor Hart begins to resemble the view of 
law that we have attributed to a "sanction theorist." In Professor 
Hart's extreme case, the official class faces the same dilemma in 
regard to· enforcement costs and political resistance in a large 
and heterogeneous society as would the sovereign in the view of 
the sanction theorist. Professor Hart's theory of normativity, 
however, if not pushed to the extreme case, may provide the 
foundation for deriving a partial solution to the problem of en-
forcement costs and to creating a viable theory of legal instru-
mentalism. To the extent that a legal rule is normative-that is, it 
is backed by serious social pressure and therefore exists as a so-
cial fact within a large segment of society-enforcement costs 
borne by government (or the dominant social group promoting 
the rule) ought to lessen substantially. They should do so be-
cause legal officials (the "sovereigns") cease to be the sole enfor-
cers of the rules. If a normative rule exists within society, then by 
definition, strong social pressure will be exerted by all members 
of the society sharing the internal point of view as to that rule in 
favor of obedience. Such pressure does not ensure that rules 
will always be obeyed, but it does mean that most people will 
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obey such rules most of the time, i.e., they will be law-abidin 
Furthermore, there will be a large segment of society ready~· 
discover deviations from the rule. To the extent that legal rule~ 
can be normative, one ought to see the phenomenon of a self-
enforcement process, which will be less costly from an economic 
perspective though perhaps not less intrusive from a priva 
perspective. 24 The legal system, as a result, will be able to ope?'-
ate more cost-effectively. 
As already noted, however, normativity is a social fact, one 
that arises within society. It cannot simply be imposed by gov-
ernmental fiat. A sovereign or its agents cannot simply declare 
that hencef~rth. a particular rule will be normative and seriously 
expect that 1t will be so. Nevertheless, sovereigns and officials-
those having the power and authority to make and enforce 
law-must recognize the cost efficiency of normative rules and 
attempt to foster normativity and not depend solely on the fear 
of sanctions and deterrence. This, we may suggest, can be ac-
complished in part by shaping the perception of particular sub-
stantive legal rules by members of a society through careful 
attention to the forms of legal discourse and by adopting an 
ideological and explanatory context for the rules designed to 
make them more acceptable, thereby facilitating the process 
of internalization. To return to the nineteenth century, one may 
suggest that the precise reason why legal instrumentalism in 
favor of commercial interests was so successful was because sub-
stantive law changes were presented within a particular style of 
judicial reasoning, which has come to be known since Llewellyn 
as "legal formalism." 25 Substantive tort law changes were not 
baldly pronounced as being for the benefit of the railroads, for 
instance. Rather, the rules were "derived" from "established 
doctrine."
26 
By this means, it became necessary for the populace 
to internalize a belief in the inexorable logic and progress of the 
law in order to give normative value to these substantive 
changes. 
The Modern Instrumentalist 
The legal instrumentalist in the latter part of the 
twentieth century faces a number of problems that our nine-
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th-century predecessors avoided. First, society is infinitely 
teen d · d' · 1 · t't t' f mplex and the legislative an JU lCia 1ns 1 u Ions o :more co , 
· ty have correspondingly grown more complex, larger, and soC1e . h 
:more heterogeneous. And, of cou~se: our society and t e groups 
holding political and legal power In It have grov:n more nurr:er-
d far more heterogeneous. Nevertheless, Instrumentahsm 0 us an . . 
. the sense described above is not impossible 1n the modern 
m t t What has changed radically from the nineteenth- to the con ex. . . . 
twentieth-century contexts, however, IS the relahve ment of at-
tempting to establish hierarchically imposed sets of legal rules 
over an unwilling or disinterested popula~e, as ~ppose~ to. at-
ti.ng to create an environment conducive to Internalization temp . . . 
of desired legal changes. If broad internahzahon of desued rules 
be achieved in a heterogeneous and large society, it would 
can 
1 
· h 
m quite reasonable that the social cost of imp emenhng t ese 
see · 1 · 
legal changes would be f~r lower .t~an any attempt simp y to u~--
ose them on an unwilhng or disinterested group. For one, In ~e latter case compliance costs will be higher t~e larger and 
more complex a society becomes. Second,. as a so~1ety becomes 
more complex, strict enforcement of non1nternahzed rules be-
comes far more difficult, and the level of intrusiveness necessary 
to achieve satisfactory compliance may be deemed by the popu-
lace to be too high to be acceptable. Such a pheno.meno~ cur-
rently plagues tax policymakers confronting co~pha~c~ Issues 
in the industrialized West. 27 To maximize economic efflCien~y ~s 
well as minimize governmental intrusiveness in private. affa.Irs, It 
would seem desirable to employ any method by which Inter-
nalization of legal rules in a large and complex society could be 
facilitated. 
This, of course, raises the question of whether any such effec-
tive method exists. Certainly, heterogeneity is a factor counter to 
the success of any means used to facilitate popular internaliza-
tion of legal rules and the creation of "Hartian" norms. One 
aspect of Professor Hart's Concept of Law that has received to.o 
little attention is the fact that the social model he develops Is 
based, in large part, on mid-twentieth-century England, .on~ of 
the least heterogeneous populations in the West. Internahzaho~ 
of legal rules and the development of norm~ with t~e ~oncomi­
tant creation of serious social pressure agmnst deviatiOn from 
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those norms presupposes a society sharing at least certain fun-
damental ideas and premises. In the United States, for much of 
this century, we have witnessed a growing cultural and social 
heterogeneity as well as the disappearance of many fundamen-
tal, shared concepts. The agony of the Vietnam experience and 
the disillusionment of Watergate and its aftermath have com-
bined to shatter even the most basic concepts to which most 
Americans might once have subscribed. Thus, there is some 
question whether it is possible at all, in our current society, 
to find a means of facilitating widespread internalization and 
norm-creation. Professor Rotunda's study of the development 
and use of the idea of liberalism in American political and legal 
circles in the late nineteenth century and first half of the twen-
tieth century is an attempt to explore this question. 
Instrumentalism and the Study 
of Political/Legal Terms 
The text that precedes this essay contains a case 
study of how one particular political/legal term became integral 
to the American political tradition over time. Its importance lies 
in two areas. First, it is an excellent attempt to examine how, over 
the course of several centuries, the notions of "liberal" and 
"liberalism" took on significant connotative values. Words, gen-
erally, may have both denotative and connotative values. Their 
denotative values are their core meanings. Their connotative val-
ues are more complex. These are the images, the interconnec-
tions with other concepts, the subtleties and shades of meaning 
a particular word may give rise to in the minds of a reader or 
listener. Denotative values change slowly, if at all. Connotative 
values, however, must be understood within particular socio-
historical contexts-must be seen, indeed, as outgrowths of 
those contexts. The connotative values of a particular term are, 
in this sense, normative and are observable social facts. Thus, on 
one level, that of historical inquiry, the preceding case study of 
the changes in the social meanings and impact of the terms "lib-
eral" and "liberalism" is of great significance. It allows us to see 
how a basic political/legal term has had varied connotations dur-
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ing different periods and in different societies, precisely in re-
sponse to those societies' normative beliefs. 28 • • •• 
The second level on which this case study 1s of great signifi-
cance relates to the first two parts of this essay. The notions of 
"liberal" and "liberalism" are not clear-cut in our society. The 
case study might easily have been subtitled "A Study in Ambi-
guity." Nevertheless, these terms have connotations that make 
them fundamentally legitimizing for a significant part of the 
American populace, just as does the term "conservative" for an-
other part. Thus, to label a particular political or legal action as 
liberal, regardless of the true substance of the action, will affect 
how that action is received by different parts of society. To take 
an illustrative example, let us suppose that the Supreme Court 
keeps its promise and next year decides a case turning upon the 
continued validity of the exclusionary rule. Let us also suppose 
that the Court decides effectively to retain the exclusionary rule 
in American jurisprudence. That retention will take place in the 
form of a written opinion, or more likely several opinions. If, in 
the course of writing such an opinion, the author uses liberal 
phraseology and portrays the decision as one falling squarely 
within the liberal American judicial and legal tradition, it seems 
quite inevitable that the linguistic usages in the opinion will in-
fluence the public. Those who hold themselves to be liberals will 
incline toward acceptance. Those who hold themselves opposed 
to liberalism will incline toward rejection of the decision. Of 
course, I do not suggest that labeling the act, in and of itself, will 
legitimize it, but at the very least it will create a presumption of 
legitimacy for those who support-indeed have internalized-
the label. 
Thus, perhaps the core of the Professor Rotunda's study is its 
examination of the way in which the modern notion of liberalism 
was first developed and popularized in this country through the 
writings of Harold Laski and the New Republic staff and how 
Franklin Roosevelt, himself a consummate master of the political 
arena, used this phrase to aid him in attempting precisely the 
form of legal shaping so necessary to New Deal social engineer-
ing. By examining the degree of success or lack of it, one can 
gain insight into how much the instrumentalist approach to law 
can be aided through the use of a carefully chosen linguistic for-
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mat. Thus, the case study becomes, in fact, a historical testin 
ground for the notion that th~ molding of an instrumentalist ap~ 
proach to law, what many might call even an activist approach 
can be facilitated through careful shaping and presentation. ' 
Concluding Remarks 
. One of the most basic questions that even begin-
ning law students always ask is why people obey the pronounce-
ments of legislatures and courts. It is obvious, precisely from 
the growing breakdown in overall respect for law in its various 
forms, that this question cannot be answered simply by saying 
that people obey because they fear sanctions. As noted, to main-
tain an adequate deterrence system is too costly, both econom-
ically and socially. A possible answer is, in the language of nine-
teenth-century contract lawyers, that people obey laws where 
they have come to a meeting of the minds with the laws' pro-
mulgators, when they have internalized the laws to the point 
that they have become normative. This study of political/legal 
language and its use during one of the most legally activist 
periods in American history helps us to understand how lan-
guage can facilitate that internalization. Or to be quite blunt, as 
merchandisers know, public acceptance of a product depends 
as much on the packaging as on the product itself. For law, 
the packaging is the language in which it is conceived, written, 
and explained. 
Notes 
1. Symbols in Politics and Law 
1. Thurmond W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1935). 
2. Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 
196o), p. 76. 
3· See, for example, Kenneth Clark, The Nude: A Study in Ideal Form 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956), pp. 227-28. 
4· Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Ill. : Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 19. See, generally, Schauer, An Essay on 
Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797 (1982). 
5· West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
662 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson, in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943), in the ma-
jority opinion, agreed with Frankfurter's analysis of the importance of 
symbols. See also Justice Cardozo in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 
U.S. 517, 586 (1933) and, generally, Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 
So. CALIF. L. REv. 167 (1981). 
6. "Kennedy Clashes with coRE Chief," New York Times, Decem-
ber 9, 1966, p. 1. 
7· T. H. Williams, Richard N. Current, and Frank Freidel, A History of 
the United States Since 1865 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 197· 
8. Ibid., p. 332. 
9· Thurmond Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1937), pp. 207-208. 
10. Nan Robertson, "Teacher Opposes the Term 'Negro,"' New York 
Times, December 10, 1966, p. 27. 
11. Dean Rusk, et al., The Vietnam Hearings (New York: Random 
House, 1966), pp. 137-38. The quotations cited are taken from Mr. Ken-
nan's testimony. See also Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 
1149 (1981). 
12. Edelman, Symbolic Uses, p. 122. See also Ellen Peters, Reality and 
the Language of Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193, 1196 (1981); M. H. Hoeflich, "The 
112 ·Notes to Pages 7-10 
Speculator in the Governmental Theory of the Early Church" v· .1. . . ' zgzzae Chrzsttanae 34 (1980): 120, 125, 127; Deutsch and Hoeflich, Legal Dut 
Judicial Style: The Meaning of Precedent, 25 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 87 (1g81)~ and 
1.3· See, for example, Stanley L. Payne, The Art of Asking Questions 
(Prmceton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1951). 
14. Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (New York: Stein 
and Day, 1964), pp. 243-44-
15. See, for example, William J. Small, Political Power and the p 
ress (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), p. 204. 
16. Time, November 6, 1972, p. 36. 
17. Army Digest, April1g68. 
18. Cited in Harry Hoijer, "Cultural Implications of Some Navajo Lin~ 
guistics Categories," in Language in Culture and Society, ed. Dell Hymes 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 142. 
19. Ibid. 
20. See Martin Diamond, "The Federalists' View of Federalism," in 
George C. S. Benson, et al., Essays in Federalism (Claremont, Ca.: Insti~ 
tute for Studies in Federalism, 1961), pp. 27-42. 
21. Robert G. McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 168-73. 
22. Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc., 1965), p. 353· 
23. Louis Hartz documents the complete lack of appeal of socialism 
and communism in the United States in his book, The Liberal Tradition in 
America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955). 
24. See, for example, 0. G. Villard, "What Is a Liberal?" Nation, No-
vember 27, 1937; M. Thorpe, "Who, Then Is the Liberal? Justice Rey-
nolds and His Decisions," Saturday Evening Post, March 12, 1938; E. F. 
Goldman and M. Paull, "Liberals on Liberalism: Nine Definitions of 
Liberalism," New Republic, July 22, 1946; "What Is a Liberal?" Time, Feb-
ruary 21, 1949; D. Bendiner, "What Is a Liberal?" Nation, March 26, 1949; 
R. M. Christenson, "What Is a Liberal?" New Republic, July 19, 1948. 
See also Lou Harris, "5% More Call Selves More Liberal," Washington 
Post, November 27, 1972. 
25. By 1978, 42 percent of the respondents in a poll called themselves 
moderately conservative or very conservative. In 1964 only 30 percent 
of the poll respondents put themselves in that category. Adam Clymer, 
"More Conservatives Share 'Liberal' View,". New York Times, Janu-
ary 22, 1978. 
26. Adam B. Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Random 
House, 1960), p. go. 
Notes to Pages 11-15 · 113 
27
. For example, see Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 193~), P~· 3-10; .and Robert A. Taft, 
"What Is a Liberal," Commercial and Fmanctal Chronzcle, May 16, 1946, PP· 
2641, 2668, 2670. . , . 
28. Charles Frankel, "A Liberal Is a Liberal Is a-, New York Tzmes, 
February 28, 1960, sect. 6, p. 21. .. 
29. Quoted in Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Polztzcal 
Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963), P· 271. 
30. Frankel, "A Liberal." 
See "Politics and the Name Game," Time, November 2, 1970. 31. "b 1' "A l ·1 
32. Alan P. Grimes, "Contemporary ~meri~an L1 era tsm, nnua. s OJ 
the American Academy of Political and Soctal Sctences (November 19~2). 33· 
E · L Linn "The Influence of Liberalism and Conservatism on 33. rwm . , . 
Voting Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly 13 (Summer 1949) · 299, 300, 
307, 309· "b 1" " 
34. Grimes, "Contemporary American L1 era~~~, P· 33· 
35 . It's Later Than You Think: The Need for a Mtlttant Democracy (New 
York: Viking Press, 1939), P· 3· .. 
36. "The Pragmatic Course of Liberalism," Western Polztzcal Quarterly 9 
(September 1956): 633. 
37. See L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 
1911)· · · · M'l k · 
38. Thomas P. Neill, The Rise and Declme of Lzberalzsm ( 1 wau ee. 
Bruce Publishing Company, 1953), PP· 279-8o. 
39· Ibid., p. 283. . . G 
40. Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Ltberaltsm, trans. R. . 
Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), P· 156. 
41. Neill, Rise and Decline, pp. 278-79. . . 
42. Herbert Croly, The Promise of Amencan Life, ed. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr. (1gog; reprinted ed., Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1965), P· v. 
43 . "Liberalism and the National Idea," in ~eft, Right, and Center: Es-
says on Liberalism and Conservatism in the Unzted _states, _ed. Robert A. 
Goldwin (Chicago: University of Chicago, Pubhc Affaus Conference 
Center, 1965), P· 143· . 
44. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklm D. 
Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Random House [vols. 
1_ 5], Macmillan Co. [vols. 6-g], Harper & Brothers [vols. 10-12], 
1938-5o). 
45· Beer, "Liberalism," p. 144· . . . 
46. An article count in the Readers' Guide to Perwdzcal Lzterature shows 
114 ·Notes to Pages 15-18 
that in the ten-year period 1890-99 (when 56 periodicals were indexed) 
there was only one article indexed under "Liberalism " In th 1 · e ear y 
!ears of the New Deal, from July 1932 to June 1935, the Readers' Guide 
mdex~d 114 periodicals and reports. Though the number of indexed 
matenals merely doubled-reflecting in part a more intelligent 
. ~~~ 
articulate, and more politically aware public-the number of arti 1 
1. d c es Iste under "Liberalism" increased by forty times. This figure is mad 
more impre.ssive if we remember that this second time period is les: 
than one-third as long as the first time period. 
47· Another index reflecting popular usage and mass vocabulary · 
the New York Times Index. The preface to each volume of the index a:~ 
sure~ us that the headings reflect the popular concerns of that year. A 
head~ng ~ay appear with many articles listed under it one year, and the 
headmg Itself may have disappeared the next year. The results of a 
search through the New York Times Index, from 1913 through 1965, dem-
onstrates that it is not until1922 that the subject heading "Liberalism" is 
even listed in the index. By far the greatest number of articles concerned 
':ith liberalism as a symbol appear in the decade of the 1930s. This ar-
ti:le search shows only the number of times articles referring to liber-
alism were written. What it does not show, and what we will see later, is 
not ~nly t~at there were more articles in the New Deal period than any 
previous hme period, but also that many of these articles were much 
l~nger and more thorough than previously; full-length magazine ar-
ticles suddenly appear in the popular literature of the 1930s discussing 
"liberal" as a political symbol. 
48. Personal communication, October 26, 1966. 
49· Raymond Moley, with the assistance of Elliot A. Rosen, The First 
New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), p. 327n. 
50. Personal communication, December 7, 1966. 
51. Personal communication, November 22, 1966. 
52. R. G. Tugwell, "The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition" West-
ern Political Quarterly 3 (September 1950):420. ' 
53· John T. Flynn, "What Liberalism Means to Me," American Mercury 
67 (August 1948):175. 
54· New York Times, February 23, 1936, sect. 7, p. 3· 
2. The British Analogy 
1. Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc., 1965), p. 357. 
2. See Thomas P. Neill, The Rise and Decline of Liberalism (Milwaukee: 
Notes to Pages 18-22 · 115 
Bruce Publishing Company, 1953), p. 7, and Neill, "Liberalism ... A 
Term of Many Meanings Whose Sense Must Be Defined When Used," 
Social Order 3-4 (October 1954):341. 
3· Neill, "Liberalism," p. 341. 
4· Neill, Rise and Decline, p. 7· 
5· Neill, "Liberalism," p. 341. 
6. Sartori, Democratic Theory, pp. 357-58. 
7· Neill, "Liberalism," p. 341. 
8. Neill, Rise and Decline, p. 94· 
9· Ibid., PP· 94-95· 
1o. J. M. Robertson, The Meaning of Liberalism (London: Kennikat 
Press, 1925), p. 15. 
11. Sir James A. H. Murray, ed., A New English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles, vol. 6 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), p. 238. 
12. Sir William A. Craigie and James R. Hulbert, eds., A Dictionary of 
American English: On Historical Principles, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1942), p. 1417. 
13. See Michael Grant, Roman History from Coins (Cambridge, Eng.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958), for a discussion of Roman use of 
Liberalitas on coins; c£. A. R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and 
Rome (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968). 
14. Neill, Rise and Decline, p. 3· 
15. Hamilton Fyfe, The British Liberal Party (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1928), p. 14. 
16. Murray, vol. 6, p. 238. 
17. The new label "conservative" was also successful because of its 
appeal to those fearful of the violent changes occurring in France. Rob-
ertson, The Meaning of Liberalism, p. 14. 
18. Sir James A. H. Murray, ed., A New English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893), P· 855. 
19. Guido De Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, trans. R. G. 
Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), PP· 128-29. 
20. De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, pp. 93 and 128. 
21. Murray, vol. 6, p. 238. 
22. In 1847 Cockburn wrote: "I have scarcely been able to detect any 
Candidate's address which, if professing Conservatism, does not ex-
plain that this means 'Liberal Conservatism.'" Cited in Murray, vol. 6, 
p. 238. 
23 . In this section I am indebted to the argument developed in 
Ruggiero, European Liberalism, pp. 94-123. 
24. De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, p. 99· 
25. Ibid., p. 102. 
116 ·Notes to Pages 22-28 
26. Ibid., p. 106. 
. 27. John D. Rosenberg, The Darkening Glass: A Portrait of Ruskin's Ge-
mus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 131. 
28. John Ruskin, Unto This Last (New York: John Wiley and Son 
8 ~ 1 75), p. 126. 
29. De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, p. 109. 
}0. Ibid., p. 110. 
31. Ibid., pp. 111-12. 
32. Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization vol 
I • 3 (New York: Viking Press, 1949), pp. 142, 146. 
33· De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, p. 116. 
34· John Dewey, "A Liberal Speaks Out for Liberalism," New York 
Times, February 23, 1936, sect. 7, p. 3· 
35· De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, pp. 133-35. Cf. Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
36. Neill, Rise and Decline, p. 228. 
37· Max Lerner, It's Later Than You Think: The Need for a Militant De-
mocracy (New York: Viking Press, 1939), p. 9· 
38. De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, p. 140. 
39· Neill, Rise and Decline, pp. 234-35. 
40. Neill, "Liberalism," p. 342. 
41. De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, p. 142. 
42. Ibid. 
43· Neill, Rise and Decline, p. 245. 
44· John S. Mill, "A Crisis in My Mental History: One Stage On-
ward," in Victorian Prose, ed. Frederick Roe (New York: Ronald Press, 
1947), pp. 218-35. See, generally, Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism 
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1963). 
45· Quoted in Neill, Rise and Decline, p. 228. This statement does not 
appear in the original1848 edition of Mill's Principles of Political Economy, 
but it does appear in all editions subsequent to 1852. 
46. Quoted in Neill, Rise and Decline, pp. 10-11. 
47· De Ruggiero, European Liberalism, p. 149. 
48. Neill, "Liberalism," pp. 342-43. 
49· Thomas D. Ungs, "Liberal-Conservative: The Sense and Non-
sense of Political Labels," University of Wichita Bulletin (February 
1964):10. 
50. Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," Left, Right, 
and Center: Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States 
ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965): 
p. 147· 
Notes to Pages 29-35 · 117 
51. Quoted in Neill, Rise and Decline, P: 284 .. 
52. Quoted in De Ruggiero, Euro~ean Ltberalzsm, P· 151. 
53. Quoted in Neill, Rise and Declme, p. 291. 
54. Fyfe, British Liberal Party. . . 
55 . John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuaswn (New York. Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., i932), PP· 323-24. 
56. Ibid., p. 325. 
57· Ibid., p. 335· 
58. Ibid., pp. 335, 327, 345· 
3. The United States Background until1932 
1. Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc., 1965), P· 358. . , 
2. Quoted in Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the ~at~onal Ide~, 
Left, Right, and Center: Essays on Liberalism and Conservatzsm m the Umted 
States, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 
1965), p. 144. See also Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak, andJ. Nelson 
Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substam:e and Procedure, vol. 3 (St. 
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1985), sects. 23.19-23.23. 
3· Ibid. . ~ k· 
4. Earle Dudley Ross, The Liberal Republzcan Movement (New or · 
Henry Holt and Company, 1919), P· 28. . .. 
5. See, generally, Norma Peterson, Freedom.and ~ranchzs~: The :olttzcal 
Career of B. Gratz Brown (Columbia, Mo.: Umverstty of Mtssoun Press, 
1965), PP· 174-90. 
6. Ross, Liberal Republican Movement, p. 28. . . . 
7. Thomas s. Barclay, The Liberal Re~ublican .Moveme~t m ~zssourz: 
186s- 1871 (Columbia, Mo.: State Histoncal SoCiety of M1ssoun, 1926), 
pp. 272-73. 
8. Ross, Liberal Republican Movement, pp. 30-31. 
9· Ibid., p. 25. 
10. Ibid., pp. 24-25. . . 
11. Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of Amencan Bwgraphy, vol. 16 (~ew 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), p. 466; Ross, Liberal Republzcan 
Movement, p. 5· 
12. Ross, Liberal Republican Movement, p. 14. 
13. Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
14. New York Times, October 31, 1872, p. 6; November 1, 1872, p. 4; No-
vember 2, 1372, p. 6; November 4, 1872, p. 4; November 5, 1872, P· 4· 
118 ·Notes to Pages 36-41 
15. Peterson, Freedom and Franchise, p. 198. 
16. Richard Allen Gerber, "The Liberal Republican Alliance of 18 ,, (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1967), p. 7. 
72 
17. New York Times, November 4, 1872, p. 4· 
18. Ross, Liberal Republican Movement, p. 16. 
19. T. H. Williams, Richard N. Current, and Frank Freidel, A Histo f 
the United States Since 1865 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1961) p ryo 
' ' . 105 20. Ibid., pp. 105-106. . 
21. Ibid., p. 106. 
. 22. Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Dictionary of American 
Bwgraph~,.vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 533. 
23. Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 106. For an example 
of the political abuse leveled at Horace Greeley see Everett Chamb li 
Th ~~ 
e Struggle of '72 (Chicago: Union Publishing Company, 1372), 
chap. 25. 
24. Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 107. 
2?. C~arles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism (New York: Oxford 
Umvers1ty Press, 1961), p. viii; Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive Era (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 18-20. 
26. Quoted in ibid., p. 153. 
27. Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Co., 1931), P· 575· 
28. Forcey, Crossroads, pp. 152-55· 
29. Charles Forcey, "Intellectuals in Crisis: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann 
a~d the 'New Republic': 1900-1919" (Ph.D. diss., University ofWiscon: 
sm, 1954), p. 510. 
JO. Link, Woodrow Wilson, p. 237. See also Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., 
The Holmes-Laski Letters, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1953), pp. 16 and 33· 
31. Forcey, "Intellectuals," p. 522. 
J2. Ibid., p. 52J. 
33· Ibid., p. 515. 
34· Ibid., pp. 523-28. See also Link, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 24o-41. 
35· Forcey, "Intellectuals," pp. 527-28, m6. 
36. Forcey, Crossroads, p. 255. 
37· Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.). 
38. Alan P. Grimes, "The Pragmatic Course of Liberalism" Western 
Political Quarterly 9 (September 1956):637. ' 
J9· Beer, "Liberalism," p. 147. 
40. June 6, 1921, p. 7· 
41. September 7, 1922, p. 19; November 6, 1922, p. 2. 
42. November 6, 1922, p. 2. 
Notes to Pages 41-47 · 119 
43 . June 23, 1923, p. 11. 
44· December 8, 1924, p. 17. 
45. New York Times, February 17, 1927, p. 20. 
46. New York Times, August 18, 1919, p. 7· 
47. See, generally, Belle Case LaFollette and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. 
Lafollette (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), PP· 996-1014· 
48. New York Times, July 17, 1920, P· 2. 
49· New York Times, July 20, 1920, p. 1. 
50. New York Times, July 17, 1920, p. 2. 
51. Fred Greenbaum, Robert Marion LaFollette (Boston: Twayne Pub-
lishers, 1975), PP· 211-19. 
52. New York Times, February 5, 1920, P· 7· . . . 
53. Samuel H. Church, The Liberal Party in Amenca: Its Prmctples and 
Its Platform (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931), PP· 4-5. 
54· New York Times, February 10, 1930, p. 11. 
55· February 10, 1930, p. 11. . 
56. Thomas P. Neill, "Liberalism ... A T~:m o~ Many Meamngs 
Whose Sense Must be Defined When Used, Soctal Order (October 
1954):344· 
57· New York Times, September 22, 1919, P· 7· 
58. New York Times, September 14, 1919, sect. J, p. 1; August 30, 1922, 
sect. 2, p. 4· 
59· New York Times, February 10, 1930, p. 11. 
6o. New York Times, February 5, 1940, P· 17; April23, 19JO, P· 1. · 
61. Church, Liberal Party, p. 3· 
62. Ibid., p. 21. . . . , 
6J. R. G. Tugwell, "The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition, West-
ern Political Quarterly 3 (September 1950):400; see also James A. Wechs-
ler, The Age of Suspicion (New York: Random House, 1953),. P· 45· 
64. New York Times, November 10, 1923, p. 5· See also N.tchol~s Mur-
ray Butler, The Faith of a Liberal (New York: Charles Scnbner s Sons, 
1924), pp. 6, 14; quoted from an address delivered before the Round 
Table Club, St. Louis, November 9, 1923. 
65. New York Times, November 10, 1923, p. 5· See also Butler, Faith of a 
Liberal, pp. 11-14. 
66. New York Times, September 18, 1925, p. 6. 
67. New York Times, September 21, 1923, P· 4· 
68. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), PP· 40-41. 
69. New York Times, September 18, 1925, p. 6. 
70. Ibid. 
71. New York Times, July 24, 1926, P· 1. 
120 • Notes to Pages 47-53 
72. New York Times, November 23, 1929, p. 23. 
73· April 28, 1922, p. 16. 
74· August 8, 1923, sect. 2, p. 6. 
75· November 25, 1931, p. 20. 
76. September 28, 1924, sect. 2, p. 4· 
77· February 6, 1930, p. 22. 
78. Quoted in Beer, "Liberalism," p. 148, n7. See also B. F. Wright J 
A 5 b 
, r., 
ource ook of American Political Theory (New York: Macmillan c 
) 
0., 1929 I p. 639• 
79· "Text of President Hoover's Address: Kings Mountain Battlefield 
S.C.," New York Times, October 8, 1930, p. 18. ' 
8o. "Hoover in Warning on Red Doctrines," New York Times, Octo-
ber 8, 1930, pp. 1, 18. 
4· The Great Debate: 1932-1940 
1. Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1954), p. 57; T. H. Williams, Richard Current, and Frank 
Freidel, A History of the United States Since 1865 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1961), p. 322. 
2. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), pp. 8o, 81; David Burner, Herbert 
Hoover: A Public Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 153- 54. 
3· Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 57· See also Edgar Robinson and 
Vaughn Bornet, Herbert Hoover, President of the United States (Stanford, 
Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), p. 12. 
4· Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1, pp. 84-87; Williams, Current, 
and Freidel, A History, pp. 408-409. 
5· Finis Parr, F.D.R. (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1972), 
pp. 167-68. 
6. Quoted in Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 4o8. 
7· Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 377; Warren Sloat, 
1929: America Before the Crash (New York: Macmillan Co., 1979), pp. 
220-21. 
8. Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 430; Burner, Herbert 
Hoover, p. 174. 
~- Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 440; Freidel, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, pp. 417-18. 
10. Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover " 
Antioch Review 13 (December 1953):419. ' 
Notes to Pages 53-59· 121 
11. Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought (East Lansing, Mich. : 
Michigan State University Press, 1958), p. 52. 
12. Quoted in Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1, p. 290. See also 
Arthur A. Eirch, Jr., Ideologies and Utopias: The Impact of the New Deal on 
American Thought (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 81-82. 
13. Frank Freidel and Norman Pollack, eds., Builders of American In-
stitutions (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), PP· 457-58. 
14. Elliot A. Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brain Trust (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 297-301. 
15. Tugwell, "The Protagonists," p. 442. 
16. R. G. Tugwell, "The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition," West-
ern Political Quarterly 3 (September 1950):396-97· 
17. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Har-
court, Brace & World, Inc., 1955). Hartz uses the term "liberal" in a very 
specific manner: the philosophy of John Locke. Compare with Jay 
Sigler, The Conservative Tradition in American Thought (New York: Put-
nam, 1969). 
18. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition, p. 262 
19. Tugwell, "The New Deal," p. 400; Thurmond W. Arnold, The 
Symbols of Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), 
pp. 238-89. See also Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak, and J. Nelson 
Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, vol. 2 
(St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1985), sect. 15·3· 
20. Arnold, Symbols, pp. 252-53, 232. 
21. Edgar E. Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt (Stanford, Ca. : Stan-
ford University Press, 1947), P· 4· 
22. Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1952), pp. 41-42. 
23. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, vol. 7, ed. Samuel Rosenman (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1941), p. xxxi. 
24. Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," Left, Right, 
and Center: Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States, ed. 
Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), P· 146. 
25. William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
1932-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 8; 
Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1, pp. 523-25, n3o. 
26. Personal communication, November 22, 1966. 
27. Tugwell, "The New Deal," pp. 391-92. 
28. Personal communication, November 22, 1966. 
29. Personal communication, October 26, 1966. 
122 ·Notes to Pages 59-66 
30. Quoted in Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 54, 282, n6. 
31. See Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1, pp. 277, 520-21, n5. 
32. Personal communication, October 26, 1966. 
33· Daniel Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
the Origins of the New Deal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 
pp. 226-27. 
34· Quoted in Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 211. 
35· Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 35· 
36. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition, p. 262. 
37· Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 54· 
38. Tugwell, "The New Deal," pp. 400-401. 
39· Quoted in Beer, "Liberalism," p. 147. See also Schlesinger, Age of 
Roosevelt, vol. 1, p. 313. 
40. Personal communication, October 26, 1966. 
41. Quoted in Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 45· 
42. "The Excitement of the Hundred Days," in The New Deal and the 
American People, ed. Frank Freidel (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1¢4), p. 5· 
43· Ibid., p. 8. 
44· Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, vol. 2 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 22. 
45· Quoted in New York Times, July 16, 1933, sect. 4, p. 4· 
46. New York Times, December 7, 1933, p. 22. 
47· Texaco Star, March-April, 1933, p. 4· 
48. See Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 2, p. 471. 
49· Ibid., p. 486; V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), p. 189; Denis W. Bro-
gan, The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1950), pp. 197-98. 
50. Burner, Herbert Hoover, pp. 329-30. 
51. Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 2, pp. 487-88. 
52. Ibid., p. 472. 
53· Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1934), pp. 4, 7-8, 6o-61. 
54· New York Times, October 18, 1934, p. 22. 
55· Ibid., October 22, 1934, p. 14. 
56. Ibid., October 25, 1934, p. 22. 
57· Ibid., December 29, 1934, p. 6. 
58. Ibid., October 1, 1934, p. 16. 
S9· Beer, "Liberalism," p. 148. 
6o. P. W. Wilson, "Liberalism Faces a World Challenge," New York 
Times Magazine, March 11, 1934, pp. 10, 20. 
Notes to Pages 68-76 · 123 
61. New York Times, October 1, 1934, p. 3· 
62. Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 2, p. 489. 
63. Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 500. One of the Sen-
ate seats was filled by Harry S. Truman. 
64. Tugwell, "The New Deal," p. 390. 
65. Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, pp. 500, 502. 
66. Raymond Moley, with the assistance of Elliot A. Rosen, The First 
New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), p. 526. 
67. Tugwell, "The New Deal," pp. 399-400. 
68. New York Times, January 6, 1935, sect. 4, p. 1. 
69. Ibid. 
70. Key, Politics, p. 189; Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt, p. 33· 
71. Brogan, Era, p. 199. See also Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt, 
P· 33· 
72. New York Times, April19, 1936, p. 28. 
73· Ibid., March8, 1936, pp. 1, 36. 
74· See Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, p. 110. 
75· John Dewey, "A Liberal Speaks Out for Liberalism," New York 
Times Magazine, February 3, 1936, pp. 3, 24. 
76. New York Times, October 18, 1936, sect. 4, p. 8. 
77· Ibid., March 2, 1936, p. 16. 
78. Ibid., June 8, 1936, p. 14. 
79· Key, Politics, pp. 189-90. 
8o. Moley, The First New Deal, p. 527. Arthur Krock writes that he 
agrees with Moley's explanation; personal communication, December 7, 
1966. 
81. Frank Latham, FDR and the Supreme Court Fight, 1937: A President 
Tries to Reorganize the Federal Judiciary (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 
1972), p. 4; Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 169. 
82. Alpheus T. Mason and William M. Beaney, American Constitutional 
Law (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 221. See, gen-
erally, John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, andJ. Nelson Young, Consti-
tutional Law (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 38-39, 146-50. 
83. Mason and Beaney, American Constitutional Law, p. 222. See also 
Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law (St. Paul: West Publish-
ing Co., 1981), pp. 206-207. 
84. Justice Roberts, in particular, appeared to leave the conservative 
bloc and join the liberal bloc. It was said that he was "the switch in time 
that saved nine." In fact Roberts privately announced his vote in one 
case-West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding a 
state minimum wage law in a 5 to 4 vote-before the Court-packing plan 
124 · Notes to Pages 76-82 
was unveiled, but after the November election returns. See Rotunda 
Modern Constitutional Law, p. 207. ' 
85. Mason and Beaney, American Constitutional Law, p. 223. 
86. New York Times, June 10, 1937, p. 18. 
87. Ibid., October 23, 1937, p. 16. 
88. Ibid., October 26, 1937, p. 22; October 27, 1937, p. 30; October 31, 
1937, sect. 4, p. 9· 
89. Ibid., October 26, 1937, p. 22; October 27, 1937, p. 30. 
90. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 119; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, p. 266. 
91. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 267; New York Times, June 
25, 19)8, pp. 1, 3· 
92. New York Times, September 3, 1938, p. 1. 
93· Quoted in New York Times, June 26, 1938, p. 2. See also Ellis W. 
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 424. 
94· Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 259. 
95· Ibid., p. 269. 
96. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers, vol. 7, pp. xxxi-xxxii. 
97· Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, pp. 119-120; Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., History of U.S. Political Parties, 4 vols. (New York: Chel-
sea House Publishers, 1973), 3:1950. Representative John O'Connor, 
House Rules Committee chairman, was defeated but "mostly for local 
reasons.'' 
98. Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, pp. 513, 515-16, 520. 
99· Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 269, nso. 
100. Ibid., p. 268. 
101. New York Times, November 7, 1938, p. 9; New York Times, Septem-
ber 4, 1938, p. 2. 
102. Ibid., September 25, 1938, p. 3; July 11, 1938, p. 4; September 25, 
1938, sect. 4, p. 9; July J, 1938, sect. 4, p. 9· 
103. Des Moines Register editorial, quoted in New York Times, June 26, 
1938, p. 2; New York Times, July 1, 1938, p. 9; September 28, 1938, p. 6. 
104. For example, during 1938 and 1939, definitions of "conservative" 
began to appear in the New York Times: July 11, 1938, p. 4; September 6, 
1938, p. 1, 3, and editorial p. 20; September 8, 1938, p. 22; September 25, 
19)8, p. J; July 6, 1939, p. 2; July 9, 1952, p. s; July 14, 1939, p. 18; July 16, 
1939, sect. 4, p. 9; July 23, 1939, sect. 4, p. 9· 
105. Williams, Current, and Freidel, A History, p. 520. 
106. New York Times, August 12, 1939, p. 1; Williams, Current, and' 
Freidel, A History, p. 541. 
107. New York Times, July 9, 1939, p. 5· 
Notes to Pages 85-90 · 125 
5· Roosevelt and a National Liberal Party 
1. For example, see Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought (East 
Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1958), pp. 123-24; 
Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 
1933), pp. 10-11. 
2. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 120. 
3· Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1952), p. 464. Much of the remainder of this section is based 
on Rosenman, chap. 24, pp. 463-70. See also James MacGregor Burns, 
Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Inc., 1970), pp. 511-12. 
4· I am indebted to Professor Frank Freidel, who holds this opinion 
and who first suggested to me this argument. 
5· Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1960), p. 448. 
6. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, p. 466. 
7· F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-45, vol. 2, ed. Elliott Roosevelt 
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), p. 1520. Roosevelt had as-
sured Willkie that the meeting would be offthe record. 
8. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, p. 466. 
9· Ibid. 
10. The July 13 letter was published almost verbatim in the New York 
Times of August 12, 1944. 
11. Denis W. Brogan, The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1950), pp. 352-53. 
12. Freidel, America, p. 449· 
13. Brogan, Era of Roosevelt, p. 353· 
6. The Epilogue to the Great Debate 
1. Information about this poll is taken from Thomas P. Neill, The Rise 
and Decline of Liberalism (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1953), 
pp. 3-4, and Robert Bendiner, "Politics and People," Nation 168 
(March 26, 1949):349-50. 
2. Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: 1962), p. 195; 
James W. Prothro, "Verbal Shifts in the American Presidency: A Con-
tent Analysis," American Political Science Review 50 (September 1956):727. 
3· New York Times, June 28, 1963, p. 33· 
4· David McCord Wright, "When You Call Me Conservative, Smile," 
Fortune 43:2 (May 1951):76-77, 192. 
126 ·Notes to Pages 91-99 
5· Robert A. Taft, "What Is a Liberal?" Commercial and Financial Chron-
icle 163:2 (May 16, 1946):2668. 
6. Louis Bromfield, "The Triumph of the Egghead," Freeman 3 (De-
cember 1, 1952):157. 
7· Leon Shull, executive director, ADA, quoted in New York Times 
June 15, 1980, p. 14. ' 
8. New York Times, June 30, 1980, p. 19. 
9· Ibid., October 6, 1981, p. 26. 
10. Ibid., January 22, 1978, p. 1. 
11. Ibid., p. 30. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid., September 20, 1980, p. 19. 
15. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Is Liberalism Dead?" New York Times, 
March 30, 1980, pp. 42, 73· 
16. Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1985, p. 6o; New York Times, Oc-
tober 6, 1981, p. 26; Wall Street Journal, March 8, 1985, p. 48. 
17. Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1985, p. 6o. 
18. Thurmond Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1935), pp. 258- 59· 
19. Ibid. 
20. Quoted in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Mean-
ing (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923), p. xxiv. See James Boyd 
White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions 
of Language, Character, and Community (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), pp. 275-76. 
21. Neill, Rise and Decline, p. 6. See also A. James Gregor, An Introduc-
tion to Metapolitics (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 77: "Language is at 
once a commonplace and a great puzzlement. It is the principal vehicle 
of communication . . . and yet it is a treacherous source of confusion." 
Afterword 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). See also N. MacCormick, 
H. L. A. Hart (London: Clarendon Press, 1981). Also influential in this 
regard are the works of one of Hart's former students, Joseph Raz; see 
The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) 
and The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
2. Eds. P. Hacker and J. Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
3· The Critical Legal Studies Movement founded in the 1970s by 
Notes to Pages 99-103 · 127 
scholars such as Mark Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, and Morton Horwitz 
is now beginning to have a major impact on legal scholarship, though 
not yet to the extent of the "law and economics" movement. See, for 
instance, R. M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REv. 563 (1983), and Note, Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal 
Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1982). The first 
collection of CLS essays has been recently published in D. Kairys, ed., 
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1982); see the review by Sanford Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier 
Said than Done, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466 (1983). 
4· See J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 2d ed. (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954). See also the treatment of the Aus-
tinian sanction theory in Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 18. On Austin in 
general, see W. L. Morison, John Austin (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1982). 
5· See Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 16. 
6. Ibid., p. 112. 
7· Ibid., pp. 55-56, 84. 
8. Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
9· Ibid., pp. 111-13. 
10. Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 85. 
11. Ibid., p. 181. 
12. Ibid., p. 77· 
13. Hacker and Raz, Law, Morality, and Society. 
14. R. S. Summers, "Naiv~ Instrumentalism and the Law," in Law, 
Morality, and Society, eds. P. Hacker and J. Raz, p. 119. 
15. See especially M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 
1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), build-
ing, in part, on the insights of K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradi-
tion-Deciding Appeals (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960). See also M. 
Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery 1810-1860 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1981), and J. W. Hurst, Law and Markets 
in United States History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1982). 
16. See, for instance, the remarks of Professor Tony Freyer in 
T. Freyer, Forums of Order: The Federal Courts and Business in American 
History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 
17. "Naive Instrumentalism," p. 118. 
18. See Austin, Province of Jurisprudence; see also Summers, "Naive In-
strumentalism," p. 131. 
19. On the relationship between enforcement costs and the size of so-
128 ·Notes to Pages 103-109 
ciety, se~ R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Umversity Press, 1982). 
2o. Cf. Tushnet, L~w of Slavery, and the criticism of it by w. A.}. 
Watson~ Slave Law: Hzstory and Ideology, 91 YALE L.J. 1034 (1982). 
21. Ibid., pp. 111-13. 
22. Ibid., p. 77· 
2}. Ibid., pp. 92-94· 
24. Posner, Justice; M. Hoeflich, "Of Reason, Gamesmanshi & 
Taxes," 2 AM. J. TAx PoLICY 1 (1983). p 
25. Llewellyn, Common Law Tradition. 
.26. See, for example, G. E. White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual 
Hzstory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
27. See Hoeflich, "Of Reason." 
2.8. Se.e, for example, D. Graber, Verbal Behavior and Politics (Urbana: 
Umvers1ty of Illinois Press, 1976). 
Index 
Abolitionists, Greeleyites and, 
36 
Adams, Charles Francis, 37 
Afro-American symbol, 6 
Agnew, Spiro, 94; radical liber-
als and, 11 
American Bar Association, 75 
American Construction Coun-
cil, 53 
American Free Trade League, 
34, 35 
Anti-Federalists, 9 
Antitrust: antitrust legislation 
as symbol, 5-6; Clayton Anti-
trust Act, 5; Herbert Hoover 
and, 52; Roosevelt Brain 
Trust, 6o; Thurmond Arnold 
and, 6 
Arnold, Thurmond: antitrust 
laws, 6; copperheads, 79; im-
portance of symbols, 96; sym-
bols, F. D. Roosevelt's need 
for, 55, 56; The Symbols of Gov-
ernment, book by, 79 
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 28, 6o 
Attlee, Clement, 23 
Austinian view of the law, 100, 
103 
Baird, Keith, 6 
Bandwagon effect, 8 
Barlow, Lester, 42 
Beard, Charles, 39, 45 
Beer, Samuel, 15, 66 
Bentham, Jeremy, 22, 26, 98 
Benthamite Radicals, 22-23 
Benthamite view of the law, 100, 
103 
Black, Hugo, 13, 76 
Black power, as symbol, 5 
Bolsheviki, origin of label, 7-8 
Borah, William Edgar, 43 
Bourne, Randolph, 39 
Brandeis, Louis: Herbert 
Hoover and, 52; nomination 
to Supreme Court, 39 
British Liberal party, 88 
Brogan, Denis W., 72, 86 
Brown, B. Gratz, Liberal Repub-
lican party and, 33 
Brownson, Orestes, 32-33 
Bull Moose Progressives, 38, 40, 
71 
Butler, Nicholas Murray, 45, 46, 
49 
Camelot, John F. Kennedy and, 
93 
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir 
Henry, 28, 6o 
Cardozo, Benjamin, importance 
of symbols, 111 
Carlyle, Thomas, 68 
Carter, Jimmy, 94 
Challenge of Liberty, The, book by 
Herbert Hoover, 64 
Church, Samuel H., 43, 44 
Churchill, Winston, 14; compar-
130 ·Index 
ing socialism with liberalism, 
2g 
Civil War, American, g4 
Class-oriented politics, 70, 74, 
So 
Clayton Antitrust Act, 6 
Colby, Bainbridge, 76 
Committee of Forty-eight, 42 
Concept of Law, The, book by 
H. L. A. Hart, gg, 104, 107 
Confederation, g 
Conscription in peacetime, g1 
Conservative: election of 1g36, 
73; origin of symbol in the 
United States, 66; origin of 
term in England, 20-21; rise 
in use of label in England, 
115, 116; rise in use of label in 
United States, 81, g1-g5; as 
symbol, 1o; use of "Liberal 
Conservative" label in En-
gland, 116 
Conservative party: in England, 
26; in New York, 81 
Constitution, U.S.: Federalists, 
g, 10; interpretation by Hamil-
ton, 32; Jefferson's view on 
amending, 77; as symbol, 64. 
See also Court-packing plan; 
Justices, Supreme Court; Su-
preme Court 
Coolidge, Calvin, 52, 53, g3 
Copperheads, 78, 7g 
Court-packing plan, 75-78, So, 
8g 
Crimean War, 25 
Critical Legal Studies Group, 
gg, 127 
Croker, }."'W., 20 
Croly, Herbert, 15, 38, 3g, 40 
Davis, Elmer, 65 
Davis, John W., 65 
Democracy, as symbol, 10 
De Ruggiero, Guido, 21, 22, 24 
Dewey, John, 25, 3g, 63, 73 
Dewey, Thomas E., 84, 85,87 
Dickens, Charles, 68 
DuPont, Pierre, 44 
Early, Stephen, 84 
Economics and law movement, 
gg, 100, 106, 107, 110, 127 
Economists, classical liberalism 
and, 23 
Edelman, Murray, 5 
Eisenhower, Dwight, 11, 8g, go, 
g3 
Election of 1g36, 71-73 
Election of 1g44, 85 
Erwin, Sam, g4 
Exclusionary rule, 1og 
Fair Deal, xi, 8g; as symbol, 17 
Farmer-labor party, 42 
Federalists, g, 10 
Flynn, John T., 16 
Food Administration of World 
War I, 53 
Food stamp program, g2 
Forcey, Charles, 3g, 40 
Ford, Gerald, g4 
Forty-eighters, 42, 44 
Frankel, Charles, 11 
Frankfurter, Felix, 5, 3g; impor-
tance of symbols, 111 
Free trade, 34-37 
.Freidel, Frank B., 86 
George, Henry, 24 
George, Lloyd, 6o 
Gilded Age, 10 
Gillette, Guy, 78 
Gladstone, William Ewart, 24, 
26, 6o 
Glass, Carter, 81 
Goldwater, Barry, 3, 12, go, g2, 
g4 
Gompers, Samuel, Clayton 
Antitrust Act and, 6 
Grant, Ulysses S., 33, 35, 36, 37, 
38 
Great Communicator, g4 
Great Progressive, Herbert 
Hoover as, 58 
Great Society, 3, g3 
Greeley, Horace, 35, 36, 37 
Grimes, Alan P., 13 
Hamilton, Alexander, on inter-
preting the Constitution, 32 
Hamiltonians, g 
Hand, Learned, 3g 
Hanna, Mark, 64 
Harding, Warren G., 52, 53, g3 
Hart, H. L.A., gg, 1oo, 101, 104, 
105 
Hartz, Louis, 55, 6o 
Hitler, Adolph, 76, So 
Hobhouse, L. T., 14, 28, 40 
Holding Company Act, 70 
Hollis-Bulkley farm credits bill, 
3g 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 40 
Honore, A. M., gg 
Hoover, Herbert, 13, 14, 16, 17, 
50, 51, 88, go; Alfred Landon 
and, 71-72; compared with 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 53-54; 
election of 1g36, 73; fight to 
capture liberal label, 4; Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's admiration 
of, 52; "Great Progressive," 
Index· 131 
58; as liberal, 10-11, 65, 66; 
Liberty League and, 64; Louis 
Brandeis and, 52; philosophy 
of, 52-53; political poll, 82; as 
progressive, 52, 58, 74; Theo-
dore Roosevelt and, 52 
Hopi Indians, language pat-
terns, g 
Hopkins, E. Martin, 46 
House, Edward, 3g 
Hughes, Charles Evans, 3g, 40 
Humphrey, Hubert, Vietnam 
War and, g4 
Hundred Days, the, 62, 6g 
Individualism, as symbol in the 
United States, 55, 62, 68 
Instrumentalism, legal, 102, 104, 
106, 110 
Iranian hostage crisis, g4 
Italy, liberalismo, 18 
Jackson, Robert H., importance 
of symbols, 111 
Jefferson, Thomas, 68; views on 
amending the Constitution, 
77 
Jeffersonians, 40 
Johnson, Lyndon, 3; Great So-
ciety, g3; Vietnam War, g4 
Judaeo-Christian morality, 101 
Justices, Supreme Court: Black, 
Hugo, 13, 76; Brandeis, 
Louis, 3g, 52; Cardozo, Ben-
jamin, 111; Court-packing 
plan, 75-78, So, 8g; Frank-
furter, Felix, 5, 2g, 111; 
Holm~s, Oliver Wendell, 40; 
Hughes, Charles Evans, 39, 
40; Jackson, Robert H., 111 
132 ·Index 
Kennan, George, 7 
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 12, 
93; tax cuts, 95 
Kennedy, Robert, 94 
Keynes, John Maynard: eco-
nomic program, 30; Frank-
linD. Roosevelt and, 61; lack 
of understanding of FDR, 61; 
Liberal party and, 29 
Kiplinger, Willard, 63 
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 95 
Kissinger, Henry, 95 
Knowland, William, 11 
Krock, Arthur, 16; defining lib-
eralism, 70-71 
Ku Klux Klan, 77 
Labor party: of 1920, 42; of 1930, 
43 
Labour party, 23, 29 
LaFollette, Robert, 13, 42, 43, 58 
Lame duck, as symbol, xi 
Landon, Alfred, 71 
Laski, Harold, 18, 109 
Lasswell, Harold, 7 
Law, Morality, and Society, fest-
schrift of H. L. A. Hart, 99 
Law, theories of, 100, 101, 105 
Law and economics movement, 
99, 100, 106, 107, 110, 127 
Law of rent, 23_-24 
League of Nations, 66 
Legal formalism, 106 
Legal historians, 102 
Legal instrumentalists, 102, 104, 
106, 111 
Legal philosophers, 68, 100-103 
Lenin, V,).: Bolsheviki, 7; Men-
sheviki, 8; Unification Con-
gress, 7 
Leuchtenberg, William, 79 
Liberal: Arthur Krock and, 70-
71; as defined in political 
polls, 11-12, 82; Hoover and 
effort to capture liberal label 
4; John Stuart Mill and, 26-' 
27, 68; as label for liberal con-
servatives, 116; as label on the 
Continent, 18; origin of, as 
FDR symbol, 59· See also New 
Republic magazine; Roosevelt, 
Franklin D. 
Liberal Civic League of Massa-
chusetts, 42 
Liberal Democrats, Horace 
Greeley and, 36 
Liberales, of Spain, 18 
Liberal Immigration League, 42 
Liberalism: of France, 18; of 
Italy, 18; John Dewey and, 73 
Liberalism, classical: economic 
liberals, 23; in England, 22-
25, 67; radical liberals, 22; reli-
gious nonconformity, 24-25; 
toleration, 68; welfare liber-
alism, 23, 27, 28, 67 
Liberalitas, Roman government, 
20 
Liberal League, formation of, 
48-49 
Liberal League of Mid-West Col-
leges, 41 
Liberal League of Negro Ameri-
cans, 41 
Liberal party: English, 14, 21, 
25, 29, 30, 50, 6o; formation of 
in 1919 in United States, 42; 
Roosevelt's efforts to form na-
tional liberal party, 84-87. See 
also Liberal Republican party 
Liberal Republican League of 
Massachusetts, 41 
Liberal Republican party: Carl 
Schurz and, 34; Horace 
Greeley and, 35-37, 38; Lib-
eral party in England and, 37; 
Liberal Republicans of 1872, 
6o; Massachusetts Liberal Re-
publican League, 41; U. S. 
Grant and, 33, 34,37 
Libertarians, 95; as new conser-
vatives, 11 
Liberty League, 73; compared 
with Liberty and Property 
Defense League, 28; forma-
tion of, 64 
Liberty of contract, as symbol in 
the United States, 56 
Lincoln, Abraham, 68, 72, 79 
Lippmann, Walter, 38, 39, 40 
Llewellyn, Karl, 106 
Looking Forward, book by Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt, 63 
Macaulay, Thomas Babington, 19 
Magna Carta: Clayton Antitrust 
Act compared to, 6; English, 
19 
Malthus, Thomas Robert, 23 
Manchester economics, 40, 42 
Manchester liberals, 27, 28 
Mankiewicz, Frank, 95 
Marx, Karl, 55; Nicholas Murray 
Butler and, 45 
Massachusetts Liberal Civic 
League, 42 
Massachusetts Liberal Republi-
can League, 41 
McCarthy, Eugene, 94 
McClurg, Governor, 35 
McCormick, Anne O'Hare, 62 
McElvaine, Robert, 93 
McGovern, George, 95 
McKinley, William, 64 
McKissick, Floyd, 5 
McNutt, Paul, 82 
Index· 133 
Menshiviki, origin of label, 7 
Midterm elections of 1934, 68 
Mill, John Stuart, 26-27, 68 
Maley, Raymond, 59, 6o, 61, 62, 
69, 74; first use of "liberal" 
symbol, 16; speechwriter, 15 
Mondale, Walter F., 4 
Morris, William, 23 
Mussolini, Benito, 47 
Naive instrumentalism, 102, 104 
National health insurance, 91, 
92 
Neill, Thomas P., 14, 18, 20, 28, 
97 
New Deal, xi, 4; birth of the 
"liberal" symbol, 14; as sym-
bol, 58 
New ~ederalism, xi 
New Freedom, as symbol, 17 
New Frontier, as symbol, 17 
New Liberalism, of Hobhouse, 
14 
New Opportunity, xi 
New Republic magazine, 15, 50, 
88, 109; connotations of classi-
cal liberalism, 42; early cir-
culation, 39; formation of, 38; 
Hoover-for-President cam-
paign, 52; influence on F. D. 
Roosevelt, 59; liberal label, 
first use of, 39-40; in the 
198o's, 95; nomination of 
Louis Brandeis, 39; search for 
political label, 6o 
Newspeak, George Orwell and, 4 
Nixon, Richard, 94 
Non-Partisan League, 42 
Normalcy, as symbol, 17 
Normativity, 100, 101, 104, 105, 
106 
134 o Index 
O'Connell, Daniel, 19 
Office of Price Administration, 91 
Orwell, George, 4 
Peacetime draft, 91 
Philosophes, 1S 
Pinchot, Gifford, S4 
Poincare, Raymond, 97 
Political polls, 11-12, S2, 92-93, 
112-113 
Progressives: Bull Moose Pro-
gressives, 3S, 40, 71; Roose-
velt, F. D., differences with, 
6S; as symbol, 5S; Woodrow 
Wilson and, 40. See also 
Hoover, Herbert; LaFollette, 
Robert; New Republic 
magazine 
Prohibition, 42, 43, 44 
Promise of American Life, The, 
book by Herbert Croly, 15 
Pro-slavery men, Greeleyites 
and, 36 
Prothro, James W., Sg 
Purge, as symbol, So 
Purges of 193S, 7S-S2, S4, S5, 97 
Radical Republicans, opposed 
to Liberal Republicans, 35 
Reagan, Ronald, 3, 94, 95 
Recession of 1937, So 
Reform Bill of 1S32, 19 
Religious Nonconformity, Brit-
ish liberalism and, 24-25 
Revolution of 1S4S, 34 
Ribicoff, Abraham, 5 
Ricardo, David, 23, 24 
Roman government, ancient, 4, 
20 '"' 
Roosevelt, Elliott, S1 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., xi, 4, 10, 
13, 16, 17, so; admiration of 
Herbert Hoover, 52; Alfred 
Landon, 71; American Con-
struction Council, 53; British 
Liberal party and, SS; budget 
cutting, 62; class-oriented 
politics, 70, 74, So; compared 
with Herbert Hoover, 53_ 54; 
conservative British press and 
the New Deal, 6S; Court-
packing plan, 74-7S, So, Sg; 
early use of liberal-conser-
vative dichotomy, 59; efforts 
to attract Republican voters, 
57; experimentation of, 39, 53, 
63, SS, 96; government econ-
omy, 53; as governor, 57; John 
Maynard Keynes and, 61; 
Looking Forward, book by, 63; 
midterm elections, 6g; na-
tional liberal party, S4-S7; 
New Deal as symbol, 5S; New 
Republic, influence on, 40; op-
position to business, 70; po-
litical polls, S2-S3; progres-
sives, differences with, 6S; 
public papers of, 15; purge of 
193S, 7S-S2, S4, S5, 97; re-
pudiation of communism, 
72-73; Ronald Reagan and, 
94; Second New Deal, 6g; se-
cret letter to Wendell Willkie, 
S6; symbols, need for, 54, s6; 
as vice-president, 56; Wendell 
Willkie and, S4-S7 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 15, 3S, 43, 
93; Herbert Hoover and, 52; 
New Nationalism and, 39; 
progressive leader, 58 
Rosenburg, John D., 23 
Rosenman, Samuel, 57, 84, S5, 
S6 
Ruskin, John, 23 
Safire, William, xi 
Sanctions and law, 110 
Sanction theory of law, 103, 105, 
110 
Santayana, George, 39 
Sapir, Edward, 9 
Sartori, Giovanni, 10, 1S 
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 62, 
6g, 94; on Hoover's The Chal-
lenge of Liberty, 64 
Schurz, Carl, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 
Secessionists, 37 
Second New Deal, 6g, 74 
Sexual stereotyping, symbols 
and,S-9 
Sloan, Alfred P., 64 
Smith, Adam, 23, 61, 67 
Smith, Alfred E., 47, 50 
Spain, liberals of, 18 
Spencer, Herbert, 27, 2S, 31, 59 
Suffrage, 19, 26 
Summers, R. S., 99, 102, 103 
Supreme Court: Court-packing 
plan, 75-7S, So, Sg; nomina-
tion of Louis Brandeis, 39; as 
symbol, 75-76; use of sym-
bols in legal opinions of, 109 
Symbols: bandwagon effect, S; 
connotative values, 10S; de-
notative values, 10S; generat-
ing authority, 4, 10S; generat-
ing loyalty, 5, 7, 110; giving 
appearance of action, 5, 16; as 
hidden persuaders, gS; in-
strumentalist approach to law, 
110; legitimizing function, 4, 
1oS; loyalty, 5, 7, 110; molding 
thought, 7, g, 97; reflecting 
thought, 7, 15; used to create 
cross pressures, 12-13, 56-
57' S7, g6 
Symbols of Government, The, 
Index o 135 
book by Thurmond Arnold, 
79 
Taft, Robert A., 10, go; as lib-
eral, 3, 10-11 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 94 
Thomas, Norman, 47 
Tories, 72; British, 2S, 32; derog-
atory use of "liberal" symbol, 
20; origin of "conservative" la-
bel, 20- 21; as symbol in the 
United States, 55 
True Republican party: of Mis-
souri, 33, 35; of Virginia, 34 
Truman, Harry S., S4, 91, 93 
Tsongas, Paul E., 92, 95 
Tugwell, Rexford G., 16, 61, 6g, 
70; commenting on Nicholas 
Murray Butler, 45; origin of 
"liberal" symbol, 59; "pro-
gressive" as symbol, 5S; rec-
ognition of F. D. Roosevelt's 
need for symbol, 54-55; view 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 54; 
view of Herbert Hoover, 53, 
54 
Tully, Grace, S6 
Ulam, Adam, 10 
Union Leaguers, 36 
Unions, British, 26 
Unto This Last, book by John 
Ruskin, 23 
Utilitarianism, book by J. S. Mill, 
26 
Vietnam War, S, 92, 94, 10S; use 
of symbols in, S 
Von Hoffman, Nicholas, 95 
Wagner Act, 70 
Wallace, Henry Agard, 66 
136 ·Index 
War on Poverty, 93 
Watergate, 94, 108 
Wells, David A., 34 
Weyl, Walter, 38, 39, 40 
Wheeler, Burton K., 76 
Whig party: accepting label of 
"liberal," 20; Liberal Republi-
can party and, 34; Reform Bill 
of 1832, 19 
White, William Allen, 46, 47 
Whitman, Walt, 68 
Whorf, Benjamin, 9 
Williams, Aubrey, 82 
Willkie, Wendell: death of, 86; 
election of 1944, 84; secret 
letter from FDR, 86; secret 
meeting with FDR, 85-86; 
value of possible endorse-
ment to FDR, 87 
Wilson, P. W., 66-68 
Wilson, Woodrow, 93; New Na-
tionalism and, 39; New Re-
public and, 38-39; progressive 
label and use of, 40 
